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Chapter I
Introduction
1 Overview
This dissertation analyzes the impact of informed trading on the efficiency of financial
markets. I refer to the informed traders as the investors who have a temporary in-
formational advantage over other market participants. They obtain this informational
advantage, because they either have some private information or they are able to cor-
rectly process new public information more quickly than other investors in the mar-
ket. The term “market efficiency” relates to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) of
Fama (1965). The EMH states that at any point in time security prices should incorporate
all public and private information available to market participants. Specifically, the EMH
assumes that all investors are fully informed and agree on the same fundamental value
for a stock. All transactions take place at this fundamental value, which is only revised
subsequently to arrivals of the new information.
The presence of the informed traders introduces a friction in the EMH setup, because
the informed investors know some information that is not available, at least temporarily,
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to other investors in the market. The informed investors usually use their temporary ad-
vantage to trade with the uninformed investors and extract profit from these transactions.
The implications of informed trading for the market efficiency are twofold. With each
trade, informed investors disclose a part of their private information, because market
participants can infer the direction of their trades.1 As the private information is disclosed
over time, the prices become informationally more efficient and approach the fundamental
value of the stock. However, this positive effect of informed trading can be outweighed
by its negative impact on the incentives of other investors to participate in the trading
process. Market makers, who act as dealers and post their quotes to buy and sell the
stock, realize the risk of trading against an informed investor and demand additional
compensation for the losses they incur from these transactions. Specifically, they set their
quote to buy (the bid quote) lower and their quote to sell (the ask quote) higher, which
increases the bid-ask spread for the roundtrip transaction. A higher bid-ask spread pushes
the transaction price away from its fundamental value and makes the uninformed investors
more reluctant to participate. In the extreme case, they might completely withdraw from
the market, after which the trading process might temporarily freeze out.
This dissertation contributes to the on-going discussion about the role of informed
trading in the formation of efficient security prices. In Chapter II, I examine the pre-
announcement periods with the temporary increases in informed trading. The findings
suggest that the market can detect the temporary changes in the information environ-
ment of a stock in these periods with the standard measures of information asymmetry.
In Chapter III, I analyze how the increases in trading aggressiveness by informed and
uninformed traders after earnings announcement releases impact the speed of price ad-
justment to its new equilibrium level. I find that an increased use of aggressive orders
1Although the trading process is anonymous, market participants can still observe the total order flow
and calculate the imbalance between the buy-initiated and sell-initiated transactions.
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slows down the adjustment process, especially in the situations when the majority of ag-
gressive orders are submitted by uninformed traders. Chapter IV investigates different
reasons for the current practice of corporate insiders who represent a group of potentially
informed investors to spread their trades over time. The findings suggest that the ma-
jority of insider trades are not information-related and that insiders time liquidity of the
market.
Next, I provide an introduction to the market microstructure approach of price for-
mation in current financial markets, which is followed by the synopsis of main results.
The detailed discussion of the relevant literature is relegated to the respective Chapters II
to IV.
2 Price Formation in Financial Markets
An informationally efficient price is useful for the broad categories of market agents. In-
vestors are interested in efficient prices, because they care about returns on their financial
investments. Market regulators are interested in fully functioning financial markets, be-
cause they would like to ensure a level playing field for all participants. Trading exchanges
also care for accurate and transparent prices to remain competitive in attracting order
flow from the uninformed investors. Corporate decision makers are interested in reference
stock prices when they take their investment decisions or managerial compensation deci-
sions. An accurate stock price is also relevant for capital budgeting decisions of the firms,
such as new equity issues or share repurchases.
This section explains how prices are formed in current financial markets and how
the new information is impounded into the prices. Recall that in the EMH setup all
transactions take place at the same price that is immediately revised after the arrival of
9
the new information. This price corresponds to the Walrasian market-clearing price and is
set by an invisible auctioneer who matches supply and demand. The implicit assumption
here is that demand always equals supply, such that the market-clearing price always
exists.
One major difference between the EMH setup and the real world is that demand
does not necessarily equal supply in each time interval. Some traders are impatient and
prefer to buy or sell immediately, whereas others can wait and are able to postpone their
trades. Suppose you are an impatient buyer, but you cannot find a counterparty for your
transaction, because demand temporarily exceeds supply. What can you do? Certainly,
you can wait until more sellers arrive to the market. Another solution to your problem is
to pay a higher price to convince sellers to sell instantly. Thus, in addition to a standard
security price, you also incur an immediacy cost.
The market microstructure literature refers to impatient traders as liquidity demanders
and to patient traders as liquidity suppliers. Liquidity demanders bear transaction costs
in exchange for being able to trade immediately. Liquidity suppliers require compensation
in the form of transaction costs in exchange for posting quotes and quantities, at which
liquidity demanders’ orders can be executed.
Markets are either organized as dealer markets or as limit order markets. In a dealer
market, only market makers (dealers) can assume the role of a liquidity supplier. They
post bid quotes at which they stand ready to buy immediately, and ask quotes at which
they stand ready to sell immediately. The difference between the bid price and the ask
price is called the bid-ask spread and represents the dealer’s compensation for the order
processing costs, the incurred inventory risks and the adverse selection risk of trading
against an informed investor. The market maker normally revises his quotes after each
transaction. After a series of buy orders, he revises the ask price upwards, because these
10
buy orders might come from the informed traders with private information. Similarly,
he revises the bid price downwards after a series of sell orders. Therefore, even in the
absence of the information arrivals, the prices fluctuate over time and might deviate from
the fundamental stock value.
In limit order markets, any investor can be either a liquidity demander, or a liquidity
supplier. Liquidity demanders submit the market orders that set the amount of shares
to be purchased or sold (the size of the order). They are executed at the best available
quote, but, as in the dealer markets, liquidity demanders incur immediacy costs. Liquidity
suppliers submit the limit orders that set not only the order size, but also the limit price,
above (below) which the limit buy (sell) order will not be executed. If the limit price is
non-binding, the order is immediately executed. Otherwise, it is added to the limit order
book that represents the collection of all outstanding limit orders. A limit order remains
in the limit order book until it is either exercised against an incoming market order, or
canceled.
Figure I.1 presents an example of a limit order book. The first column shows the
currently quoted prices and the second column indicates the number of shares available
at each price (the depth of the book at each price). The upper part of the limit order
book displays ask prices at which liquidity demanders can instantly buy the corresponding
amount of shares. The best ask price is $10.73 with 200 shares available at this price. The
lower part of the book displays the bid prices at which liquidity demanders can instantly
sell their shares. The best bid price is $10.70. However, a liquidity demander could only
sell 300 shares at this price. The bid-ask spread is the difference between the best bid
and the best ask price, and equals $0.03.
Suppose a market buy order for 400 shares arrives at the market. At which price
will it be exercised? The limit order book is organized as a discriminatory auction, which
11
Figure I.1: Limit Order Book
Price Shares
ask side
$10.76 1,000
$10.75 500
$10.73 200
bid side
$10.70 300
$10.67 600
$10.66 1,200
means that a market order can be split, and each portion of it can be exercised at different
prices. In our example, the first 200 shares of the market buy order exercise at the best
ask price of $10.73, and the remaining 200 shares go up the limit order book and exercise
at $10.75. After this order is executed, the best ask price increases to $10.75, and the
amount of shares available at this price decreases to 300 (500 - 200). Each point in time
new market and limit orders arrive at the market, and the best prices change subsequent
to the exercises of market orders or the arrivals of new limit orders.
After the new information is released to the market, market participants update their
beliefs about the fundamental value of a stock. In the EMH setup, this update is im-
mediate, and the new information is already incorporated into prices before any investor
can trade on it. In contrast with the theory, prior empirical studies document abnormal
trading volumes and abnormal volatility after information releases, which indicates that
price adjustment does not happen immediately.2
Importantly, even though investors have access to the same public information, they
still may not reach the consensus about the fundamental value of the stock. On the
one hand, some investors, such as market professionals, can process the same public
information quicker than unsophisticated retail investors. For instance, Barber and
2Bamber, Barron, and Stevens (2011) provide an extensive literature review on the trading volume
around corporate information releases.
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Odean (2008) and Corwin and Coughenour (2008) argue that the attention of investors
is limited and, therefore, they can pay different amounts of attention to different stocks
in their portfolios. On the other hand, even after the information has been processed,
investors might reach different conclusions about the implications of this new information
for the stock price due to their heterogeneous beliefs about the future development of the
stock price. As the trading process evolves and investors update their beliefs, we observe
a continuous trading process, and the price gradually adjusts towards its new equilibrium
value.
To sum up, transaction prices can deviate from the fundamental value of a stock in
current financial markets. They deviate more after information releases when not everyone
has processed new information yet, and they fluctuate around the fundamental value as
soon as investors reach the consensus about the new value of the stock. This dissertation
analyzes the role of the informed traders in this price discovery process and examines
whether and how informed trading contributes to the formation of efficient security prices.
3 Outline of the Thesis
Chapter II examines whether the market is able to detect the temporary increases in in-
formed trading with the standard measures of information asymmetry. I use the periods
before tender offer announcements and the first rumors about bankruptcy filings to iden-
tify the temporary increases in informed trading. Prior studies by Agrawal and Nasser
(2010), Seyhun and Bradley (1997) and Iqbal and Shetty (2002) show that corporate in-
siders who represent a group of potential informed traders act on their private information
in these periods. I find that the market can detect changes in the information environment
of a stock up to six months before a tender offer announcement and up to nine months
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before the first rumors of the bankruptcy filing. Surprisingly, I find that simple measures
of information asymmetry - the relative spread, the Amihud measure and the intraday
price impact - consistently outperform more complex measures, specifically constructed
to measure “pure” information asymmetry, such as the adverse selection component of the
spread and the order imbalance measures.
Chapter III investigates the influence of an increase in investors’ trading aggressiveness
on the speed of price adjustment after an earnings announcement release. Subsequent to
the news release, those traders who can process the new information faster try to ex-
ploit their advantage and switch to the most aggressive order type, an intermarket sweep
order (ISO). ISOs allow for the quickest possible execution, but potentially at the transac-
tion price inferior to the NBBO (National Best Bid and Offer). However, the uninformed
investors might also trade more aggressively because of the decrease in liquidity supply
around earnings announcements. Chakravarty et al (2011a) provide empirical evidence in
support of the latter explanation.
The implications of abnormal trading aggressiveness on the speed of price adjustment
after an information release are twofold. An increase in trading aggressiveness allows for
quicker price changes within a given time interval. Quicker price changes can be benefi-
cial, if the majority of aggressive orders are submitted by informed investors and push the
price in the direction of its new equilibrium level. However, abnormal trading aggressive-
ness can also slow down the adjustment process if aggressive orders are mostly used by
uninformed investors with heterogeneous beliefs. In this case, quick price changes in dif-
ferent directions just increase intraday volatility and the probability of price overshooting.
Empirical findings of my study suggest that the latter negative effect dominates, and it is
especially harmful for illiquid stocks. Importantly, adjustment times of these stocks have
even increased compared to the period before aggressive ISO orders became available.
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Chapter IV analyzes trading strategies of corporate insiders and is a joint work with
Ernst Maug and Christoph Schneider. We investigate how and why insiders spread their
trades over time in current financial markets. One explanation, which takes its roots in
Kyle (1985), is that insiders split their trades to optimally exploit their private informa-
tion. The second explanation, based on more recent theories of Bertsimas and Lo (1998)
and Vayanos (1999, 2001), is that insiders trade for pure liquidity reasons and spread their
trades over time to minimize the temporary price impact. We consider situations when
multiple insiders are trading in the same direction and find evidence in support of both
explanations. Importantly, we find that the vast majority of insider trades (more than
85%) are liqudity-based. Further, insiders time liquidity and exercise a larger portion of
their trades on days when liquidity is higher. Overall, our evidence suggests that most
of insider trading nowadays is not information-related and can hardly be perceived as
detrimental to the efficiency of financial markets.
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Chapter II
Measuring and Monitoring
Time-Varying Information Asymmetry
1 Introduction
In the recent past, the most striking example of information asymmetry between informed
and uninformed investors was, probably, Enron’s bankruptcy case. For more than a
year before Enron filed for Chapter 11 on December 2, 2001, its top executives started
to dispose of their holdings at the share’s highest price of $90, while at the same time
encouraging uninformed investors to keep buying the stock. After the successful unloading
of the insiders’ shares, the stock price started to decrease gradually. It abruptly fell below
one dollar on November 28, 2001 when the news about millions of dollars in losses became
public.1
Was the abnormal increase in the informed trading of the Enron stock before the of-
ficial news reached the market possible to detect? Motivated by this question, I examine
whether standard measures of information asymmetry can detect temporary increases in
1As described by McLean and Elkind (2003) in their book “Smartest Guys in the Room: the Amazing
Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron”.
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the informed trading prior to unexpected events, such as tender offer announcements and
crashes in stock returns that are followed by a subsequent bankruptcy filing. The em-
pirical findings of this paper suggest that the simple measures of the relative spread, the
intraday price impact, as well as the Amihud measure show significant positive deviations
from their base level at least six months before the corresponding event. Moreover, the
monitoring of the time-varying information asymmetry with the above measures can help
risk-averse uninformed investors better time the volatility of their portfolios. Overall,
these investors should avoid investing in the stocks with the highest increases in informa-
tion asymmetry during the previous three months, because the portfolios of these stocks
exhibit consistently lower Sharpe ratios.
The first main assumption of this study is that two groups of investors exist in the
market: those “informed”, who possess material non-public information about a firm, and
those “uninformed”, who represent liquidity traders.2 The second main assumption is that
the informed investors act on their information by submitting buy or sell orders. Thus,
the informed investors partially disclose their information through their trades that cause
higher permanent price changes, compared to the trades of the uninformed investors.3
The information asymmetry between the informed and uninformed investors varies
over time as their information sets about the fundamentals of a company change. It in-
creases temporarily with the arrival of new private information about the operational or
strategic activities of the company and decreases when at least some of this information is
made public. The most suitable setup to test the validity of the time-varying information
asymmetry measures are the periods with large differences in the company’s valuation be-
2Note that “informed” investors include not only the management of a company and other insiders,
but also people who are potentially informed through them (e.g., family, friends, brokers etc.)
3Importantly, if none of the informed investors uses his or her information to trade on the market, the
price does not adjust until after the information becomes public. Therefore, the time-varying information
asymmetry is only measurable in cases where informed investors actively trade on the market. Since
there are several informed investors for one firm, it is reasonable to assume that at least some of them
trade on their private information.
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tween informed and uninformed investors. Arguably, these differences attain their highest
value prior to unexpected corporate announcements that produce large impacts on the
stock price.4 This setup does not use any benchmark measure but rather directly looks at
the changes in the information asymmetry within a firm. Since informed investors would
like to take advantage of their private information, they intensify their trading in these
periods and the information environment of a stock gradually changes. A valid measure
should then detect this temporary change in the information environment of the stock
through the abnormal deviation from its base level.
In this paper, I use periods that precede tender offer announcements and crashes in
stock returns that are followed by bankruptcy filings to proxy for times of temporarily
high information asymmetry. As opposed to regular corporate information releases, such
as earnings announcements, these events are not scheduled and are not expected by the
market. Further, these events result in a strong price reaction that represents price
adjustment towards the stock’s new fundamental value, previously known only to the
informed investors.
Before a firm publicly announces a tender offer, only a very limited circle of insiders
has access to the private information about an upcoming event. Despite the documented
evidence on the takeover rumors and the runups of pre-bid target stock prices, a tender
offer is mostly unexpected by the market.5 Further, Agrawal and Nasser (2010) show
that corporate insiders act on their information by increasing their net purchases of the
stock of a target company in the six months preceding the announcement of a tender
offer. As opposed to tender offers, some bankruptcy filings are anticipated by the market
4Several prior studies make an assumption about a temporary increase in information asymmetry
between informed and uninformed investors before the release of a corporate announcement. A non-
exhaustive list of such studies includes Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1992), Aﬄeck-Graves, Callahan,
and Chipalkatti (2002), Vandelanoite (2002), Serednyakov (2002), Aktas et al (2007), and Tetlock (2010).
5Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) examine the link between takeover rumors and target stock prices and
find that takeover rumors predict a final takeover bid less than half the time.
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long in advance. Thus, they do not represent unexpected news to the market and do not
cause large changes in the stock price. For this reason, this paper analyzes the information
asymmetry measures only in the period preceding first rumors of an upcoming bankruptcy,
represented by the first crash in the stock’s returns. Similar to periods preceding tender
offer announcements, corporate insiders engage in profitable trading of their shares prior
to bankruptcy announcements. They increase their sales significantly not only prior to
the actual bankruptcy filing date (Seyhun and Bradley, 1997), but also before the market
starts expecting the bankruptcy filing (Iqbal and Shetty, 2002).
The major difference between the two setups is the duration of the information asym-
metry. The large information advantage of the investors that know about an upcoming
tender offer ceases to exist after a relatively short period of three to six months. As in
the case of Enron, the information asymmetries in the periods preceding the bankruptcy
filings can persist over much longer time periods: up to two years prior to the actual
bankruptcy filings. Testing the information asymmetry measures in two different setups
also serves as a reliability check that ensures the validity of a measure does not depend
on any particular sample or the direction of a price change.
The information asymmetry measures examined in this study belong to four broad
categories: (1) the broad measures of transaction costs, such as the relative spread; (2) the
daily (intraday) price impact measures that evaluate the change in the daily (intraday)
prices; (3) the adverse selection component of the spread and (4) the order imbalance
measures.6 All of the measures, except the daily Amihud price impact measure, are
estimated on an intraday basis with high frequency data. I refer to the relative spread
and the price impact measures as “mixed” measures of information asymmetry, because
6The Probability of Informed Trading (PIN), first proposed by Easley et al (1996), belongs to the last
category. However, I exclude PIN from the analysis because only quarterly estimates of this measure are
available.
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they also include a pure liquidity component and are often used as liquidity measures in
the literature. However, when the informed trading in the market temporarily increases,
these measures should deviate from their base level largely due to an increase in their
information component. The main advantage of these measures are that they are easy to
construct. In contrast, the adverse selection component and the order imbalance measures
represent more complex “pure” measures, specifically constructed to capture information
asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders.
Surprisingly, the results from a difference-in-differences analysis suggest that the simple
“mixed” measures - the relative spread, the Amihud measure, and the intraday price
impact - consistently outperform the “pure” information asymmetry measures in both the
tender offer and bankruptcy samples. In the tender sample, the “mixed” measures deviate
significantly from their base level in the previous year starting as early as six months
prior to an announcement date. Consistent with prior expectations, the information
environment of the stocks with subsequent bankruptcy filings experiences changes even
earlier - up to nine months prior to the first rumors about an upcoming bankruptcy filing.
In contrast, the adverse selection component and the order imbalance measures do not
display any significant deviations in either of the two samples. These results are further
confirmed in the subsample analyses. These analyses show that the “mixed” information
asymmetry measures deviate more for the stocks with more intensive informed trading in
the pre-announcement periods.
The “pure” information asymmetry measures fail because the underlying assumptions
for their constructions do not hold empirically. The main assumption of the order imbal-
ance measures is that the informed trading unbalances the order flow either to the buy side
if the information is positive or to the sell side if it is negative. Empirically, even though
the total trading volume increases in the pre-announcement periods, both the sales and
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the purchases increase proportionally, which implies that the effect of an increase in the
informed trading is camouflaged by an even greater increase in the uninformed trading in
both directions. The main problem with the adverse selection component of the spread
is that it is mechanically driven by changes in the spread level. In contrast with the
theoretical predictions, the correlation between the adverse selection component and the
spread is negative: as the spread decreases over time, the adverse selection component
increases as a percentage of the spread. This finding implies that the adverse selection
component shows only limited time variations as the percentage of the stock price.
Further, this paper shows that monitoring the time-varying information asymmetry is
especially important for risk-averse uninformed investors. I form a trading strategy that
ranks 753 stocks, approximating the market portfolio, at the beginning of each month
in an ascending order based on the previous deviations in their information asymmetry
level. The results show that the portfolios of the stocks that experience no change or
a slight decline in their information asymmetry over the previous three months, have
consistently higher Sharpe ratios as compared to the portfolios of the stocks with a large
increase in their information asymmetry level. Overall, these results imply that risk-
averse uninformed investors can reduce the excess volatility of their portfolios without
diminishing their expected returns if they monitor the fluctuations in the informed trading
and time their investments accordingly.
Monitoring variations in information asymmetry over time is useful not only for unin-
formed investors, but also for the broader categories of market agents. Corporate decision
makers should consider the information environment of their company’s stock before new
equity issues and share repurchases. For example, Ausubel (1990) and Manove (1989)
make an assumption that a corporate decision maker and a corporate insider, trading on
his or her information, are different individuals. The decision maker can then partially
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learn the private information of the insider by observing the recent trading in the com-
pany’s stock. Monitoring fluctuations in informed trading is also important for trading
venues, such as major stock exchanges or off-exchange trading platforms. With a higher
number of informed traders, it is more difficult for a trading venue to attract order flow
from uninformed investors, which has a negative effect on its profits.
Surprisingly, only a few studies exist that compare the empirical measures of informa-
tion asymmetry. Some of them, for example, prior studies by Clarke and Shastri (2000)
and Ness, Ness, and Warr (2001), concentrate mainly on cross-sectional differences in the
information asymmetry. In particular, they examine the differences between information
asymmetry proxies from the corporate finance literature, such as size, R&D expendi-
ture, and the ratio of intangibles to total assets, to more high-frequency proxies from
the market microstructure literature used in this study. However, the measures from the
corporate finance literature do not suit the purposes of this paper, because they provide
only annual or quarterly estimates at best. The second type of studies examines daily
or intraday measures that are better suited to detect the fluctuations in the information
asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors, but these studies always relate
the performances of several measures to one benchmark measure. For example, Lei and
Wu (2005) run a horse race between the different information asymmetry measures to
predict the bid-ask spread on the next day. Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) and
Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2011) analyze time-series and cross-sectional correlations
of different high-frequency liquidity measures with the effective relative spread. In this
paper, I extend the existing literature by testing the validity of the time-varying infor-
mation asymmetry measures. The advantage of my approach is that I do not assume a
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benchmark measure, but rather look directly at periods prior to unexpected information
releases when informed trading is known to be high ex post.7
This study contributes to different strands in the finance literature. First, measuring
fluctuations in information asymmetry is of high interest to researchers who work in cor-
porate finance. One of the most prominent examples is probably the pecking order theory
of capital structure, first proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and subsequently tested
by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and several other papers.8 Further examples include
the relation between information asymmetry and the corporate spin-off decision (Krish-
naswami and Subramaniam, 1999), the value of cash in the firm (Drobetz, Grüninger, and
Hirschvogl, 2010) and the investment-cash flow sensitivity (Ascioglu, Hegde, and McDer-
mott (2008)). Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1992) theoretically analyze the impact
of time-varying information asymmetry on the timing of equity issues by a company. The
second strand is the insider trading literature that relates the information asymmetry to
the level of insider gains (Aboody and Lev, 2000 and Huddart and Ke (2007)). A further
important question from the asset pricing literature is whether information asymmetry
affects equity prices (Chan, Menkveld, and Yang (2008)). Several of the studies listed
above concentrate on the cross-sectional variations in information asymmetry, but ad-
dressing the time variations in the information asymmetry within each firm might help
further enrich our previous insights into these questions.
7Several studies investigate changes in a particular measure prior to a corporate information release.
For instance, Venkatesh and Chiang (1986), Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) and Chae (2005) examine
the dealer’s bid-ask spread. Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1992) and Aﬄeck-Graves, Callahan, and
Chipalkatti (2002) analyze changes in the bid-ask spread and its components around earnings announce-
ments. Vandelanoite (2002) investigates deviations of the adverse selection component around takeover
announcements, and Serednyakov (2002) conducts the same type of analysis for bankruptcy announce-
ments. Aktas et al (2007) provide evidence on the anomalous behavior of a PIN measure before M&A
announcements. However, neither of the previous studies compares different measures between each other
in the pre-announcement periods.
8See, for example, Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2003), Leary and Roberts (2010).
Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2009) provide a full overview of the mixed empirical evidence on the
pecking order theory.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the details of
the construction of the final samples and a brief overview of all of the measures used in
this study. Section 3 investigates the time-varying information asymmetry measures in
the pre-announcement periods. Section 4 demonstrates the importance of monitoring the
information asymmetry fluctuations and Section 5 briefly concludes.
2 Data and Sample Construction
2.1 Tender Sample
The data on the tender offer announcements comes from the Security Data Company’s
(SDC) Mergers & Acquisitions database. The initial sample includes 1,232 tender offer
announcements with a publicly traded target firm and a deal value over $1 mln in the US
market over the years 1997 to 2008.9
[Insert Table II.1 approximately here]
Panel A of Table II.1 presents the details of the construction of the tender offer sample.
I lose 54 observations from the initial sample after excluding the repeated tender offer
announcements for each firm. After the first tender proposal becomes public, the informed
investors lose their informational advantage over the uninformed investors with respect to
the identity of the target firm. Although the identity of an acquirer might not be known
yet due to the possibility of subsequent tender offers, the highest returns typically accrue
to the shareholders of the target firm.10 I omit another 229 announcements due to the
incomplete coverage by CRSP because I require a minimum of twelve months of trading
9My access to the NYSE Transactions and Quotes database (TAQ) is limited to years 1996-2008. I omit
all announcements from 1996 because I require twelve months of trading data before the announcement
date to calculate the long-run means of the information asymmetry measures.
10Schwert (1996) shows that the cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) to target firms’ stocks
on an announcement day are positive and significant irrespective of the subsequent success of an offer.
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data to construct long-run means of information asymmetry measures. Further, I drop
all observations with missing data for at least one event month for any of the information
asymmetry measures. This requirement assures an equal number of observations for all
measures, which is crucial for a comparison study. These filters yield the final sample
with 909 tender offer announcements.
[Insert Table II.2 approximately here]
Panel A of Table II.2 reports the summary statistics for size and the financial data of
the target firms in the tender sample.11
The median target firm is relatively small with a market capitalization of around $129
mln and total assets of around $160 mln. However, the distribution is positively skewed
with a few relatively large firms in the sample (the mean of the market capitalization is
$516 mln and the mean of the total assets is $709 mln). The financial leverage, defined
as the ratio of total liabilities to the total firm value, varies considerably, and is between
10% and 76% with the median firm financing 37% of its investment needs through debt.
A median target firm has a positive return on assets (ROA) of 2%.
The majority of the tender offer announcements occur in the years 1998 to 2000 with
around 150 tender offers per year. This number gradually declines to 25 in the year
2004 and goes slightly up again to 50 in 2008. The sample is widely distributed across
47 industries in the Fama and French (1997) industry classifications, with the greatest
number of tender offers in the sectors of business services (174), drugs & pharmaceuticals
(55), retail (51), and wholesale (44) (results not tabulated).
Figure II.1 shows the cumulative average daily abnormal returns (CARs) and the
average daily net sales (in basis points of market capitalization) for the target firms
11I match firms in the tender sample with Compustat on a quarterly basis. Since Compustat data are
available only for 879 out of 909 firms in the tender sample, the number of observations for Compustat
variables differs from the total number of observations. Overall, the Compustat variables represent 96%
of the tender sample.
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in the tender sample from day -120 to day +30 relative to the date of the first public
announcement. I use the market model with the CRSP value-weighted portfolio as the
market index to estimate the necessary parameters for the calculation of the abnormal
returns. The length of the estimation window is 200 days starting from day -321.
Figure II.1 depicts a stylized fact in the literature: the abnormal return of a typical
target firm’s stock on the announcement day is positive and statistically significant at the
1% level. The mean abnormal return of a target firm in the tender sample is 26%.12 The
price runup starts around 20 days before an announcement date due to takeover rumors
or information leakage to the market. However, the information asymmetry between the
informed and uninformed investors is probably still very high during this period, because
the uninformed investors do not know whether a tender offer will be announced or not.
Interestingly, the pre-announcement order flow is almost balanced, with approximately
the same volume of purchases and sales of a target stock within a trading day (see Figure
II.1). On the announcement day, the net sales of a target stock increase dramatically,
reaching almost 1% of the market capitalization. This additional sales increase is most
probably due to those shareholders who seek an immediate realization of their profits in
the fear of a transaction cancellation.
2.2 Bankruptcy Sample
The source for the bankruptcy announcement dates of public US companies is
the BankruptcyData.com website. Since this database provides only the names of the
companies, but not their CUSIPs, I manually find the CUSIPs for each company from the
CRSP database. Out of the 2,050 firms with bankruptcy announcements in the period
12Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988), Schwert (1996) and Agrawal and
Nasser (2010) have similar findings in their samples.
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Figure II.1: CARs and Trading Volume of Stocks in Tender Sample. The figure displays the
cumulative average daily abnormal returns (CARs) and the average daily net sales (in basis points of
market capitalization) from day -120 to day +30 relative to the date of the first public announcement for
909 target firm stocks over the years 1997 to 2008. I use the market model with the CRSP value-weighted
portfolio as the market index to estimate the necessary parameters for the calculation of the abnormal
returns.
from January 1, 1997, until December 31, 2008, an unambiguous name match exists for
1,220 firms, which constitute the initial sample.
The construction of the final bankruptcy sample follows similar steps as in the tender
sample (see Panel B of Table II.1). The major difference between the two samples is the
identification of an event month. In the tender sample, an event month is the month in
which a tender offer is announced. This definition is due to the fact that the information
asymmetry continues to stay on a high level up to an announcement date, when the price
of a target stock jumps abruptly almost to the offer level.13 Because a bankruptcy filing
might be expected by the market long in advance, a public bankruptcy announcement does
not usually cause a large adjustment in the stock price. The price of a typical bankrupt
13If the success of an offer were certain, the price of a target stock would equal the offer price. The
discount in the price of the target stock reflects the probability that a tender offer might fail.
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stock is almost always below $2 in the months preceding a bankruptcy announcement.
For the case of bankruptcy filings, the information asymmetry between the informed
and uninformed investors is high in the months before the market starts expecting the
bankruptcy filing by the company. Iqbal and Shetty (2002) provide empirical evidence
that insiders sell their shares prior to the expectation of the bankruptcy by the market.
Also, the insiders at Enron started selling their shares as long as one and a half years
before the official bankruptcy filing.
When does the market start to expect a bankruptcy filing? Dugan and Forsyth (1995)
and Ramaswami (1987) show that the parametric change in the mean and the variance
of stock returns is related to the releases of unfavorable news about a company in the
Wall Street Journal. A period between the first perception of an upcoming bankruptcy
and an actual filing can then last for several months. Based on this evidence, I define the
month, after which the bankruptcy filing is expected by the market, as the first month in
which the return crash occurs. The definition of the return crash comes from Marin and
Olivier (2008). The crash in returns occurs in the month when an excess stock return
drops below two standard deviations of the average excess monthly return in the past 24
months:
Crash =

1 if ri,t − ri,t ≤ −2σi,t
0, otherwise.
Out of 366 bankruptcy announcements for which up to three years of CRSP data is
available, I can clearly identify the month when the market starts to expect a bankruptcy
filing for 261 firms. I omit the remaining 105 firms from the analysis, because I cannot
define an event month unambiguously. Also, a bankruptcy filing for these companies
might have been anticipated long in advance and was not surprising to the market. The
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mean and median interval between the anticipation time and the eventual bankruptcy
date is 9.34 months and 8 months, respectively (results not tabulated). The exclusion of
an additional 49 observations with insufficient data yields the final bankruptcy sample of
212 announcements.
The famous examples of Enron’s and Worldcom’s bankruptcies illustrate the credibil-
ity of this approach for identifying the starting point of the bankruptcy expectation by
the market. Although Enron’s stock had been gradually decreasing in value from the be-
ginning of 2001, it experienced the first crash in late October 2001, when the fraudulent
accountant practices began to be divulged. The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) started its investigation on October 22 of 2001. On that day the stock price fell by
$5.40 to $20.65.14 The further decrease to $16.41 followed on October 25 with the removal
of Enron’s CFO from his position.15 Overall, Enron’s stock value had dropped by more
than a half in one week. In contrast to the rather unexpected bankruptcy filing of Enron
(the time between the first bankruptcy expectation in October 2001 and the bankruptcy
filing on December 2, 2001, constitutes barely one month), the first expectation of World-
Com’s bankruptcy filing, which occurred in July 2002, was as early as November 2000.
On November 1, 2000, WorldCom announced its major restructuring plans and the first
earnings warning. As a result, its stock price plummeted by 21.58% to $18.62, giving the
first major concern about the financial stability of the company.16
Panel B of Table II.2 presents the summary statistics for the firms in the bankruptcy
sample before the market starts expecting an upcoming filing.17 The median stock price
is $5, but drops below $2 after the unfavorable information is released to the market
(results not tabulated). Because the price of a pre-bankrupt stock gradually decreases
14The New York Times, 2001, Where Did The Value Go At Enron? October 23.
15The New York Times, 2001, Enron Ousts Finance Chief As SEC Looks at Dealings, October 25.
16CNN Money, 2000, WorldCom warns, splits in two, November 1.
17Compustat data are available only for 167 out of 212 firms in the bankruptcy sample.
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Figure II.2: CARs and Trading Volume of Stocks in Bankruptcy Sample. The figure displays
the cumulative average monthly abnormal returns (CARs) and the average monthly net sales (in basis
points of market capitalization) in the twelve months before and the three months after the market starts
expecting an upcoming bankruptcy filing. The final sample consists of 212 bankrupt firm stocks in the
period 1997 to 2008. I use the market model with the CRSP value-weighted portfolio as the market index
to estimate the necessary parameters for the calculation of the abnormal returns.
over the preceding months, the financial leverage is relatively high, reaching 69% of total
assets. As expected, the ROA is negative and equals -1% for a median firm in the sample.
Overall, the financial characteristics of firms in the bankruptcy sample follow the normal
patterns of firms close to financial distress. The number of firms in the bankruptcy sample
varies over the years with a maximum of 37 bankruptcy filings in 2001 and a minimum
of 3 in 2006. The leader in financially distressed firms is the retail industry (27 firms)
followed by business services (17 firms) and transportation services (14 firms) (results not
tabulated).
Figure II.2 displays the CARs and the average monthly net sales of the firms in the
bankruptcy sample in the year preceding the crash in their returns. By definition, the
crash happens in the event month 0, which is also observable from Figure II.2. In contrast
to tender offers, I conduct the event study on a monthly basis for bankrupt firms due to the
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longer duration of the information asymmetry. As previously shown, the informed traders
are already selling their shares several months before the market starts anticipating the
bankruptcy filing. The estimation window length is 24 months starting from month -36
relative to the event month. As expected, the price declines gradually in the months before
the crash with sales slightly dominating purchases in all of the months. The net sales reach
almost 1.5% of the market capitalization in the event month and continue to stay at this
high level up to the official bankruptcy filing. This evidence provides additional support
for the hypothesis that the information asymmetry decreases considerably after the first
release of the unfavorable information to the market.
2.3 Information Asymmetry Measures
In this study, I examine the daily or intraday measures of information asymmetry, because
only frequently calculated measures can potentially capture changes in the information
asymmetry over relatively short time periods. Intraday transaction and quote data come
from the TAQ database. The daily returns and the daily trading volumes come from
CRSP. I provide the detailed definitions for all of the variables used in this paper in the
Appendix A and the technical details of the construction of the information asymmetry
measures in the Appendix B.
Relative Spread (RelSpr). The broadest measure of transaction costs is the relative
spread. The relative spread measures the quoted bid-ask spread as the percentage of the
midpoint price:
RelSprt = (At −Bt)/Qt,
where Qt is the average of the bid and the ask price. The relative spread captures
the overall liquidity of the stock, but it can be decomposed into three components that
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compensate for order processing, inventory and adverse selection costs.18 When informed
trading in the market temporarily increases, the relative spread changes its value due to
an increase in its adverse selection component. An increase in informed trading should
not influence the order processing component and the inventory component of the spread.
Therefore, a temporary increase in the information asymmetry between the informed and
uninformed investors should cause a temporary positive deviation in the relative spread
from its normal level.19 20
Adverse selection component of the spread (Lam). I use the Lin, Sanger, and
Booth (1995) approach to decompose the spread and to extract its adverse selection
component, Lam. In brief, Lam represents the regression coefficient of the changes in the
midpoint prices on the effective spread:
∆Midpointt = λ · (Pricet−1 −Midpointt−1) + εt.
The exact estimation procedure is in the appendix. Lam is a reasonable representation
of the speed of the incorporation of the information from the previous transaction into
quotes that prevail for the next transaction. The adverse selection component is estimated
as the percentage of the effective spread.21
The Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) approach is attractive because it accounts for
both the reasonable difficulty of the estimation as well as the plausible estimates. The
theoretically appealing Huang and Stoll (1997) model that reconciles all the previous
decomposition models provides poor empirical estimates in almost 60% of the cases, as
reported by Clarke and Shastri (2000) and Krishnan (2000).
18Ness, Ness, and Warr (2001) provide a good survey of different models for the decomposition of the
bid-ask spread.
19The necessary condition is that informed investors actively trade on their information.
20Results do not differ materially if I use the effective relative spread, defined as 2 · |Pt −Qt| /Qt,
instead of the relative spread.
21By definition, the adverse selection component can take values between zero and one. I delete all
estimates that lie outside of this theoretical range.
32
Price impact measures. The price impact that a trade produces over an interval of
time x is measured as the change in the midpoint price of a stock from the transaction time
t to the future time point t+x. I examine two measures of the price impact: the Intraday
Price Impact (PrcImp) that calculates the change in the stock price’s midpoints over
five-minute intervals, and the Daily Price Impact measure of Amihud (2002) (Amihud)
that captures the price impact of all trades in one day. The Amihud measure is defined as
the ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that day and requires
only daily trading data, which is available from the CRSP database. The intraday price
impact measure is similar to the one used by Riordan and Storkenmaier (2009). I follow
their assumption that a five-minute interval is long enough to reflect all the information
from the previous trade. Additionally, I scale the intraday price impact by the size of a
trade, which makes it equivalent to the Amihud measure, calculated on an intraday basis.
A trade that comes from an informed trader should cause a permanent price impact
because it partly reflects his or her private information, and the market subsequently
incorporates this information into the price.22 In contrast, the price changes due to order
processing and inventory costs are transitory in their nature, and their impact should
vanish after the next few transactions. With an increase in the information asymmetry
that precedes a major information release, the trades by informed investors should cause
a larger price impact per dollar traded because more information is incorporated into the
prices.
Note that the price impact measures are similar in their motivation to the adverse
selection component, Lam. However, there are several important differences between these
two measures. First, both of the price impact measures control for trade size, because
22Kyle (1985) is among the first authors to address strategic trading by informed investors. Under the
assumption that trading time is finite, he shows that all information will be reflected in prices at the end
of the trading period.
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larger trades normally cause larger price changes. Second, the price impact measures
capture price changes over longer time periods (five minutes to one day) as compared to
Lam, which is based on a transaction-by-transaction analysis. Further, Lam measures
price changes as a percentage of the spread, whereas the price impact measures directly
address the changes in the midpoint price.
Imbalance measures. The basic reasoning behind the imbalance measures is that
with the existence of some private information, all informed traders will trade only on one
side of the market, which unbalances the order flow in either the direction of purchases
or in the direction of sales. The Daily Order Imbalance (OIB) captures an absolute
difference between the number of purchases and the number of sales in one trading day
relative to the total number of transactions:
OIB = |B − S| /(B + S),
where B stands for a number of buys and S for a number of sells in one trading day.
Aktas et al (2007) show that the daily order imbalance measure faithfully approximates
the Probability of Informed Trading (PIN), as proposed by Easley et al (1996). I do not
analyze the PIN because this measure provides only one estimate per quarter and is too
infrequent for the purposes of measuring the changes in the information asymmetry over
short time intervals.
The weak point in the OIB is that this measure concentrates solely on the difference
in the number of trades and does not take the transaction’s size or value into account.
The Trade Value Imbalance (OIBvalue), defined as an absolute difference between the
traded value of purchases and the traded value of sales to the total traded value in one
day (OIBvalue = |BV AL − SV AL| /(BV AL + SV AL)), seeks to overcome this shortcoming.
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Summary Statistics. Table II.3 reports the summary statistics for the information
asymmetry measures, the volume traded (Volume), and the stock volatility (Volatility)
across the firms in both of the samples. The volatility is defined as the annualized standard
deviation of the daily market-adjusted stock returns in the corresponding calendar month
(with the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio as the market index). All observations are on a
firm-month level. The first three columns of
Table II.3 report the mean, the median, and the standard deviation for all of the vari-
ables in the twelve months before the corresponding event month (event month -12). The
table’s last three columns report the same statistics for the month immediately preceding
the corresponding event month (event month -1).
[Insert Table II.3 approximately here]
Panel A of Table II.3 shows the differences in the distributions between the two pe-
riods for the tender sample. Overall, the stocks in this sample are relatively liquid with
an average relative spread of 2.8% and an average five-minute price impact of 2.6%. The
relative spread, the intraday price impact, the daily traded volume and the volatility sig-
nificantly increase in their means in the pre-announcement month. The Amihud measure
also increases in its mean and median, but this increase is not significant. Interestingly,
the adverse selection component does not change significantly from its mean value of
42%. The mean daily order imbalance is 29%, whereas the mean trade value imbalance
reaches up to 37%. However, neither of the imbalance measures changes its mean value
significantly in the pre-announcement month as well. Panel A of Table II.4 shows that
even though the number of transactions and the dollar value traded overall increased
in the pre-announcement month, the number of purchases (and their dollar value) still
approximately equals the number of sales (and their dollar value).
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[Insert Table II.4 approximately here]
Panel B of Table II.3 displays the summary statistics for the bankruptcy sample. The
stocks in this sample exhibit a higher spread (the mean relative spread is 3.5%) and a
higher intraday price impact (3.8%) than the stocks in the tender sample. Remarkably, the
mean trading volume per day exceeds the volume in the tender sample by more than three
times. Such a high volume in the bankruptcy sample is partly explained by the overall
lower prices of the financially distressed stocks. The relative spread, the Amihud measure
and the intraday price impact significantly increase in their means in the month preceding
the crash in the returns. As in the tender sample, the adverse selection component barely
varies between the two periods. Neither of the imbalance measures changes its mean
value significantly as well, because the number of purchase and sale transactions remains
the same in the pre-crash month (see Panel B of Table II.4). Their dollar values also
proportionally decrease in both trading directions, due to an overall decrease in the stock
prices.
Table II.5 presents a matrix of the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients for the
information asymmetry measures, the volume and the volatility of stocks in the tender
(Panel A) and bankruptcy samples (Panel B). For brevity, the p-values are not reported.
All of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level, except the coefficients
for Lam in the bankruptcy sample, which is no longer significantly correlated with any of
the other variables.
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[Insert Table II.5 approximately here]
Overall, the correlations in the tender and bankruptcy samples follow similar patterns.
Almost all of the measures except the adverse selection component of the spread have a
positive correlation with each other and the excess volatility of the stocks. This finding
is in line with prior expectations. On average, the stocks of firms with higher degrees of
information asymmetry should exhibit higher volatility, because it is harder for a market
to value the operations of these firms correctly.23 Further, the same set of measures has
a negative correlation with the average daily trading volume. This negative correlation
is also not surprising, because more frequently traded stocks usually have higher price
informativeness and new information is priced in more quickly for these stocks. Surpris-
ingly, the adverse selection component, Lam, shows a mostly negative correlation with the
remaining measures and the stock volatility. The correlation patterns of the adverse se-
lection component are puzzling, because the component should be higher for more volatile
stocks and is expected to have a positive correlation with other information asymmetry
measures. Recall that Lam measures the changes in the midpoint price as a percentage
of the spread. For stocks with larger spreads, the revisions of their price quotes by lower
percentages of the spread suffice to achieve the same absolute price change than for stocks
with lower spreads, which might explain the negative correlation between Lam and Rel-
Spr. Other negative correlations are probably driven by the negative correlation of Lam
with the relative spread.24
23However, excess volatility can also arise from the general uncertainty about the firm’s value, even
without any differences in the information sets of insiders and outsiders. Therefore, stock volatility can
be regarded only as a noisy measure of information asymmetry.
24Note that the very high correlations are mostly mechanical. For example, a high correlation of the
Amihud measure with the OIB and the OIBvalue is due to the fact that all of these three measures are
scaled either by the total dollar volume traded during the day or by its close substitutes (e.g., the number
of trades during the day). The relative spread also displays very high correlations with the Amihud
measure and the OIB measures, partly due to its high negative correlation with the volume traded.
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3 Pre-Announcement Changes in Information
Asymmetry Measures
Provided that informed investors act on their information in the periods preceding cor-
porate announcements, an unusual trading pattern arises as prices gradually incorporate
the new information. A measure of the time-varying information asymmetry can only be
valid if it exhibits temporary positive deviations from its normal level during this period
of the increased informed trading.
The main difference between the prediction for the tender sample and the predic-
tion for the bankruptcy sample is the duration of a temporary increase in the informa-
tion asymmetry between the informed and uninformed investors. Whereas Agrawal and
Nasser (2010) provide evidence that insiders of the target firms start acting approximately
six months before a tender offer announcement is made public, Iqbal and Shetty (2002)
detect insider trading in pre-bankrupt firms long before the market expectations about
an upcoming bankruptcy filing, up to two years in advance. Therefore, I expect the in-
formation asymmetry measures to deviate from their long-run mean for a shorter time
period of up to six months before an announcement for the tender sample and for up to
twelve months before the first unfavorable information release for the bankruptcy sample.
3.1 Univariate Results
First, I test the significance of the deviations in the information asymmetry measures in
a univariate setup. Table II.6 presents the results. The first column indicates the number
of months before the corresponding event month, with the event month defined as t = 0.
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[Insert Table II.6 approximately here]
Columns 2 through 7 in Panels A and B show the cross-sectional averages of the
percentage deviations (∆) of the measures from their long-run means. I construct the
deviations for each measure (∆M) according to the following formula25
∆M t =
M t −
∑−13
i=−24M i
12∑−13
i=−24M i
12
. (II.1)
The ∆RelSpreadt=−1, for example, denotes an average percentage deviation of the
relative spread from its mean, calculated over t=-24 to t=-13, in the month preceding
the corresponding event.
Panel A of Table II.6 shows the univariate results for the tender sample. Almost all
of the measures, except the imbalance measures, display statistically significant positive
deviations from their long-run means in each of the six months preceding an announcement
of a tender offer. The deviations increase gradually over the months and attain their
highest values in the three months before an announcement. These results are in line with
the previous expectations, because the imbalances in the market should increase as more
informed traders arrive in the market. Further, the deviations of these measures decrease
in the event month (t=0), and even become negative for the relative spread and the
Amihud measure. This result is also plausible under the assumption that the information
asymmetry declines considerably in the event month, or even resolves completely in cases
where the shareholders accept the offer.
Remarkably, the imbalance measures increase significantly in the event month, but
not in the preceding months. Panel A of Table II.4 shows that, although the overall
25Please note that I suppress the subscripts for identification of individual stocks for ease of exposition
purposes.
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number of trades increases in the pre-announcement month, the number of purchase
and sale transactions experiences a proportional change. The overall dollar value also
increases proportionally for purchases and sales. Thus, both the daily order and trade
value imbalances, remain constant. The imbalance measures fail because not only the
number (and value) of purchase transactions changes, which presumably come from the
informed traders, but the number (and value) of sales transactions does as well. The
significant increase in the number of sale transactions potentially reflects the pessimistic
beliefs of the uninformed investors about the stock. Aktas et al (2007) find that the
OIB, closely approximating the PIN, even falls before the M&A announcements for the
stocks traded on the Paris Stock Exchange. The large deviation of 12% in the daily order
imbalance in the event month results from the disproportional increase in the sales of
the stock (see Panel A of Table II.4). Retail investors are willing to sell their shares
immediately, even at a slight discount to the offer price that reflects the probability of
the tender offer’s failure. Institutional investors, on the contrary, buy these stocks and
hold them until the deal is closed. As a compensation for the incurred risk, they get the
difference between the market price and the offer price - a strategy known as “merger
arbitrage”.
The deviations in the relative spread, the Amihud measure, and the intraday price
impact of the bankruptcy sample (Panel B of Table II.6) are much larger than the corre-
sponding deviations of the tender sample. The explanation for this fact might partly be
because of the lower prices for the stocks of the financially distressed firms (the average
price is $8 as compared to the average price of $14 of stocks in the tender sample). The
small changes in the absolute prices lead to higher changes in the relative spread and the
price impact measures for these stocks.26 Overall, the measures in the bankruptcy sample
26The tick size, defined as the minimum amount by which the quotes of the stock can change, does
not play a big role in my analysis, because the bankruptcy sample spans the years 1997-2008. The
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display the same patterns as in the tender sample with the highest deviations in the three
months before the first crash in the stock returns. However, the market starts perceiving
an increase in the information asymmetry much earlier, eight to nine months in advance.
As in the tender sample, the imbalance measures do not deviate significantly from
their long-run means. In the event month, both the numbers of purchases and sales
proportionally increase, decreasing an overall order imbalance (Panel B of Table II.4). The
dollar value of the buy transactions decreases and the dollar value of the sale transactions
increases, compared to the pre-crash month, which reduces the trade value imbalance
even further.
Panels C and D of Table II.6 illustrate the changes in the information asymmetry
measures in the six months before the event for two firms, Enron from the bankruptcy
sample and Caminus Corp. from the tender sample. Consistent with the univariate results
from Panels A and B, the relative spread and the price impact measures are higher
in the month immediately preceding the event than the six months before the event.
Interestingly, the changes for Caminus Corp. are more pronounced with an increase in
the relative spread from 1.5% in t = −6 to 5.2% in t = −1 and an increase in the intraday
price impact from 5% to 17% over the same period. These higher changes are due to the
lower overall liquidity for the stock of Caminus Corp., a relatively small firm as compared
to Enron. Again, consistent with Panels A and B the imbalance measures do not reliably
capture the change in the informed trading of the stock. The OIBvalue decreases in both
cases, and the OIB decreases for Enron and increases for Caminus Corp.
decimalization of the spreads was finally adopted in April 2001 by all stock exchanges in the US with
135 out of 212 bankruptcies in my sample occurring in the post-decimalization period. The results do
not differ materially for the sub-sample of bankruptcies occurring in the post-decimalization period (not
tabulated).
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3.2 Difference-in-Differences Analysis
One limitation of a pure time-series analysis is that it does not take into account an
overall change in the information environment for the stocks with comparable trading
characteristics. For example, after the revelation of the massive earnings manipulations
of Enron and WorldCom, the overall degree of investor trust decreased, simultaneously
increasing the cost of capital for less transparent firms and the transaction costs for their
investors.
To circumvent this problem, I conduct a difference-in-differences analysis that controls
for both the cross-sectional and the time-series variations in the information asymmetry
measures. First, I match each event firm with a similar (in terms of trading characteristics)
non-event firm. In the second step, I compare the deviations in the information asymmetry
measures between the event and the matched control firms. I expect the deviations in
the information asymmetry measures to be higher for the stock of an event firm due to
higher levels of informed trading in this stock.
Matching Procedure. For each firm in the event samples (tender and bankruptcy)
I find a firm of similar size, trading volume, volatility, and price level from the control
group. The control group covers all listed US firms in the CRSP database that have
trading data for at least 12 months and belong to neither of the event samples. The
matching of the pairs is based on their propensity scores and is done at the beginning of
the corresponding event year.27 Overall, I find a corresponding match for 899 out of 909
firms in the tender sample and for 201 out of 212 firms in the bankruptcy sample.
The propensity score matching (PSM) approach finds a comparable firm in terms of
the observable trading characteristics, such as price, market capitalization, volume, and
27I match stocks with replacements, so that one stock from a control group might serve as a control
for several event stocks. Further, I require that a propensity score of a control stock lies within 1% of the
propensity score of an event stock.
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volatility. Matching on these trading characteristics is important, because they influence
the overall level of stock liquidity and informed trading. For example, almost all of the
information asymmetry measures are mechanically correlated with an inverse of the stock
price. For this reason, I prefer matching on the inverse than on the price itself. Higher
trading volume and market capitalization increase the liquidity of the stock and reduce
the price impact of the informed trades. Higher stock volatility signals a higher disagree-
ment between the stock’s investors about its fundamental value. This disagreement might
arise either due to a general uncertainty about the firm’s value among all investors or due
to the higher information asymmetry between the informed and uninformed investors, or
both. Since two matched firms are similar in terms of their observable characteristics,
they differ only with respect to the unobservable factors, like rumors in the market or
temporary changes in the informed trading. Differences in the deviations in the informa-
tion asymmetry measures between an event firm and its control should then reflect these
differences in the trading environment of the two stocks.
One criticism of the PSM approach concerns the industry contagion effects. Rumors
and informed trading might occur not only for an event stock, but also for the stocks of
other potential targets, so that the information asymmetry increases for those stocks as
well.28 However, the presence of other potential targets in the control group should bias
the results against finding any significant differences between the event and the matched
control firms. Further, this effect is especially weak in this study because only 7% of
28See Song and Walkling (2000) for a discussion of the contagion effects in the industries of takeover
targets. However, Agrawal and Nasser (2010) show that an increase in the net purchases of insiders from
takeover targets is significantly larger than that of insiders from the control firms, which are similar in
size and belong to the same industry. Further, Agrawal and Nasser (2010) and Song and Walkling (2000)
find that cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of firms that subsequently become targets are usually
larger than those of their rival firms. These findings provide some evidence about existing differences in
the information environments of similar firms from the same industry. Even if the degree of information
asymmetry increases for the control firms (e.g., due to industry contagion effects or insider trading), the
deviations in the information asymmetry measures from their long-run means should be lower than the
corresponding deviations of an event stock.
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the matched pairs in both samples belong to the same industry (based on the Fama and
French (1997) industry classification).29
Table II.7 displays the trading characteristics for the stocks in the treated samples and
in their corresponding control groups. The last column shows the p-values of a two-sided
t-test on the equality of the means between the two groups and the last row reports the
p-values of a Hotelling’s test on the joint equality of the means for all of the matching
variables.
[Insert Table II.7 approximately here]
Overall, the differences in the means between the event firms and their controls are
not jointly significant in any of the event samples. The p-values of the Hotelling’s test
are 83% in the tender sample and 13% in the bankruptcy sample. The bankruptcy firms
and their controls are, in general, smaller and more volatile than the corresponding firms
from the tender sample. Due to the lower prices of the firms in the bankruptcy sample,
their average daily trading volume exceeds the trading volume of the takeover targets
(and their controls) by almost five times.
Differences in Deviations Between Event and Non-Event Firms. Table II.8
summarizes the results of the difference-in-differences analysis. Columns 2 through 10
display the cross-sectional averages of the differences in the deviations for all of the mea-
sures. The difference in the deviations in the information asymmetry measures (∆2M)
between an event stock and a corresponding control stock is defined as
29If I require a control firm to belong to the same industry, then matching on trading characteristics,
such as volume and volatility is rather poor. For this study, matching two firms on their trading char-
acteristics is more important than matching them on their industry membership, because measures of
informed trading are more closely related to the trading environment of the stock than to the operating
process of the firm. However, the results do not change materially, when I match event firms to firms
from the same industry and with the same market capitalization (results available upon request).
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∆2M t =
M t,Event −MEvent
MEvent
− M t,Control −MControl
MControl
, (II.2)
where M is a long-run mean over t [−24,−12]. If the deviations of an event stock
and its corresponding control do not differ significantly, their difference (∆2) should be
close to zero.
[Insert Table II.8 approximately here]
Consistent with the univariate results, the relative spread, the Amihud measure, and
the intraday price impact show significantly higher deviations in the treated samples than
in the corresponding control samples. Although the difference between the two groups is
positive for the above measures, it is lower than the stand-alone deviations of the event
stocks in Table II.6. This result implies that the relative spreads and the price impact
measures of the stocks in the control groups have also increased, but to a lower degree than
for the stocks in the treated samples. However, an increase in the above measures for the
control stocks is mechanically driven by a decline in their price levels and not by a change
in the information asymmetry between the informed and uninformed investors (results not
tabulated). Again, as in the previous results, a difference in the deviations of the relative
spread, the Amihud and the intraday price impact declines in the event month for stocks
in the tender sample (Panel A) and further increases for stocks in the bankruptcy sample
(Panel B).30 The results for the order and trade imbalance measures are also consistent
with the univariate results: the imbalance measures do not change significantly for firms
in the tender and bankruptcy samples as well as in their corresponding control groups.
30A further increase in the relative spread, the Amihud measure and the intraday price impact in the
month of the first negative information release for a stock in the bankruptcy sample is driven to a high
extent by the crash in its price level.
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Importantly, the deviation of Lam loses its significance after controlling for its cross-
sectional variation and even becomes negative. Thus, the adverse selection component
increases by the same amount for the stocks in the event samples and their controls.
To investigate this issue more closely, I plot the development of Lam separately over
time for the sample of event firms and for their control group. Panel A of Figure II.3
displays the close time-varying relation between the adverse selection components in the
two samples, which suggests that its time variations are similar for all stocks. Specifically,
Lam monotonically increases in both samples until mid-2006 and declines afterwards.
Since Lam is measured as a percentage of the spread, the deviations in Lam might be
mechanically related to the deviations in the spread levels.
Panel B of Figure II.3 compares the development of these two measures over time in
the combined samples of the event firms and their controls. The figure displays a strikingly
negative relation between the time variations in the two measures: as the spread decreases
over time, Lam increases as a percentage of the spread. In contrast, as the spreads start
increasing in anticipation of the 2008 financial crisis, Lam is monotonically decreasing,
which suggests that the deviations in Lam are mechanically driven by the deviations in
the spread levels. The negative and significant correlation between Lam and the spread in
Table II.5 further supports this explanation. The negative relation between Lam and the
spread stays in contrast with theory, which predicts that the adverse selection component
should increase as a percentage of the spread with higher levels of informed trading. Such
contradictory evidence casts doubts on the adverse selection component as a valid measure
of the time-varying information asymmetry.
Overall, the results of the difference-in-differences analysis suggest that only the rela-
tive spread and the price impact measures (the Amihud measure and the intraday price
impact) can consistently capture the changes in the information asymmetry between the
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Figure II.3: Development of relative spread and lambda over time. Panel A of the figure
displays the development of the adverse selection component, Lam, over 1996 to 2008 separately for the
sample of the event firms (solid line) and their matched controls (dashed line). Panel B of the figure
displays the development of the relative spread (solid line) and the lambda (dashed line) over 1996 to
2008 in the combined samples of event firms and their matched controls.
A. Development of Lambda over time
B. Development of Relative Spread and Lambda over time
informed and uninformed investors in both of the samples. The imbalance measures do
not display any significant changes in almost every month, and the adverse selection com-
ponent, Lam, loses its significance after controlling for its increase in the sample of the
comparable companies.
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3.3 Subsamples Analysis
The previous section examines differences in the deviations of the information asymmetry
measures in the total samples of the tender offer and bankruptcy announcements. The
next step is to examine whether the information asymmetry measures deviate more for
stocks with more intensive informed trading prior to an event date. Prior studies by
Meulbroek (1992) and Schwert (1996) show that the daily stock returns have a correlation
with the insider trading activity and that almost half of the price runup in the month
before a tender offer announcement occurs on days when insiders trade. Thus, a higher
price runup in pre-announcement periods indicates the leakage of information to the
market through the trades of informed investors. In the following, I measure intensity of
the informed trading by the degree of the price runup preceding the event.
To differentiate between the high and low price runups, I construct a price runup ratio
that calculates the proportion of information that has already been incorporated into the
prices prior to an event:
∣∣∣ CAR[−x;t−1]ARt+CAR[−x;t−1] ∣∣∣ .
The ARt is the abnormal return on the event day (month) t in the tender (bankruptcy)
sample. The CAR[−x; t − 1] represents the cumulative abnormal return for x days
(months) prior to an event, with x = 120 days in the tender sample and x = 12 months
in the bankruptcy sample. The higher the ratio, the higher is the observed price runup in
relation to the abnormal return on an announcement day. I expect the deviations in the
information asymmetry measures to be higher for the subsample with the above median
price runup ratio.
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Tables II.9 and II.10 summarize the differences in the deviations across the two sample
splits. Panel A presents the results for the subsample with the above median price runup
ratio, and Panel B displays the results for the remaining observations.
[Insert Tables II.9 and II.10 approximately here]
Consistent with the prior expectations, the relative spread and the intraday price
impact deviate more significantly for the stocks with the higher price runup ratios in the
tender sample as well as in the bankruptcy sample. The Amihud measure also deviates
more significantly in the bankruptcy sample, but not in the tender sample. The reason is
that the higher pre-announcement abnormal returns in the tender sample are accompanied
by an abnormal (dollar) volume increase, whereas the overall (dollar) volume significantly
drops in the bankruptcy sample. Since the Amihud measure is constructed on a daily basis,
it relates the total trading volume, both by the informed and the uninformed investors, to
the total price impact over the day. Therefore, it is harder for this measure, as compared
to the intraday price impact, to estimate the price impact of the individual trades within
a day. As before, the adverse selection component and the imbalance measures do not
display significant deviations in any of the subsamples.
4 Monitoring Information Asymmetry by Uninformed
Investors
If temporary fluctuations in the information asymmetry between the informed and the
uninformed investors can be detected, then the risk-averse uninformed traders should
monitor these fluctuations and time their trades accordingly. When a large number of
informed traders enters the market for a stock, this signals a higher probability of a price
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change in the near future after information has been released to the market. However, the
uninformed traders do not know ex ante the direction of the price change that depends
on whether the news released will be positive or negative. Thus, a stock with a high level
of informed trading experiences a temporary increase in its volatility, and the risk-averse
uninformed investors should prefer to stay temporarily out of the market for this stock.
In the following, I form a trading strategy to test whether monitoring variations in
the information asymmetry over time can help uninformed investors to time the volatility
of their portfolio.31 The previous findings suggest that only the relative spread, the
Amihud and the intraday price impact can reliably capture the temporary deviations in
the information asymmetry of the traded stocks. Therefore, I omit the remaining measures
from the following analysis.
[Insert Table II.11 approximately here]
The sample of analyzed stocks includes 753 stocks from the CRSP database, which
approximates a market portfolio. The sample period starts in January 2001 and ends
in December 2007. Panel A of Table II.11 presents the details of the stock selection. I
consider only common stocks that traded on the NYSE, the AMEX or the Nasdaq for
at least 24 months. I further exclude all firms from the financial industry and utilities.32
Due to the computational intensity of the intraday measures, the final sample comprises
only 20% of the 3,886 stocks traded as of June 30, 2004. The following procedure is used
to approximate a market portfolio. First, all of the stocks are split by industry and by
quintiles of the market capitalization within each industry group. Afterward, I randomly
draw 20% of the stocks from each industry-market capitalization group to form a sample
31The importance of volatility timing is discussed in previous studies by Busse (1999) and Fleming,
Kirby, and Ostdiek (2001). Busse (1999) finds that mutual fund managers tend to reduce their market
exposure in times of high expected volatility. Fleming, Kirby, and Ostdiek (2001) provide evidence that
volatility timing strategies outperform the unconditionally efficient static portfolios.
32According to Fama and French (1997) industry classification.
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of 764 stocks. Excluding 11 stocks with missing data for several information asymmetry
measures yields a final sample of 753 stocks.
At the end of each month all of the stocks in the final sample are ranked in ascending
order on the basis of their deviation in the corresponding information asymmetry measures
from their 12-month moving averages and are subsequently sorted into deciles. Decile 1
comprises stocks with the lowest increase in information asymmetry, which might also
be negative, and Decile 10 consists of stocks for which the information asymmetry has
increased the most. At the beginning of the following month, a decile portfolio is formed
that comprises all of the stocks sorted into the corresponding decile over the previous
three months.33 Thus, only one third of a decile portfolio is rebalanced each month.34 A
zero-cost trading strategy then buys the stocks with the lowest information asymmetry
increase in the previous three months (Decile 1) and sells the stocks with the highest
information asymmetry increase (Decile 10) accordingly. The average monthly returns
and the Sharpe ratios of the decile portfolios, based on deviations in the corresponding
information asymmetry measures, are presented in Panel B of Table II.11. Decile 1-10
shows the average monthly returns of the zero-cost trading strategy. I also report the
p-values of a two-tailed t-test with a null hypothesis of an average monthly return being
equal to zero.
On average, the monthly returns are slightly higher for the portfolios in the lower
deciles that consist of stocks with recent decreases in their information asymmetry levels.
These higher returns might be partially explained by the momentum effect, such that
price increases in the previous months lead to price increases in the following month as
well. However, the returns of the zero-cost trading strategy (Decile 1 - Decile 10) are not
33If a stock stays in the same decile over the previous two (three) months, then a double (triple) amount
is invested in this stock.
34The results are qualitatively the same, and even stronger, if 100% of a decile portfolio is rebalanced
monthly. However, a holding period of three months is more plausible in this setting.
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statistically significant. The positive average returns of the Decile 10 portfolio represent
an interesting result, because they mean that stocks with the highest increase in their
information asymmetry level in the past will on average rise in their price, possibly due
to some positive news. Although positive on average, the Decile 10 portfolio returns are
only marginally significant for the relative spread and not significant for the price impact
measures.
To control for the changes in volatility, I calculate Sharpe ratios for each decile.35
Starting from Decile 2, the Sharpe ratios gradually decrease and attain their lowest values
in Deciles 9 and 10 for all measures. This result is crucial, because it confirms the
importance of monitoring the variations in the information asymmetry over time. The
stocks with the highest increase in the informed trading in the past represent a relatively
poor investment in terms of compensation per each unit of risk incurred. This result is
driven by a disproportional volatility increase for the stocks in the higher information
asymmetry deciles. Although the volatility of the individual portfolios is not tabulated in
Table II.11, clearly some portfolios in the higher deciles have lower Sharpe ratios despite
having a higher monthly average return, as compared to portfolios in the lower deciles for
the same measure.36
Puzzling at first glance, the Sharpe ratios for the Decile 1 portfolios are lower than the
Decile 2 portfolios for the relative spread and the intraday price impact, and are equal
to each other for the Amihud measure. This counterintuitive observation is the result
of increased volatility for the stocks that experience a considerable rise in the number
of transactions by uninformed traders. Jones et al (1994) confirm a positive volatility-
35The Sharpe ratio is calculated as the ratio of the excess return of a portfolio to its total volatility in
the current month. Table II.11 reports average Sharpe ratios over 72 months or 6 years for each decile.
36For example, compare the Decile 8 and the Decile 4 portfolios for the Amihud measure, the Decile 8
and the Decile 3 portfolios for the intraday price impact, and the Decile 7 and the Decile 4 portfolios for
the relative spread.
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volume relation and further show that it is mainly driven by an increase in the number of
transactions, and not by their size. Overall, it is important to distinguish between different
sources for the volatility increase of a stock. The volatility can rise because of an increase
either in the number of uninformed traders or informed traders, or both. The Decile 1
portfolio comprises the stocks with the highest decrease in their information asymmetry
in the past three months. Thus, although information asymmetry has previously existed
for these stocks, it has probably been completely resolved after a corporate information
release, causing the arrival of additional uninformed investors to the market in the current
month. As in the example with the tender offer announcements, the relative spread and
the price impact measures experience a significant decline after an announcement release.
Simultaneously, the volume traded and the number of transactions surge, and the daily
volatility remains on a relatively high level, even without any information asymmetry
between the different investor types.37
The overall findings suggest that the risk-averse uninformed traders should avoid in-
vesting in stocks that have experienced extreme increases in their information asymmetry
level in the recent past. Monitoring the time-varying information asymmetry can thus
help them improve the volatility timing of their portfolios.
37The volatility argument is also important to demonstrate that the results for the higher deciles are
driven by an increase in the information asymmetry level of the stock, and not by the pure liquidity effects.
If a stock experiences a pure liquidity decline in the form of an exogenous decrease in the number of the
uninformed investors, its volatility should actually decrease due to a lower overall transaction number.
The high volatility of the higher decile portfolios rather signals an arrival of the informed traders to the
market.
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5 Conclusions
This paper tests the validity of the time-varying information asymmetry measures in
periods prior to unexpected events, such as tender offer announcements and the first
rumors about an upcoming bankruptcy filing. Since the levels of informed trading usually
increase in these periods, the information environment of the stock changes. A valid
measure should detect this change through the abnormal deviation from its base level of
the previous year.
The measures analyzed in this study can be divided into “mixed” measures that include
both an information component and a liquidity component, and “pure” measures that
extract a pure information component. Specifically, the relative spread, the intraday price
impact, and the Amihud measure belong to the “mixed” category, whereas the adverse
selection component and the order imbalance measures represent the “pure” information
asymmetry measures.
Based on a sample of 909 announcements of tender offers and the return crashes of 212
stocks that subsequently file for bankruptcy, this paper provides evidence that the “mixed”
measures consistently outperform the “pure” measures in both of the samples. The relative
spread and the price impact measures show significant deviations from their base levels
starting six months prior to tender offer announcements and as early as nine months prior
to the return crashes of subsequently bankrupt stocks. Further, these measures deviate
by a larger amount in periods when informed trading is more intensive, as measured by
the higher price runup ratios.
In contrast, the order imbalance measures do not show significant deviations in the
periods of increased informed trading, because the number and the value of the purchases
and sales increases proportionally. This proportional increase in trades in both directions
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contradicts the main underlying assumption of these measures - namely, that informed
traders unbalance the order flow either to the buy side or to the sell side. The adverse
selection component of the spread ceases to capture variations in the information asym-
metry over time after controlling for its changes in a group of stocks with similar trading
characteristics. Further analysis shows that this measure has similar time variations for
all stocks and that the changes in this measure are mechanically driven by the changes in
the spread level.
Further, this paper demonstrates that monitoring temporary deviations in the infor-
mation asymmetry can help the risk-averse uninformed investors better time the volatility
of their portfolios. Overall, the decile portfolios of stocks with high deviations in their
information asymmetry levels over the previous three months have lower Sharpe ratios
as compared to the portfolios of stocks that do not experience any changes or only slight
decreases in their informed trading.
The findings of this paper can be of interest for researchers from broad finance and
accounting areas, because the suggested “mixed” measures of the information asymmetry
are easy to construct and the Amihud measure requires only daily trading data. However,
caution needs to be exerted when using the suggested measures to identify changes in
informed trading in a particular stock. Additional controls for the changes in price and
volume are always necessary, because artificial deviations in the information asymmetry
measures can also be caused by exogenous changes in the trading characteristics of a
stock, which might occur, for example, after a stock split.
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Appendix A
Variable Definitions
Variable Description Source
Amihud The Amihud measure of illiquidity, defined as the ratio
of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume
on that day (Amihud, 2002).
CRSP
Cash Cash and the short-term investments of the company (in
million $)
Compustat
Event,
t = 0
One for observations in the event month (t = 0), which
includes the event day and 30 days thereafter, and zero
otherwise.
Eventt,
t [−1,−6]
One for observations in the month t, where t is defined
as CurrentMonth-EventMonth. Event days [-31;-1] are
assigned to t=-1, event days [-32;-62] to t=-2 and so on.
Lam The adverse selection component of the effective spread,
based on the estimation procedure of Lin, Sanger and
Booth (1995). For estimation details, please refer to the
Appendix B. Observations that lie outside of the range
between zero and one are set to missing values.
TAQ
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Variable Description Source
Leverage The market leverage of the company, defined as the ratio
of the total liabilities to the sum of the total liabilities
and the market capitalization of the company.
Compustat
Liabilities The total liabilities of the company (in million $) Compustat
MarketCap The market capitalization of the company (in million $) CRSP
NumberTrades The average daily number of trades in a particular stock TAQ
OIB The daily order imbalance, defined as the absolute dif-
ference between the number of buy- and sell-initiated
transactions in one day relative to the total number of
transactions.
TAQ
OIBvalue The trade value imbalance, defined as the absolute dif-
ference between the traded value of the buy- and sell-
initiated transactions to the total traded value in one
day.
TAQ
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Variable Description Source
PrcImp The price impact of each trade after five minutes, defined
as PrcImpt = 2 |Qt+5 −Qt| /(Qt · wt),
where Qt+5 represents the quote midpoint price of the
stock after five minutes and wt stands for the size of a
trade.
TAQ
Price (P) The closing price of a stock (in $) CRSP
ROA Return on assets, defined as the ratio of the operating
income after depreciation to the average total assets of
the current year and the previous year.
Compustat
RelSpr The relative spread, defined as the daily average quoted
bid-ask spread, scaled by the quote midpoint price; ob-
servations with RelSpr>0.5 are set to missing values.
TAQ
Sharpe The Sharpe ratio of the portfolio, calculated as
Sharpei = (Rit − Rft)/σRi. The Rit is the return of
a portfolio i in the month t and the Rft is the risk free
rate in the month t. Data on the risk free rates in the
USA comes from the Kenneth French’s website.
CRSP
Total Assets The total assets of the company (in million $) Compustat
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Variable Description Source
Volatility The annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns
over the calendar month
CRSP
Volume The average daily traded volume of a stock (in thou-
sands of shares)
CRSP
59
Appendix B
Computational Routines
For all of the high frequency measures, I use the NYSE TAQ database to extract the
necessary intraday transaction data. For each trade I assign the bid quote and the ask
quote that prevail at least one second before the trade took place.38 The final data set
contains the following items for each transaction:
1. Date and time stamp (up to seconds)
2. Transaction price (Pt)
3. Transaction volume in shares (wt)
4. Prevailing bid quote (Bt)
5. Prevailing ask quote (At)
I calculate the quote midpoint price (Qt) as the average of the prevailing bid and ask
quotes (Qt = At+Bt2 ). I further use the Lee and Ready’s (1991) algorithm to classify
trades into the buy-initiated and sell-initiated transactions. Specifically, I classify the
trades with a transaction price above the quote midpoint (Pt > Qt) as buy-initiated and
those with a transaction price below the quote midpoint (Pt < Qt) as sell-initiated. If a
transaction price is equal to the quote midpoint, I compare the current transaction price
with the previous transaction price. If Pt < Pt−1, I consider a trade to be sell-initiated;
if Pt > Pt−1, I consider it to be buy-initiated. Should the two prices be equal, I leave the
trade as unclassified.
38Henker and Wang (2006) consider this procedure to be more appropriate compared to the classical Lee
and Ready (1991) five-second rule. Bessembinder (2003) tries zero- to thirty-second delays in increments
of five seconds and does not find any differences in the results.
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Relative Spread
I calculate the relative spread for each transaction as the quoted bid-ask spread, scaled
by the quote midpoint:
RelSprt =
At−Bt
Qt
.
To reduce the noise, I average the relative spreads of all transactions for a stock over
one month and set observations with RelSpr > 0.5 to missing values.
Adverse Selection Component of the Spread
Following the Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) approach, I estimate the adverse selection
component of the effective spread, Lam, as the coefficient λ from the regression of the
change in logs of the quotes on the log of the one-half signed effective spread (zt = pt−qt):
qt+1 − qt = λ · zt + εt+1.
The qt stands for the logarithm of the quote midpoint Qt for a transaction t, and the
pt denotes the logarithm of the transaction price Pt. In this setup λ represents the adverse
selection component as the percentage of the effective spread.
Amihud Measure
Amihud (2002) was the first to propose the measure of the daily price impact that requires
only daily stock trading data. The Amihud measure is calculated as follows:
Amihudt =
|Returnt|
Pricet·V olumet .
For convenience of the coefficients’ presentation I multiply this ratio by 106.
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Intraday Price Impact
This measure is calculated as the five-minute price impact of the trade, scaled by its size:
PrcImpt = 2 |Qt+5 −Qt| /(Qt · wt),
where Qt+5 represents the quote midpoint price of the stock after five minutes (300
seconds). I average the intraday price impact of all trades for a stock over one month.
In principle, this measure corresponds to the Amihud measure. The only difference is
that the five-minute price impact is calculated on an intraday basis, whereas the Amihud
measure estimates the price impact over the whole day. The five-minute price impact
measure builds on the similar measure proposed by Riordan and Storkenmaier (2009),
but the measure used in this paper additionally controls for the size of the transaction.
Daily Order Imbalance
The measure of daily order imbalance (OIB), as proposed by Aktas et al (2007), captures
the absolute difference between the number of purchases and the number of sales in one
day relative to the total number of transactions:
OIB = |B−S|
B+S
,
where B stands for the number of buy-initiated transactions and S for the number of
sell-initiated transactions in one trading day. I classify each trade as buy- or sell-initiated
with the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm.
Trade Value Imbalance
In contrast to OIB, OIBvalue accounts not only for the imbalance in the number of
transactions, but also for their value. It is defined as the absolute difference between the
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traded value of the buy- and sell-initiated transactions to the total traded value in one
day:
OIBvalue = |BV AL−SV AL|
(BV AL+SV AL)
,
where BV AL =
∑m
t=1(P
A
t · wAt ) and SV AL =
∑n
t=1(P
B
t · wBt ).
PAt (wAt ) denotes the transaction price (size) at the ask and PBt (wBt ) is the transaction
price (size) at the bid.
63
Tables
Table II.1: Construction of Tender and Bankruptcy Samples. This table shows the details of
the sample construction. Panel A presents the steps in the construction of the tender sample that consists
of the announcements of tender offers in the USA between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2008. The
data source for the announcement dates of tender offers is the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) M&A
database. Panel B presents the steps in the construction of the bankruptcy sample. The bankruptcy
filings of the publicly traded US firms between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2008 are collected from
the BankruptcyData.com website.
Panel A: Tender Sample
Criteria Announcements
Dropped
Number of
announcements
Tender offer announcements with a publicly traded target
firm and a deal value over $1 mln
1,232
No repeat tender offer announcements for one target 57 1,175
Trading data available on CRSP for 12 months before the
announcement date
229 946
No missing data for all of the information asymmetry
measures
37 909
Panel B: Bankruptcy Sample
Criteria Announcements
Dropped
Number of
announcements
Bankruptcy filings of publicly traded firms for which
CUSIPs from CRSP could be identified
1,220
No repeat bankruptcy filings by one firm 54 1,166
Trading data available on CRSP for 36 months before the
announcement date
800 366
The month of the bankruptcy expectation is clearly
identified
105 261
No missing data for all of the information asymmetry
measures
49 212
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Table II.2: Firm Characteristics in Tender and Bankruptcy Samples. This table reports
summary statistics on the size and crucial financial variables of the firms in the tender and bankruptcy
samples. All statistics are reported on a firm-month level. MarketCap and Price data are taken from
CRSP. Financial statement variables on a quarterly basis come from Compustat. See Appendix A for
the exact definition of all variables. Panel A shows the characteristics of 909 firms in the tender sample
(879 firms for the Compustat variables). Panel B displays the statistics of 212 firms in the bankruptcy
sample (167 firms for the Compustat variables).
Panel A: Tender Sample
N Mean Std 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
MarketCap (in mln $) 9626 516 1251 21 50 129 399 1192
Total Assets (in mln $) 8228 709 2320 33 65 160 481 1255
Cash (in mln $) 8194 48 107 1 4 14 43 106
Liabilities (in mln $) 8198 461 1752 9 23 73 286 844
Price (in $) 9626 14 13 2 5 10 19 32
Leverage 8198 0.40 0.24 0.10 0.19 0.37 0.57 0.76
ROA 8160 0.00 0.06 -0.06 -0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05
Panel B: Bankruptcy Sample
N Mean Std 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
MarketCap (in mln $) 1844 503 1520 12 30 80 265 880
Total Assets (in mln $) 1373 1473 4146 36 83 204 753 2867
Cash (in mln $) 1376 60 162 0 2 7 35 130
Liabilities (in mln $) 1373 1223 3530 17 58 154 576 2415
Price (in $) 1844 8 10 1 3 5 9 18
Leverage 1373 0.64 0.24 0.28 0.48 0.69 0.83 0.93
ROA 1351 -0.03 0.07 -0.12 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.02
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Table II.3: Information Asymmetry Measures: Summary Statistics. This table displays sum-
mary statistics for the information asymmetry measures, the trading volume (in thousands of shares)
and the excess volatility of the stocks. Columns (2) through (4) report summary statistics twelve months
before the corresponding event month. Columns (5) through (7) report summary statistics in the month
immediately preceding the corresponding event month. The last column displays the p-value of the two-
sided t-test for the null-hypothesis that the difference in means between the two months equals zero. *
denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, ***
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Panel A summarizes the trading characteristics of 909
firms in the tender sample. Panel B displays the statistics of 212 firms in the bankruptcy sample. Ami-
hud, Volume and Volatility are calculated from the CRSP data. The remaining variables are constructed
from the intraday transaction data in the NYSE TAQ database. See Appendix A for the exact definition
of all variables and the Appendix B for construction and estimation details.
Panel A: Tender Sample
12M before 1M before t-test
Mean Median Std Mean Median Std
RelSpr 0.028 0.022 0.02 0.032 0.023 0.03 ***
Lam 0.424 0.415 0.19 0.430 0.416 0.17
Amihud 1.620 0.077 6.20 1.675 0.107 6.36
PrcImp 0.026 0.008 0.07 0.047 0.010 0.12 ***
OIB 0.292 0.287 0.13 0.291 0.292 0.13
OIBvalue 0.368 0.367 0.16 0.360 0.362 0.16
Volatility 0.557 0.478 0.32 0.661 0.540 0.46 ***
Volume 165 50 460 230 53 731 **
Panel B: Bankruptcy Sample
12M before 1M before t-test
Mean Median Std Mean Median Std
RelSpr 0.035 0.024 0.03 0.050 0.034 0.05 ***
Lam 0.404 0.386 0.18 0.404 0.404 0.17
Amihud 1.714 0.112 7.71 4.658 0.262 12.62 **
PrcImp 0.038 0.016 0.06 0.084 0.032 0.15 ***
OIB 0.265 0.267 0.13 0.268 0.266 0.12
OIBvalue 0.328 0.318 0.17 0.346 0.345 0.15
Volatility 0.668 0.597 0.36 0.793 0.675 0.46 **
Volume 619 88 1802 589 66 1649
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Table II.4: Number and Dollar Value of Purchase and Sale Transactions. This table displays
daily averages of the number of purchase and sale transactions and their corresponding dollar value (in
billions of dollars). Column (2) reports the corresponding means twelve months before the event month,
column (3) reports the statistics in the month immediately preceding the event month, and column (4)
reports the statistics for the event month. Panel A shows the results for 909 firms in the tender sample.
Panel B shows the results for 212 firms in the bankruptcy sample. All variables are constructed from the
intraday transaction data in the NYSE TAQ database. See Appendix A for the exact definition of all
variables.
Panel A: Tender Sample
12M before 1M before Event Month
Number of Purchases 134 223 284
Number of Sales 133 227 324
Value of Purchases ($ bln) 1.70 2.25 6.74
Value of Sales ($ bln) 1.63 2.25 8.18
Panel B: Bankruptcy Sample
12M before 1M before Event Month
Number of Purchases 383 388 538
Number of Sales 358 381 529
Value of Purchases ($ bln) 5.93 4.55 4.32
Value of Sales ($ bln) 5.34 4.20 4.42
67
Table II.5: Information Asymmetry Measures: Correlation Matrix. This table presents the
matrix of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients in the tender sample (Panel A) and in the bankruptcy
sample (Panel B). For brevity, p-values are not reported. All coefficients are statistically significant at
the 1% level, except the coefficients for Lam in the bankruptcy sample, which is no longer significantly
correlated to any of the other variables. See Appendix A for the exact definition of all variables.
Panel A: Tender Sample
RelSpr Lam Amihud PrcImp OIB OIBvalue Volat Volume
RelSpr 1.00
Lam -0.13 1.00
Amihud 0.87 -0.22 1.00
PrcImp 0.54 -0.12 0.51 1.00
OIB 0.61 -0.19 0.72 0.25 1.00
OIBvalue 0.63 -0.06 0.73 0.20 0.86 1.00
Volatility 0.38 -0.34 0.33 0.46 0.15 0.03 1.00
Volume -0.63 0.03 -0.80 -0.17 -0.70 -0.77 0.11 1.00
Panel B: Bankruptcy Sample
RelSpr Lam Amihud PrcImp OIB OIBvalue Volat Volume
RelSpr 1.00
Lam 0.05 1.00
Amihud 0.85 -0.06 1.00
PrcImp 0.57 0.02 0.47 1.00
OIB 0.65 -0.07 0.78 0.27 1.00
OIBvalue 0.69 0.02 0.80 0.23 0.88 1.00
Volatility 0.43 -0.24 0.33 0.50 0.13 0.07 1.00
Volume -0.64 -0.06 -0.86 -0.19 -0.78 -0.83 0.05 1.00
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Table II.6: Pre-Announcement Changes in Information Asymmetry Measures. Panels A and
B of this table present the cross-sectional averages of deviations in the information asymmetry measures
from their long-run means in t months preceding the corresponding event, and for the event month, t = 0.
The long-run mean for each stock is constructed over t=-24 to t=-12. P-values of a two-tailed t-test with
a null-hypothesis of a deviation being equal to zero are reported in form of asterisks to the right of each
coefficient. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** - at the 5% level, and *** - at the 1%
level. Panels C and D present the levels of the information asymmetry measures in different months for
Enron and Caminus Corp., respectively.
Panel A: Deviations in Tender Sample
t ∆RelSpr ∆Lam ∆Amihud ∆PrcImp ∆OIB ∆OIBvalue
0 -0.21 *** 0.10 *** -0.17 *** 0.81 *** 0.12 *** 0.06 ***
-1 0.19 *** 0.14 *** 0.50 *** 0.87 *** -0.01 -0.02
-2 0.20 *** 0.12 *** 0.55 *** 0.83 *** -0.01 -0.01
-3 0.14 *** 0.11 *** 0.51 *** 0.86 *** -0.01 -0.01
-4 0.13 *** 0.11 *** 0.45 *** 0.74 *** 0.00 -0.01
-5 0.10 *** 0.09 *** 0.43 *** 0.46 *** -0.00 0.01
-6 0.07 *** 0.08 *** 0.29 *** 0.48 *** -0.03 *** -0.02 ***
Panel B: Deviations in Bankruptcy Sample
t ∆RelSpr ∆Lam ∆Amihud ∆PrcImp ∆OIB ∆OIBvalue
0 0.90 *** 0.05 * 3.54 *** 3.35 *** -0.06 *** -0.05 ***
-1 0.53 *** 0.08 ** 2.98 *** 1.53 *** -0.01 0.04 **
-2 0.31 *** 0.07 ** 1.81 *** 1.41 *** -0.01 -0.01
-3 0.25 *** 0.09 ** 1.39 *** 0.76 *** -0.01 0.02
-4 0.23 *** 0.05 1.24 *** 0.72 *** -0.01 0.01
-5 0.22 *** 0.08 ** 0.78 *** 0.95 *** 0.01 0.02
-6 0.12 *** 0.07 * 0.89 *** 0.56 *** -0.03 -0.02
-7 0.12 *** 0.11 *** 0.53 *** 0.29 *** -0.01 -0.01
-8 0.09 *** 0.01 0.31 *** 0.16 * -0.03 -0.02
-9 0.02 0.06 0.13 * 0.13 * -0.01 -0.00
-10 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.15 -0.04 ** -0.04 **
-11 -0.02 0.06 ** -0.11 ** -0.13 ** 0.03 0.01
-12 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.16 *** -0.02 -0.03
Panel C: Enron Example
t RelSpr Lam Amihud PrcImp OIB OIBvalue
0 0.012 0.11 0.0002 0.04 0.16 0.25
-1 0.010 0.12 0.0002 0.06 0.07 0.15
-6 0.008 0.22 0.0001 0.01 0.13 0.17
Panel D: Caminus Example
t RelSpr Lam Amihud PrcImp OIB OIBvalue
0 0.033 0.57 0.0549 0.09 0.26 0.27
-1 0.052 0.49 0.2271 0.17 0.20 0.21
-6 0.015 0.43 0.1248 0.05 0.16 0.23
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Table II.7: Trading Characteristics of Matched Firms. This table displays the trading charac-
teristics of the event firms and their matched controls with the closest propensity scores. See Appendix
A for the exact definition of all variables. All variables used for the propensity score matching are calcu-
lated from the CRSP daily stock trading data. The market capitalization, MarketCap, and the inverse
of the price, 1/P , are taken at the beginning of the year in which an event has taken place. Volume and
volatility represent averages over the year in which an event has taken place. For each variable the table
displays the p-value of the two-sided t-test on the equality of the means. I also report the p-value of the
Hotelling’s F-test on the joint equality of the means of all matching variables in the event sample and
the corresponding control sample. Panel A summarizes the trading characteristics of 899 matched pairs
from the tender sample. Panel B displays the statistics of 201 pairs from the bankruptcy sample.
Panel A: Tender Sample
Tender Control T-test
N Mean Median Mean Median p-value
MarketCap (in mln $) 899 575 143 592 117 0.52
1/P 899 0.23 0.09 0.21 0.08 0.42
Volume (in 1,000 shares) 899 226 62 207 37 0.51
Volatility 899 0.59 0.52 0.58 0.51 0.32
Hotelling’s F-test 899 0.83
Panel B: Bankruptcy Sample
Bankruptcy Control T-test
N Mean Median Mean Median p-value
MarketCap (in mln $) 201 441 69 435 42 0.97
1/P 201 0.48 0.27 0.52 0.24 0.49
Volume (in 1,000 shares) 201 950 134 1322 78 0.33
Volatility 201 1.12 1.05 1.08 0.97 0.20
Hotelling’s F-test 201 0.13
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Table II.8: Difference-in-Differences Analysis. This table presents the cross-sectional averages
of the differences in deviations in the information asymmetry measures between the event firm and the
corresponding control firm in t months preceding the corresponding event, and for the event month,
t = 0. The long-run mean for each stock is constructed over t=-24 to t=-13. P-values of the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test with a null-hypothesis of equality of both distributions are reported in form of asterisks
to the right of each coefficient. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** - at the 5% level,
and *** - at the 1% level. Panel A displays the results of the difference-in-differences analysis for 899
matched pairs in the tender sample. Panel B presents the results of the difference-in-differences analysis
for 201 matched pairs in the bankruptcy sample.
Panel A: Tender Sample
t ∆2RelSpr ∆2Lam ∆2Amihud ∆2PrcImp ∆2OIB ∆2OIBvalue
0 -0.26 *** -0.03 -0.65 *** 0.15 0.12 *** 0.08 ***
-1 0.10 *** -0.01 0.05 0.32 ** -0.00 0.02
-2 0.13 *** -0.01 0.13 * 0.25 * -0.00 0.02
-3 0.09 *** -0.01 0.14 ** 0.32 ** -0.01 0.02
-4 0.09 *** -0.01 0.18 *** 0.25 ** 0.00 0.02 *
-5 0.08 *** -0.01 0.19 *** 0.05 0.02 0.04 ***
-6 0.03 0.03 0.11 ** 0.17 * -0.01 0.01
Panel B: Bankruptcy Sample
t ∆2RelSpr ∆2Lam ∆2Amihud ∆2PrcImp ∆2OIB ∆2OIBvalue
0 0.53 *** -0.11 *** 0.85 *** 0.92 *** -0.04 -0.07
-1 0.27 *** -0.02 0.69 *** 0.18 ** -0.02 0.01
-2 0.18 *** -0.01 0.44 *** 0.42 *** -0.03 -0.03
-3 0.12 *** -0.01 0.29 *** 0.09 0.01 -0.02
-4 0.12 *** -0.04 0.22 *** 0.35 ** -0.01 -0.03
-5 0.11 *** -0.01 0.20 * 0.05 0.03 0.04
-6 0.07 * -0.02 0.16 ** 0.18 *** -0.04 0.01
-7 0.07 * -0.01 0.21 *** 0.05 -0.07 -0.02
-8 0.09 * -0.01 0.14 * 0.19 * 0.01 -0.00
-9 0.07 * -0.02 0.10 0.05 0.05 -0.00
-10 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.14 -0.04 -0.00
-11 0.01 -0.01 0.12 * 0.05 -0.03 -0.01
-12 0.07 * -0.07 ** 0.02 0.11 * -0.04 ** -0.05 *
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Table II.9: Subsamples Analysis: Tender Sample. This table presents the cross-sectional averages
of the differences in deviations in the information asymmetry measures between the event firm and the
corresponding control firm in t months preceding the corresponding event, and for the event month,
t = 0. The long-run mean for each stock is constructed over t=-24 to t=-13. Panel A presents the results
for 450 firms in the tender sample with the above median price runup ratio, constructed as the ratio
of CAR[-120;-1] to CAR[-120;0]. Panel B presents the results for the remaining 449 firms for which the
price runup ratio lies below the sample median. The CARs are calculated on a daily basis with the help
of the market model and the CRSP value-weighted portfolio used as the market index. P-values of the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test with a null-hypothesis of equality of both distributions are reported in form
of asterisks to the right of each coefficient. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** - at the
5% level, and *** - at the 1% level.
Panel A: Higher Price Runup Ratio
t ∆2RelSpr ∆2Lam ∆2Amihud ∆2PrcImp ∆2OIB ∆2OIBvalue
0 -0.24 *** 0.00 -0.78 *** 0.31 0.08 *** 0.05 *
-1 0.10 ** -0.02 -0.12 0.50 *** -0.03 -0.02
-2 0.11 ** -0.01 -0.09 0.09 -0.03 0.01
-3 0.08 * 0.04 -0.03 0.39 ** -0.03 0.01
-4 0.11 *** 0.01 0.00 0.28 -0.00 0.01
-5 0.10 *** -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04 *
-6 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.26 * 0.00 0.01
Panel B: Lower Price Runup Ratio
t ∆2RelSpr ∆2Lam ∆2Amihud ∆2PrcImp ∆2OIB ∆2OIBvalue
0 -0.32 *** -0.04 -0.67 *** -0.20 0.16 *** 0.11 ***
-1 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.05 **
-2 0.09 * -0.01 0.23 ** 0.05 0.02 0.02
-3 0.07 -0.02 0.16 0.04 -0.01 0.02
-4 0.04 0.00 0.19 ** 0.09 0.00 0.03
-5 0.04 -0.03 0.24 *** 0.06 0.02 0.04 *
-6 -0.01 0.07 * 0.14 * 0.07 -0.02 0.00
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Table II.10: Subsamples Analysis: Bankruptcy Sample. This table presents the cross-sectional
averages of the differences in deviations in the information asymmetry measures between the event firm
and the corresponding control firm in t months preceding the corresponding event, and for the event
month, t = 0. The long-run mean for each stock is constructed over t=-24 to t=-13. Panel A presents
the results for 100 firms in the bankruptcy sample with the above median price runup ratio, constructed
as the ratio of CAR[-12;-1] to CAR[-12;0]. Panel B presents the results for the remaining 99 firms for
which the price runup ratio lies below the sample median. The CARs are calculated on a monthly basis
with the help of the market model and the CRSP value-weighted portfolio used as the market index.
P-values of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test with a null-hypothesis of equality of both distributions are
reported in form of asterisks to the right of each coefficient. * denotes statistical significance at the 10%
level, ** - at the 5% level, and *** - at the 1% level.
Panel A: Higher Price Runup Ratio
t ∆2RelSpr ∆2Lam ∆2Amihud ∆2PrcImp ∆2OIB ∆2OIBvalue
0 0.87 *** -0.17 ** 3.97 *** 2.64 *** -0.07 -0.02
-1 0.55 *** -0.17 ** 2.71 *** 1.67 *** -0.05 0.05
-2 0.31 *** -0.08 1.18 *** 1.17 ** -0.02 0.01
-3 0.23 ** -0.11 1.00 *** 0.69 -0.02 0.04
-4 0.19 ** -0.08 1.03 ** 0.45 -0.03 0.01
-5 0.17 * -0.05 0.46 * 0.32 0.02 0.06
-6 0.13 * 0.05 0.44 * 0.94 ** -0.01 0.08
-7 0.12 0.04 0.53 *** 0.13 -0.05 0.03
-8 0.09 0.01 0.16 -0.33 0.04 0.06
-9 0.08 -0.04 0.10 -0.09 -0.02 -0.03
-10 0.04 0.11 * -0.13 0.17 -0.09 * -0.04
-11 -0.02 0.04 0.12 -0.22 -0.06 * -0.05
-12 0.03 -0.07 0.04 0.20 -0.09 ** -0.08 **
Panel A: Lower Price Runup Ratio
t ∆2RelSpr ∆2Lam ∆2Amihud ∆2PrcImp ∆2OIB ∆2OIBvalue
0 0.48 *** -0.07 1.13 *** 2.59 *** -0.07 -0.09 **
-1 0.18 * 0.09 0.68 * 0.41 -0.06 -0.02
-2 0.08 -0.04 0.55 * 0.46 -0.06 -0.07 *
-3 0.08 0.01 0.39 -0.21 -0.03 -0.07
-4 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.02
-5 0.09 0.03 -0.03 0.34 -0.06 -0.02
-6 0.02 -0.03 0.28 0.11 -0.06 -0.08 *
-7 0.01 -0.05 -0.09 0.22 -0.05 -0.05
-8 -0.00 0.03 0.14 0.10 -0.04 -0.04
-9 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.27 ** 0.04 0.03
-10 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.15 0.03 0.04
-11 0.02 0.10 -0.12 0.06 0.02 -0.01
-12 0.02 -0.11 * -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01
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Table II.11: Returns and Sharpe Ratios of Risk Averse Trading Strategy. Panel A of this
table presents the details of the stock selection for the risk averse trading strategy. The sample period
covers years 2001 to 2007. Panel B presents the average monthly returns and the Sharpe ratios of the
decile portfolios that are formed by the risk averse trading strategy. The risk averse strategy buys the
stocks with the lowest increase in the information asymmetry in the previous month (Decile 1) and sells
the stocks with the highest increase in the information asymmetry (Decile 10). The holding period for
the risk averse strategy comprises 3 months. Decile 1-10 shows the average monthly returns of a zero-cost
portfolio (Buy-Sell). The Sharpe ratio is calculated as the ratio of the excess return of a portfolio to its
total volatility in the current month. Panel B reports the average monthly returns and the Sharpe ratios
over 72 months, or 6 years, for each of the deciles. P-values of a two-tailed t-test with a null-hypothesis
of an average monthly return equaling zero are reported in form of asterisks.
Panel A: Selection of Stocks
Criteria Firms Observations
All common stocks from the CRSP database traded
between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2007 on
NYSE, AMEX or Nasdaq
8,082 426,798
Trading data available on CRSP for a minimum of 24
months
6,007 403,808
Exclude Financials and Utilities 4,865 324,418
Random 20% of the market portfolio as of June 30, 2004 764 57,683
No missing data for all of the information asymmetry
measures
753 44,363
Panel B: Returns and Sharpe Ratios
RelSpr Amihud PrcImp
Decile Ret, % Sharpe Ret, % Sharpe Ret, % Sharpe
1 0.76 0.11 2.02 *** 0.29 1.24 ** 0.22
2 1.48 ** 0.24 1.66 *** 0.29 1.49 ** 0.26
3 1.46 ** 0.23 1.38 ** 0.24 1.11 * 0.18
4 1.29 ** 0.21 1.21 ** 0.21 1.19 ** 0.19
5 1.44 ** 0.22 1.09 ** 0.19 1.35 ** 0.22
6 1.25 ** 0.20 1.18 ** 0.20 1.25 * 0.19
7 1.29 * 0.18 0.93 0.13 1.27 * 0.19
8 1.26 * 0.17 1.26 * 0.17 1.32 * 0.18
9 1.22 * 0.16 0.95 0.11 1.05 0.13
10 1.17 * 0.16 0.93 0.09 1.34 0.15
1-10 -0.41 1.09 -0.10
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Chapter III
Trading Aggressiveness and its
Implications for Market Efficiency
1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the influence of abnormal trading aggressiveness on the speed of price
adjustment after earnings announcement releases. An investor is trading aggressively if
he prefers quicker execution of his limit order over a better execution price. Such a
situation is most likely to arise when investors expect immediate changes in the value
of a stock, and therefore the speed of order execution is of primary importance. Two
recent examples of abnormal trading aggressiveness on the market are the Flash Crash
(May 6, 2010), when the Dow Jones Industrial Average index (DJIA) dropped by more
than 1,000 points in less than one hour, and the release of erroneous information about
the United Airlines bankruptcy from Bloomberg on September 8, 2008. In both of these
events, traders switched to the most aggressive orders on the market as soon as they
realized that they were better off by having their orders executed immediately, even at
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inferior prices.1 Waiting for execution at the best quoted price in such moments is costly,
because the best quote might change by a large amount within the next second.
Quick action also pays off in periods immediately following corporate information re-
leases. New information makes investors revise their beliefs, which leads to a subsequent
increase in trading aggressiveness. What implications does abnormal trading aggressive-
ness have on the speed of price adjustment after a corporate information release? A higher
execution speed of an aggressive order ensures that a larger portion of this order is exe-
cuted within a given time interval, as compared to a standard limit order. Thus, aggressive
trading enables quicker price changes over relatively short time intervals. Quicker changes
are beneficial if aggressive trading is informative and, thus, pushes the stock price more
quickly towards its new equilibrium value. In contrast, if aggressive trades are mostly
submitted by uninformed traders, who are just as likely to buy or to sell, then quick
price changes in different directions might increase intraday volatility and the probability
of price overshooting. An abnormal increase in intraday volatility may slow down the
stabilization of a price at its new equilibrium value.2
Empirical results of this paper show that, on average, the negative effect of increased
trading aggressiveness dominates. Abnormal trading aggressiveness is especially harmful
for stocks with low liquidity levels, because the adjustment times of illiquid stocks with
abnormal trading aggressiveness are significantly longer compared to the time period be-
fore aggressive orders became available. However, the negative effect declines if aggressive
trades are more informative and move the stock prices in the correct direction.
1As documented by Chakravarty et al (2011b) for the Flash Crash day and Lei and Li (2010) for the
false announcement of the United Airlines bankruptcy.
2Fleming and Remolona (1999) analyze a two-stage adjustment process in the U.S. Treasury market
upon arrival of macroeconomic announcement releases. They identify the first stage as an almost imme-
diate price reaction with a reduction in trading volume. The second “stabilization” stage lasts for more
than an hour with abnormal price volatility, trading volume, and bid-ask spreads.
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I measure trading aggressiveness as a proportion of the total volume that is executed
through aggressive orders within a particular interval of time. To differentiate aggressive
orders from non-aggressive ones, I use a new order type, called an intermarket sweep
order (ISO), that represents the most aggressive trading instrument on U.S. equity mar-
kets. If an order is marked as an ISO, a trading venue has to give this order an immediate
execution - even if this execution leads to a trade-through of the best quoted price.3 Since
an ISO is marked as such at the time of its submission, I can ex post observe investor
preferences for the speed of order execution.
Earnings announcements are the most natural choice for this study, because they
represent the most common type of information release for any stock. Further, earnings
announcements are released regularly for a broad cross-section of firms in the market in
the short period of time since ISOs became available in October 2007.
The major findings of this paper are as follows. First, I show that ISO trades have
higher intraday price impacts than non-ISO trades and the difference in the price impacts
between ISO and non-ISO trades is larger for illiquid stocks. The reason is that illiquid
stocks have a thin order book with a lower number of shares quoted at each price, and,
therefore, aggressive orders can move the prices of these stocks more easily. Further,
I investigate the intraday changes in trading aggressiveness on earnings announcement
days and document a significant 15% increase in the proportion of ISO volume in the
first 15 minutes after an announcement release. Afterward, the proportion of the volume
traded with aggressive orders steadily decreases, but it continues to deviate significantly
from its base level until the end of the trading day. Additional analysis shows that
the post-announcement jump in trading aggressiveness can be explained by a significant
increase in the proportion of the sell volume of ISOs after the negative earnings surprises.
3Chakravarty et al (2010) provides an excellent overview of ISO characteristics and their use on the
current financial markets.
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This result suggests that investors trade more aggressively when confronted with negative
news. For positive news releases, ISOs are largely uninformative in the first two hours
after announcement releases with large increases in the proportions of ISO volume in both
trading directions.
Further, this paper establishes the link between increases in investors’ trading ag-
gressiveness and the speed of price adjustment after earnings announcement releases.4
The length of the price adjustment period is defined as the number of five-minute inter-
vals from an announcement release until the interval in which the realized volatility of the
one-minute midpoint returns is no longer abnormal.5 For identification, I use a difference-
in-differences approach that controls for differences in the speed of price adjustment of the
stocks in the pre-Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS) period, when aggressive
orders were not yet available.
The results of the difference-in-differences analysis suggest that the relation between
the changes in trading aggressiveness and the speed of price adjustment is rather weak for
liquid stocks, but exhibits a pronounced U-shape for stocks with low liquidity levels. Since
liquid stocks have a deep limit order book, the adverse effects from increases in trading
aggressiveness do not have a significant impact on the adjustment process of these stocks.
By contrast, high increases in aggressive trading significantly slow down price adjustment
of illiquid stocks: doubling the proportion of ISO volume on an announcement day results
in a 78-minute delay in the adjustment of illiquid stocks relative to its benchmark level of
4Note that only changes in trading aggressiveness, as opposed to its levels, are suitable for the analysis
of its effect on the speed of price adjustment. The reason is that the adverse effect on intraday volatility,
and thus on the price stabilization process, only arises if the proportion of aggressive trades actually
increases. By contrast, if trading aggressiveness is high, but stays at its pre-announcement level, there is
no additional increase in the intraday volatility of a stock. In fact, the speed of price adjustment might be
quicker for this stock than for a stock that experiences a rise in its intraday volatility due to the increased
use of aggressive orders on the announcement day.
5I prefer the volatility criterion over measuring abnormal returns or the serial correlation in returns,
because it covers both stages of price adjustment: the initial price reaction and the subsequent stabiliza-
tion period.
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4 hours and 40 minutes when the level of trading aggressiveness remains constant. This
overall negative effect of aggressive trading is more pronounced after positive earnings sur-
prises, when aggressive trading is largely uninformative. After negative earnings surprises,
when the majority of aggressive trades is submitted in the direction of the earnings sur-
prise, the impact is less pronounced and no longer statistically significant. Interestingly,
large decreases in trading aggressiveness can be even more harmful for illiquid stocks.
With low trading aggressiveness, price changes of illiquid stocks are not sufficiently quick,
which slows down the adjustment process.
This paper contributes to the on-going debate on the efficiency of financial markets.
Specifically, it examines how the investors’ trading process directly influences price ad-
justment. There is a vast amount of literature that investigates investor trading around
information releases.6 Surprisingly, the overlap between this literature and the price ad-
justment literature is relatively small.7 To the best of my knowledge, only two studies
exist that examine the relation between the trading process and the speed of price ad-
justment after information releases. Woodruff and Senchack (1988) find that stocks with
large positive earnings surprises experience quicker adjustments than stocks with large
negative earnings surprises. They further show that a large number of smaller trades
occurs after positive earnings surprises and relatively few but larger trades after negative
earnings surprises. However, they do not establish the causal relation between differences
6One of the first studies to analyze investor trading around information releases is Lee (1992), which
examines differences in the clustering of small and large trades around earnings announcements. Recent
studies examine the informativeness of institutional (Ali, Klasa, and Li (2008)) and individual trades
(Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2008), Kaniel et al (2012)) around earnings announcements. Also, Sarkar
and Schwartz (2009) document a post-announcement increase in two-sided trading, especially when the
news surprises are large.
7Prior empirical studies on the speed of price adjustment investigate the duration of the adjustment
process for different announcement types (Patell and Wolfson (1984) for earnings announcements; Ed-
erington and Lee (1993) for macroeconomic releases; Busse and Green (2002) for releases of analysts’
opinions; Brooks, Patel and Su (2003) and Coleman (2011) for unanticipated events) and relate it to the
degree of earnings surprise (Jennings and Starks (1985)), firm and report characteristics (Defeo (1986),
Damodaran (1993)), timing of an announcement (Francis, Pagach, and Stephan (1992)), and differences
in market structures (Greene and Watts (1996), Masulis and Shivakumar (2002)).
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in trading processes and the speed of price adjustment. Ederington and Lee (1995) ex-
amine the short-run dynamics of price adjustment in interest rate and foreign exchange
futures markets. They find that prices adjust in a series of small price changes, and not
in few large price jumps, which also suggests that there is intensive trading immediately
after an information release. Whereas both of the previous studies concentrate mainly on
trade size and transaction frequency, the main focus of this paper is the effect of investors’
trading aggressiveness, disclosed by their preference for the speed of order execution, on
the price adjustment process.
Following the pioneering work of Chakravarty et al (2010), this paper also sheds light
on the use and characteristics of intermarket sweep orders on the current financial markets.
In addition to Chakravarty et al (2011a), who analyze changes in market breadth and daily
trading aggressiveness on an announcement day, I investigate intraday changes in the use
of aggressive orders. Further, I examine the informativeness of ISO trades by testing
whether the proportion of ISO volume increases more in the direction of the earnings
surprise right after an announcement release.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides details
of the relevant institutional framework and develops the main hypotheses of this study.
Section 3 describes the construction of the data set. Section 4 analyzes the use and
characteristics of aggressive orders in the base period and around earnings announcements.
Section 5 investigates how abnormal trading aggressiveness affects the speed of price
adjustment after an announcement release. Section 6 briefly concludes.
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2 Institutional Background and Hypothesis
Development
2.1 Overview of Intermarket Sweep Orders
On August 29, 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a new set
of rules, known as the Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS). The SEC designed
the new regulation to modernize US equity markets and to promote their efficiency. Due
to technical difficulties with the implementation of several changes required by this new
regulation, markets achieved full compliance with Reg NMS first in October 2007.8
The most important change introduced by Reg NMS is the adoption of the Order
Protection Rule (Rule 611) that requires execution of any incoming order at the best
available price. The best available price is defined as the lowest ask or the highest bid
price quoted over the previous one second among all equity trading venues in the US. If
the trader sends a limit order to a venue that does not currently quote the best price, then
this venue has to re-route the order to the venue with the best price. The Order Protection
Rule caters mainly to the interests of retail investors. The best-price execution guarantee
increases the retail investors’ confidence and decreases their search costs for the best
available price. Further, protection of the best-priced limit orders minimizes the investors’
transaction costs, because the number of trade-throughs automatically declines.9
Although appealing to retail investors with a long-term investment horizon, the Order
Protection Rule is less attractive for short-term and institutional investors. Suppose an
institutional investor wants to sell 3,200 shares at a price not lower than $10.67. For
simplicity, suppose only two trading venues exist: A and B. Figure III.1 shows the bid
8See Regulation NMS, SEC Release No. 34-51808.
9A trade-through occurs when the best available bid or the best available offer quotation is ignored,
or in other words, “traded-through”.
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Figure III.1: Bid Side of Limit Order Book
Price Shares A Shares B
$10.75 500
$10.73 500
$10.70 2,000
$10.67 3,500
$10.66 3,000
sides of limit order books in two venues. The first column shows the currently quoted
bid prices, the second column indicates the number of shares available at each price for
venue A and the third column displays the corresponding number of shares for venue B.10
Assume that an investor submits his order to A. However, A’s depth at the best available
quote, $10.75, is too small for the order to be fully executed: only 500 shares can be sold
at the best price. Venue B quotes the next best bid price at $10.73. Under the Order
Protection Rule the outstanding part of the order (2,700 shares) has to be re-routed by
venue A to venue B. After an execution of 500 shares at $10.73 on venue B, the remaining
part (2,200 shares) has to be re-routed to A again. However, re-routing takes time and
the best bid offer can change while the order is being re-routed. Thus, the execution of
large-sized orders under the Order Protection Rule takes longer and might end up at an
inferior average price as compared to having the whole order executed at a single venue.
To avoid such situations, the Order Protection Rule makes an exemption for a spe-
cific order type, an intermarket sweep order (ISO). An ISO is a marketable limit order
(Immediate-or-Cancel) and it provides an opportunity for institutional investors to trade
large blocks quickly. Specifically, when an ISO arrives at a particular trading venue, it is
executed as if this venue stands alone, ignoring the other venues. An ISO simply walks
down the limit order book until either the order is completely filled or the limit price of
10Note that total depth at each price is equal to the sum of the number of shares quoted at this price
and the cumulative number of shares quoted above this price for the bid side of the book (or, equivalently,
below this price for the ask side of the book). Thus, total depth for P = $10.70 on trading venue A
equals 2,500 shares (500 shares quoted at $10.75 and additional 2,000 shares quoted at $10.70).
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the order is reached (the outstanding part of an ISO is then canceled). Importantly, there
is no re-routing requirement, even if some parts of the order are executed at inferior prices
as compared to the best national bid offer. To comply with the principles of the Order
Protection Rule, an investor submitting an ISO is obliged to send additional limit orders,
also marked as ISOs, with the same limit price to all other venues quoting the stock. The
total size of these additional ISOs should equal the total number of shares available at
quotes superior to the limit price at the time of the submission of the ISO. Therefore, an
ISO represents a series of marketable limit orders with the same limit price sent across
all trading venues quoting the stock. The total size of all simultaneously sent ISOs equals
the total number of shares available at prices better than the indicated limit price plus
any additional number of shares at the limit price.11
Suppose that an institutional investor wants to sell another 3,200 shares at the limit
price of $10.67 with an ISO. Thus, the investor sends two limit orders, marked as ISO,
with the same limit price of $10.67 simultaneously to both venues, A and B. The total
size of the order is then optimally split between the two venues: an ISO sent to A has
the total size of 2,700 and an ISO sent to B has a total size of 500. Since trading
venues can recognize both orders as ISOs, they do not re-route either of them. Both
venues instantaneously execute ISOs against the outstanding orders up to a limit price of
$10.67. An investor instantly sells 3,200 shares and the new best price drops to $10.67 on
venue A. Note that the institutional investor satisfies its obligations with respect to the
Order Protection Rule because the investor has extracted all available shares that are
quoted at prices better than $10.67 from both venues.
11Paragraph (b)(30) of Rule 600 gives a formal definition of an intermarket sweep order as a limit order
that satisfies the following requirements: (1) when routed to a trading venue, the limit order is identified
as an intermarket sweep order; and (2) simultaneously with the routing of the limit order identified as an
intermarket sweep order, one or more additional limit orders, as necessary, are routed to execute against
the full displayed size of all protected quotations with a superior price.
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2.2 Hypothesis Development
Speed of price adjustment. Prior empirical studies document an increase in trading
aggressiveness, measured as the proportion of ISO volume, following companies’ informa-
tion releases.12 What implications does an increased use of ISOs have on the speed of
price adjustment? With their ability to sweep liquidity almost instantly up to a particular
price level, ISOs on average produce a higher change in the best quoted bid/ask price (the
price impact) within a given trading interval, as compared to the standard limit order.
To illustrate this point, assume that if an investor trades one share, then the best quoted
bid/ask price changes by σ. In other words, the price impact per share traded equals σ.
The trading day consists of a finite number of T intervals. During a given interval t, an
order can either be submitted to one trading venue (or several trading venues in the case
of an ISO), be (fully or partially) executed at one of the venues, or be re-routed from one
venue to another.
Suppose that a standard limit order and an aggressive limit order of an identical size s
and with an identical limit price are submitted in t. In t+1, they arrive to the market and
are ready for execution. Since the aggressive order is split at t across different exchanges
as a series of limit orders, these exchanges do not need to search for the best quoted prices.
Instead, all of the ISOs get immediate executions across all exchanges and the total size s
of the aggressive order is executed at t+1. The full price impact of the aggressive order,
σ · s, is then realized within one trading interval t+1.
There are three possible execution scenarios for the standard limit order:
1) If the investor sends the limit order to the exchange with the best price quotes and
the number of shares available at the best quotes is greater than s, then the venue fully
12Chakravarty et al (2011a) report an increase in the proportion and volume of ISOs after earnings
announcements. Lei and Li (2010) document the increased use of ISOs after the erroneous information
on a bankruptcy announcement of the United Airlines on September 8, 2008.
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executes the limit order. In this case, the limit order also produces the full price impact,
σ · s, within t+1.
2) If the investor sends the limit order to the exchange that does not quote the best
price, it searches for the exchange with the best available quotes and re-routes the order
to that exchange. No shares are executed and the price impact for t+1 equals 0.
3) If the investor sends the limit order to the exchange with the best price quotes, but
the number of shares available at the best quotes, y, is smaller than s (y < s), then the
exchange only executes y shares and re-routes the outstanding part of the order, s− y, to
another exchange with the next best available price. The price impact within t+1 equals
σ · y < σ · s.
Dependent on the liquidity of the stock, some scenarios are more prevalent than others.
For example, for liquid stocks, the first scenario probably dominates, because there is large
depth at each price level for these stocks. For illiquid stocks with a low number of shares
available at each price, the last scenario occurs more frequently. However, on average,
the price impact of a standard limit order is lower than the price impact of an aggressive
order within t+1, because the full price impact does not get necessarily realized within
one trading interval.
Consider the previous numerical example. Figure III.2 summarizes the number of
shares executed and the price impact of both orders in each trading interval. Price impact
is calculated as the difference between the best bid price prior to the execution and the
best bid price after the execution.
Note that in t=1 the price impact of the standard order equals only $0.02 when the
venue executes the first 500 shares at the best available price, whereas the price impact
of the aggressive order, $0.08, is fully realized, because the total size of the order (3,200
shares) is immediately executed at both venues. If the limit order book does not change
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Figure III.2: Price Impact Interval-by-Interval: Limit Order versus ISO
Limit order ISO
t Action Shares
exe-
cuted
Best
Price
before
Best
Price
after
Price
Im-
pact
Shares
exe-
cuted
Best
Price
before
Best
Price
after
Price
Im-
pact
0 Submission
1 Execution 500 $10.75 $10.73 $0.02 3,200 $10.75 $10.67 $0.08
2 Re-routing
3 Execution 500 $10.73 $10.70 $0.03
4 Re-routing
5 Execution 2,200 $10.70 $10.67 $0.03
Total 3,200 $0.08 3,200 $0.08
over time, the cumulative price impact of both orders is the same after t=5. The standard
limit order just takes a longer time to execute because of the re-routing between the two
different exchanges in search of the best execution price.
Since an aggressive order has on average a higher price impact within a given trad-
ing interval, the higher proportion of aggressive orders in the order flow subsequent to
an announcement release enables quicker price movements within short time intervals.
Quicker price movements are beneficial for price adjustment if the majority of traders are
informed in the following sense: they have already correctly processed new information
and know the true equilibrium value of a stock. They can then purchase the stock if it is
undervalued or sell the stock if it is overvalued, pushing the stock price towards its new
equilibrium value. In this case, an increase in trading aggressiveness might speed up price
adjustment due to a quicker movement of the price in the correct direction.
However, quicker price movements might also slow down the adjustment process if
the majority of aggressive traders are uninformed, in the sense that they do not observe
the true equilibrium value of a stock and can only form their subjective beliefs about
it. Some uninformed investors will purchase the stock and push the price temporarily
upwards, whereas the other uninformed investors will sell the stock and push the price
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downwards. As the stock price continuously experiences quick upward changes, followed
by quick downward changes, it might be constantly over- and undershooting its true
equilibrium value. Thus, large increases in aggressive trading by uninformed investors with
heterogeneous beliefs produce additional abnormal volatility and make the stabilization
of a price at its new level harder.
Overall, the positive effect of quicker price movements towards the new equilibrium
value should dominate in situations with the higher proportion of informed traders,
whereas the negative effect of increased intraday volatility should dominate when the
majority of aggressive traders are uninformed and have heterogeneous beliefs about the
true value of the stock.
Liquid versus illiquid stocks. Does the influence of trading aggressiveness on the
speed of price adjustment differ for stocks with high and low liquidity? Since illiquid
stocks have a lower depth of the limit order book at each price level (their limit order
book is “thinner”), the price impact per share traded is overall higher for these stocks.
Importantly, the difference in price impact within a given trading interval between an
aggressive order and a standard order should be higher for an illiquid stock than for a
liquid stock. The effect of the aggressive order should be larger on the price of an illiquid
stock, because a larger number of shares is executed within a given trading interval and,
additionally, the price changes by a larger amount per each traded share. Basically, the
effect of a thinner book for illiquid stocks is additionally multiplied with the effect of
faster trading with aggressive orders, and an aggressive order thus goes faster through a
thinner limit order book. Therefore, I expect the positive and negative effects of increased
aggressive trading on the speed of price adjustment to be more pronounced for illiquid
stocks.
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3 Data and Sample Construction
3.1 Earnings Announcements Sample
The data source for the earnings announcements is the Institutional Brokers Estimate
System (I/B/E/S) database. I collect announcements between January 2006 and Decem-
ber 2009 that happen within the trading hours of US equity trading exchanges (9:30 a.m.
to 16:00 p.m. EST).13 Each record has an exact date and a time stamp (up to a minute).
Further, I require that each firm exists in the intersection set of I/B/E/S and CRSP.
Table II.1 provides details of the sample construction.
[Insert Table II.1 approximately here]
The initial sample comprises 10,334 announcements by 3,361 firms. I omit 647 an-
nouncements by 88 firms for which a stock is not traded on the announcement day, and
another 967 announcements by 267 firms for which intraday transaction data are not
available. Following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), I further eliminate very illiquid stocks
for which the closing price is less than $5 at the beginning of the base period. The rea-
soning behind this elimination is that the large deviations in intraday volatility of these
stocks on their announcement days might be biased upwards by the virtue of their low
price levels. Excluding days with multiple announcements and announcements with less
than 40 days of trading data previously available leaves 5,944 announcements by 2,307
firms.14 To ensure that the differences in results between the pre-Reg NMS period and
the post-Reg NMS period are not driven by differences in the characteristics of the un-
derlying stocks, I require that each stock in the sample has at least one announcement in
13I use earnings announcements from the pre-Reg NMS period to form the control group of stocks,
needed for the difference-in-differences analysis.
14I require at least 40 days of trading data to be available prior to an announcement, because I use
these days to calculate values in the base period that consists of days [-38;-2].
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each period. The final sample consists of 3,613 announcements by 675 firms, out of which
1,818 announcements happen prior to the adoption of Reg NMS and 1,795 afterward.
One of the requirements for the data set’s construction is that an announcement should
happen within trading hours. Out of the 6,536 firms for which I/B/E/S reports earnings
announcement releases over 2006 to 2009, 3,175 firms do not announce within trading
hours. The remaining 3,361 firms constitute the initial sample out of which 58 firms
release their earnings information exclusively within trading hours and 3,303 announce
both within and outside trading hours. Overall, firms announcing both within and outside
trading hours are smaller than the firms announcing only outside trading hours, with the
median market capitalization of $239 million and $482 million, respectively (results not
tabulated). Even though there is a bias towards smaller firms, the initial sample still
covers more than 50% of all of the firms with earnings announcement releases. Table III.2
summarizes the main firm characteristics in the final sample and the initial sample. All
variable definitions are in the appendix.
[Insert Table III.2 approximately here]
The median firm in the final sample has a larger market capitalization of $256 million,
as compared to $239 million of the median firm in the initial sample. Since I exclude
small and illiquid stocks with closing prices below $5 from the final sample, the median
firm in this sample is more liquid than the median firm in the initial sample, as measured
by the daily relative spread and the daily Amihud measure.15
3.2 Intraday Transaction and Quote Data
The source for the intraday transaction data is the NYSE Transaction and Quote
database (TAQ). In the first step, I extract data on the number and trading volume ex-
15The Amihud (2002) measure is defined as the ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar
trading volume on that day: Illiqi,t = |Ret|i,t /Dollar V olumei,t.
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ecuted with the ISOs and standard limit orders (non-ISOs) for each stock in the final
sample on their announcement days as well as 40 trading days preceding the announce-
ments. The ISOs are marked with the code “F” in the condition field of the TAQ database.
The base period consists of 39 trading days preceding an announcement day, starting on
day -40 and ending on day -2. I collapse transaction-by-transaction data over 15-minute
intervals and extract the number of trades and traded volume in each 15-minute interval
separately for the ISOs and non-ISOs. I use a modified Lee and Ready’s (1991) algorithm
to identify the direction of a trade, with the bid (Bt) and the ask quote (At) that prevail
one second before the trade takes place.16
The quoted relative spread for a transaction is defined as the difference between the
corresponding ask and the corresponding bid, scaled by the midpoint price (RelSprt =
(At − Bt)/Qt). The midpoint price (Qt) is calculated as the average of the prevailing
bid and ask quotes (Qt = At+Bt2 ). I set the observations with RelSpr > 0.5 to the
missing values. The effective relative spread of each transaction is calculated as twice
the absolute difference between the transaction price and the midpoint price, scaled by
the midpoint price (EffSprt = 2 |Pt −Qt| /Qt). Observations with EffSpr > 0.5 are
also set to missing values. The price impact of each trade after five minutes is defined
as PrcImpt = 2 |Qt+5 −Qt| /(Qt · wt) where Qt+5 represents the midpoint price for a
stock after five minutes (300 seconds), and wt is the size of the transaction (in shares).
Note that this measure is similar to the daily Amihud measure, but it is calculated on an
intraday basis.
The intraday one-minute returns are computed from the closing midpoint price for each
minute from the TAQ Consolidated Quotes database. Closing midpoints better serve the
16Henker and Wang (2006) consider this procedure to be more appropriate compared to the classical Lee
and Ready (1991) five-second rule. Bessembinder (2003) tries zero- to thirty-second delays in increments
of five seconds and does not find any differences in the results.
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purposes of the price adjustment analysis, because they exclude the bid-ask bounce that
is present in the transaction prices.
4 Trading Aggressiveness around Earnings
Announcements
Definition of Trading Aggressiveness. I define trading aggressiveness as the propor-
tion of total volume traded with ISOs within a particular time interval (the proportion
of ISO volume, %ISO V olume). Daily trading aggressiveness is the proportion of daily
volume that is executed through ISOs. Intraday trading aggressiveness is measured as the
proportion of ISO volume over a respective time interval within a day, for example 15 min-
utes, 1 hour etc.17 In the remainder of the paper I use the terms “trading aggressiveness”
and “trading with aggressive orders” interchangeably.
The median proportion of ISO volume in my sample is 36%. However, the variation
is quite significant with 22% of the volume traded with ISOs for firms in the lowest decile
and 56% in the highest decile (not tabulated).
Trading characteristics of aggressive orders. Panel A of Table III.3 summarizes
the differences in the characteristics of ISOs and non-ISOs in the base period and in the
hours immediately following the release of an earnings announcement.
[Insert Table III.3 approximately here]
Columns 1 and 2 display the bootstrapped means for the ISOs and non-ISOs from the
base period, correspondingly.18 Columns 3 and 4 report the cross-sectional mean of the
17The proportion of the total number of trades executed with ISOs is highly correlated with the
proportion of ISO volume (correlation coefficient of 93%). None of my results is materially affected if I
use the proportion of ISO trades to measure trading aggressiveness.
18Since the base period is rather short (38 days) and proportions of the number of trades and of their
volume are not normally distributed, I estimate their means with a bootstrap procedure. Specifically,
I draw with replacement one observation from the base period that happened between the time of an
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respective variables starting from an announcement release until the end of the trading
day. Column 5 displays the difference-in-differences (or simply the difference between the
base period and the event day for variables, calculated as proportions) and tests their
significance with a standard t-test.
The proportion of trades, executed with aggressive orders, %Trades, equals 40.8%
in the base period. It increases significantly by 4.6% in hours immediately following
an information release. The proportion of the total volume executed with aggressive
orders, %V olume, (37.8%) is lower than %Trades in the base period, but it also signif-
icantly increases to 42.4% on announcement days. The reason for the lower proportion
of ISO volume is the overall smaller size of the ISOs. The average size of an ISO in
the base period equals 176 shares, as compared to 256 shares for a non-ISO.19 Over-
all, the ISO characteristics in my sample are similar to the ISO characteristics in the
Chakravarty et al (2010) sample.20
Interestingly, investors use ISOs approximately as much for purchases as for sales. The
proportion of ISO purchase volume, %Purchases, and the proportion of ISO sales vol-
ume, %Sales, both increase significantly by around 4% on announcement days. Further,
the effective relative spread, EffSpr, is marginally lower for ISOs in the base period,
1.73%, as compared to 1.82% for non-ISOs. However, it does not differ significantly from
the non-ISO effective spread on event days. As liquidity around information releases de-
clines, all traders, including uninformed ones, become more aggressive, and the effective
relative spread increases accordingly to the level of non-ISOs. The price impact of ISO
announcement release and the end of the trading day for each stock-announcement and repeatedly cal-
culate the mean across all stock-announcements in this bootstrapped sample. I repeat this step for 1,000
bootstrapped samples.
19The size of an ISO is smaller, because the TAQ database does not record a cumulative size for all ISOs
sent simultaneously across all exchanges, but rather the size of each individual order sent and executed
on a particular stock exchange.
20The proportion of ISO trades is 46% and the proportion of ISO volume equals 41% in their sample.
The average size of an ISO equals 178 shares and is also significantly smaller than the average size of a
standard limit order.
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trades, PrcImp, is higher than the price impact of non-ISOs, and even more so in hours
following an information release (the difference-in-differences equals 0.11% and is statis-
tically significant at the 5% level). This finding is important, because it provides the first
supportive evidence for the assumption that ISO trades have a higher price impact within
a given trading interval, as compared to non-ISO trades.
Next, I examine changes in the use of aggressive orders at the intraday level.
Figure III.3 displays mean percentage deviations in the proportion of ISO volume through-
out an announcement day. The deviations from the bootstrapped means are measured in
15-minute intervals relative to the 15-minute interval with an earnings announcement re-
lease (interval 0). The dashed line shows the 1% significance level for the mean percentage
change in the proportion of ISO volume, which is equal to 3.8%.
[Insert Figure III.3 approximately here]
The proportion of ISO volume experiences a jump of up to 15% (%ISO V olume =
43.47%) in the first 15 minutes after an information release. Afterward, it steadily de-
creases, but does not drop below its 1% significance level of 3.8% until the end of the
trading day.
The reasons for an increase in trading aggressiveness on an announcement day are
twofold. First, investors have different rates of information processing. Those investors
who are able to process new information more quickly try to exploit their advantage.
The 15% jump immediately after a release indicates the increase in pressure from traders
with quicker rates of information processing. Second, uninformed investors might also
trade more aggressively because of the decreasing liquidity supply around earnings an-
nouncements. Chakravarty et al (2011a) provide empirical evidence in support of this
explanation.
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Intraday analysis of the effective relative spread and price impact. The
results from Panel A of Table III.3 confirm that the ISO trades have an overall higher
price impact within a given trading interval than the non-ISO trades. However, I expect
the difference in the intraday price impact between the ISO trades and non-ISO trades
to be higher for illiquid stocks, because an aggressive order goes faster through a thinner
limit order book of an illiquid stock, which produces an even higher price change.
To investigate this hypothesis more closely, I report the intraday price impact of ISO
trades in post-announcement hours separately for liquid and illiquid stocks (Panel B of
Table III.3). The stock is classified as liquid if its daily quoted relative spread is above
the median for all of the stocks in the sample in the base period, and it is classified as
illiquid otherwise. The last line in Panel B of Table III.3 confirms this prediction, because
the difference in the intraday price impact between the ISO and the non-ISO trades for
illiquid stocks is higher than the corresponding difference for liquid stocks by 0.45% and
is statistically significant at the 1% level. Note that investors trade illiquid stocks more
aggressively in the post-announcement hours than liquid stocks, because the proportion of
their volume traded with aggressive orders (43.4%) exceeds the proportion of ISO volume
for the liquid stocks by a significant 2%.
Table III.4 additionally investigates differences in the effective relative spread and
the intraday price impact between the ISO and the non-ISO trades in a multivariate
setup. The main variable of interest is the ISO, which equals one for ISO trades, and
zero otherwise. One observation represents a ten-minute trading interval for a stock. All
models are panel OLS regressions and include firm-, year-, daytime- and weekday-fixed
effects. In addition, I control for the inverse of the mean stock price in a ten-minute
period, which is mechanically related to the two dependent variables; the total volume
executed within a 10-minute trading interval; and the listing exchange of a stock.
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[Insert Table III.4 approximately here]
The effective relative spreads of the ISO and non-ISO trades exhibit no significant
differences in the base period as well as on announcement days, as captured by the indi-
cator variable ISO and its interaction with the indicator variable Event that denotes the
announcement day. These results are in line with prior univariate analyses and continue
to hold if I additionally control for the liquidity of a stock with an indicator variable
Illiquid (Model 2). All control variables have their expected signs.
In line with univariate findings, the intraday price impact is higher for the ISO trades
in the base period and even more so on announcement days. However, the latter effect
disappears if I add the indicator variable Illiquid, which means that an additional increase
in the intraday price impact on announcement days is driven by illiquid stocks, consistent
with the univariate results from Table III.3. After controlling for liquidity as well as other
control variables, the additional intraday price impact of an aggressive order constitutes
0.187% for an illiquid stock, which is statistically and economically significant (e.g., 3.74
cent for an average illiquid stock with a price of $20 and a quoted spread of 96.4 cent).
Informativeness of ISO trades after earnings announcements. Prior results
show that trading aggressiveness increases significantly in the hours following earnings
announcement releases. The next step is to analyze whether the increased use of aggressive
orders in post-announcement hours represents informed or uninformed trading. Recall
that the effect of trading aggressiveness on the speed of price adjustment depends on
the informativeness of the ISO trades. The effect should be positive (higher trading
aggressiveness speeds up price adjustment) if informed investors submit the majority of
the ISOs and trade in the direction of the new equilibrium value. The effect should
be negative (higher trading aggressiveness slows down price adjustment) if the ISOs are
mostly submitted by uninformed investors who are just as likely to buy or sell a stock.
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I analyze the informativeness of ISO trades by testing whether the proportion of ISO
volume increases more in the direction of the earnings surprise. For positive earnings
surprises, aggressive trading is more informative if the change in the proportion of ISO
buy volume (∆ISOBuyV ol) is overall higher than the change in the proportion of ISO
sell volume (∆ISOSellV ol). For negative earnings surprises, the opposite relation should
hold. I measure an earnings surprise as a 24-hour stock return after an announcement
release.21
If prices overshoot, then trading in the opposite direction of the earnings surprise is
also informative. For this reason, I additionally classify trades on an intraday basis: I
define an ISO trade as informative if it is buyer-initiated and the current price is below the
equilibrium price, or if it is seller-initiated and the current price is above the equilibrium
price. The proxy for an equilibrium price is the price in 24 hours after an announcement
release, which is reasonable to assume, because the short-term price adjustment happens
on average within 2.5 hours of an announcement release (as the next section documents).
I find that after positive earnings surprises 80.7% of all informative trades are buyer-
initiated and after negative earnings surprises 86.8% of all informative trades are seller-
initiated. None of my results is materially affected if I define informativeness of an ISO
trade on an intraday basis.
In the first step, I examine the imbalance between the proportions of ISO buy and
ISO sell volumes on announcement days. Figure III.4 displays both proportions for each
15-minute event interval relative to the 15-minute interval with an earnings announcement
release (interval 0). The dashed line marks the event interval 0.
21The results do not differ materially, if CAR(0;1) or I/B/E/S analyst earnings forecasts are used to
measure earnings surprises. In the case of analyst earnings forecasts, I lose around 50% of observations
in my final sample due to missing data in I/B/E/S.
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[Insert Figure III.4 approximately here]
Panel A shows the imbalance in the proportions of ISO volumes for positive earnings
surprises. Interestingly, the proportions of the ISO sell and ISO buy volumes increase
in the first hour after an announcement release. The proportion of the ISO buy volume
begins to dominate only after two hours. These preliminary results suggest that the
majority of ISO trades are mostly uninformative in the first hour after a positive earnings
announcement release. Although investors realize that higher earnings are good news,
their initial opinions might diverge on how good this news is. As time passes by, traders
correctly process the information from an announcement release and ISO trades increase
their informativeness. The situation is different for negative earnings surprises (Panel B).
The proportion of the ISO sell volume experiences a jump of up to 3% (from 47% to 50%)
in the first 15 minutes after an announcement and significantly dominates the proportion
of ISO buy volume for at least three hours after an announcement release. Thus, investors
react quickly to the negative news and increase their aggressiveness on the sell side almost
immediately.
Table III.5 examines the informativeness of the ISO trades separately for the subsam-
ples of liquid and illiquid stocks. In addition to the direction of the earnings surprise, I
differentiate between large and small surprises. An earnings surprise is defined as large if
a 24-hour stock return is above its median for positive earnings surprises and below its
median for negative earnings surprises. The first column shows the number of hours after
an announcement release. The remaining columns report the difference in means between
the increases in the proportion of the ISO buy and ISO sell volumes for the corresponding
hour:
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∆ = ∆Buy −∆Sell,
where ∆Buy = %ISOBuyV olEvent − %ISOBuyV olBase, and 4Sell is calculated
in a similar way.
[Insert Table III.5 approximately here]
On average, investors increase their trading aggressiveness in the predicted direction:
they increase the proportion of the ISO buy volume by a larger amount if an earnings
surprise is positive (∆ > 0), and by a smaller amount if it is negative (∆ < 0). As
expected, the differences in proportions are higher for larger earnings surprises.
Consistent with Figure III.4 (A), the ISO trades are quite uninformative in the first
hour after a positive announcement release for both liquid and illiquid stocks. Over time
aggressive trading becomes more informative, but none of the coefficients is statistically
different from zero. For large positive surprises, an increase in the proportion of the
ISO buy volume is on average higher and becomes statistically significant at the 10%
level for liquid stocks four hours after an announcement release. For negative earnings
surprises, the ISO trades are largely uninformative for liquid stocks, but they are strongly
informative for illiquid stocks for up to five hours after an announcement release. All
differences are negative and significant either at the 5% or the 1% levels. These findings
suggest that a significant jump in the proportion of ISO sell volume immediately after an
announcement release, observed in Figure III.4 (B), is mainly driven by an increase in the
aggressiveness of informed traders of illiquid stocks.
Overall, even though investors increase their trading aggressiveness mostly in the
correct direction, ISO trades are largely uninformative for positive earnings surprises
and are strongly informative for negative earnings surprises, but only for the subsample
of illiquid stocks.
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5 Trading Aggressiveness and the Speed of
Price Adjustment
How does an increase in trading aggressiveness after an earnings announcement release
influence the speed of price adjustment to the new equilibrium value? An increase in
trading aggressiveness by traders with quicker rates of information processing might in-
crease the speed of the initial price reaction, by pushing the price more quickly towards its
new equilibrium value. However, if the majority of the aggressive traders are uninformed,
because they cannot predict the new equilibrium value, their increased trading aggres-
siveness might also prolong the subsequent stabilization stage and unnecessarily increase
the post-announcement intraday volatility. Figure III.5 provides evidence in support of
both statements. Panel A shows that stocks with higher increases in trading aggressive-
ness on announcement days experience larger jumps in their cumulative absolute returns
during the first minutes after the information releases. However, these stocks also have
higher increases in their intraday volatilities, which persist up to four hours after the
announcement releases (as reported by Panel B). This section examines which of these
two countervailing effects dominates.
The definition of the end of the price adjustment process. The speed of
price adjustment can be theoretically measured as the difference in time between an
announcement release and the time when the price reaches its new equilibrium value.
Since the new equilibrium price level is not observable, I have to empirically determine
the time period when the price ends its adjustment process. I consider that the price
ends its adjustment process if the intraday volatility returns to its pre-announcement
level. Prior studies by Patell and Wolfson (1984) and Jennings and Starks (1985) analyze
post-announcement abnormal returns and abnormal serial correlations in price changes,
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in addition to abnormal volatility. However, the volatility criterion is more appropriate for
this study, because it captures both stages of price adjustment: the initial price reaction
as well as the subsequent period of price stabilization.22
Andersen et al (2001) show that the realized variance, calculated as the sum of the
squared high-frequency returns over a particular time interval, represents the most un-
biased and efficient estimator of daily as well as intraday volatilities. As illustrated by
Martens and van Dijk (2007), the realized variance is also robust in the presence of infre-
quent trading and non-trading intervals. I calculate the realized volatility as the square
root of the sum of the squared one-minute closing midpoint returns within each five-minute
interval according to the following formula:
RVti =
√
5∑
j=1
(log Cti,j − log Cti,j−1)2,
where Cti,j represents the closing midpoint of a minute j within a five-minute interval
i on day t. Further, I use the non-parametric test, proposed by Smith et al (1997), to
compare the realized volatility within each five-minute interval during an announcement
period (event days 0 to 2) with the realized volatility within the same five-minute interval
in the base period (event days -40 to -3). Volatility is considered to be abnormal if it
exceeds the 75% cutoff value in the same five-minute period calculated over days [−40;−3].
I also report the multivariate results for a more conservative definition of the abnormal
volatility for which volatility is defined as abnormal if it exceeds the median volatility in
the same five-minute period on the non-announcement days.23
22Patell and Wolfson (1984) and Jennings and Starks (1985) show that abnormal returns disappear in
5 to 15 minutes after an earnings announcement release. However, abnormal volatility of intraday returns
persists for several hours and can even extend to the following trading day. The recent study by Brooks,
Patel and Su (2003) provides similar evidence for unanticipated events with abnormal returns lasting for
15 minutes and abnormal variance for at least three hours after an event.
23The non-parametric test of Smith et al (1997) is more appropriate for high-frequency intervals,
especially for illiquid stocks with thin trading. Prior studies by Patell and Wolfson (1984) and Woodruff
and Senchack (1988) use parametric tests to compare distributional properties between announcement
and non-announcement samples, because they use much longer one-hour sampling intervals.
100
To identify the end of the adjustment period, I order all intervals in the event window
relative to the first five-minute post-announcement interval (interval 0). The ordering is
consecutive for all days in the event window. For example, if an announcement time was
3 p.m. on day 0, then a period from 9:30 a.m. until 9:35 a.m. on the next day is
numerated as period 13. I define the end of the adjustment period as the first interval for
which the realized volatility is no longer abnormal.24
Univariate results. Panel A of Table III.6 displays the distribution of the length
of price adjustment periods (in minutes) across the pre- and post-Reg NMS periods,
separately for the subsamples of liquid and illiquid stocks. Thus, the median length of a
price adjustment period for a liquid stock prior to the Reg NMS is 125 minutes after an
announcement release. After the Reg NMS the median adjustment time for liquid stocks
significantly decreases by 25 minutes as reported by the non-parametric Mann-Whitney
test. Surprisingly, the median length of the price adjustment period for an illiquid stock
(178 minutes or ca. 3 hours) does not change significantly in the post-Reg NMS period.
The standard deviation of the length of the price adjustment period has even increased
for these stocks, which suggests that the adjustment process has become quicker for some
illiquid stocks in the post-Reg NMS period and slower for the others.
[Insert Table III.6 approximately here]
To investigate this issue more closely, I sort all announcements into terciles of changes
in trading aggressiveness on announcement days (TA1 - TA3) in the post-Reg NMS period.
The TA3 comprises announcements with the highest increases in trading aggressiveness
24Patell and Wolfson (1984), Brooks, Patel, and Su (2003), Masulis and Shivakumar (2002), analyze
the post-announcement volatility in a univariate setup and test up to which interval it exhibits significant
increases, but they do not explicitly define the length of the adjustment period. In addition to 5-minute
intervals, I use 10-minute, 15-minute and 30-minute intervals to identify the end of the adjustment period.
All results stay robust and are available upon request.
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on event days, whereas the TA1 comprises stocks with the lowest increases.25 To compare
the change in the length of the adjustment period between two regulation regimes, I
also assign “pseudo”-terciles of trading aggressiveness for all announcements in the pre-
Reg NMS period. For this purpose, I calculate the median TA tercile for each stock
after the Reg NMS and assign this TA tercile for all announcements of this stock that
happen prior to the Reg NMS.26 Panel B of Table III.6 displays the median length of the
adjustment period (in minutes) for each TA tercile. The last two rows report the p-values
of the Mann-Whitney test on the equality of medians across different terciles of trading
aggressiveness.
Consistent with the previous results from Panel A, the price adjustment process is
quicker in the post-Reg NMS period for each TA tercile in the sample of liquid stocks.
However, there is no significant relation between an increase in trading aggressiveness
and the speed of price adjustment for these stocks. By contrast, this relation has a
striking U-shape in the sample of illiquid stocks, which gets even more pronounced in
the post-Reg NMS period. Whereas the adjustment time for illiquid stocks in the TA1
group decreases in the post-Reg NMS period, it stays constant for stocks with moderate
increases in trading aggressiveness (TA2) and even increases for stocks with excess trading
aggressiveness in post-announcement hours (TA3). The 75-minute difference in medians
between the second and the third tercile of trading aggressiveness in the post-Reg NMS
period is also statistically significant at the 5% level.
25Recall that trading aggressiveness is measured as the change in the proportion of ISO volume traded
after an announcement release relative to its mean in the base period (∆ISOvol). Although on average
trading aggressiveness increases in hours after the release, changes in the proportion of ISO volume can
take negative values for some stocks in the TA1 sample.
26Normally, there is almost no within-stock variation in liquidity and trading aggressiveness and I can
correctly assign the “pseudo”-TA tercile for almost 90% of all of the stocks in my final sample. I omit
the remaining 10% from the univariate analysis in Table III.6, but add these observations later in my
multivariate analysis.
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Figure III.6 further illustrates the relation between the mean length of the price ad-
justment period, measured in minutes, and the mean change in the proportion of ISO
volume in the subsamples of liquid and illiquid stocks.
[Insert Figure III.6 approximately here]
Overall, the patterns are consistent with those reported in Table III.6. Large increases
in trading aggressiveness slow down the speed of price adjustment for illiquid stocks, but
seem to have no effect for liquid stocks. A more surprising finding is that decreases in
trading aggressiveness have different implications for liquid and illiquid stocks. Higher
decreases in trading aggressiveness are beneficial for liquid stocks, but they slow down the
adjustment process of illiquid stocks.
Regression analysis. In this subsection, I estimate the negative binomial regressions
with the length of the adjustment period as the dependent variable.27 The identification
strategy is a difference-in-differences analysis, because I am interested in the effect of
changes in trading aggressiveness on the speed of price adjustment after controlling for
the differences in the speed of price adjustment in the pre-Reg NMS period. For this
reason, all of the regressions include earnings announcements from the pre- and the post-
Reg NMS period. Since each stock in the final sample has at least one announcement
in each of the regulation periods, the results are not influenced by differences in the
underlying subsamples.
Models (1) to (3) of Table III.7 report the results for the benchmark definition of
abnormal volatility: volatility is abnormal if the realized volatility lies in the upper quartile
of the volatility distribution in the non-announcement period.
27Since the dependent variable is the number of five-minute intervals until the price ends its adjustment,
it represents the count data. Thus, the sample consists of discrete values and is skewed to the right.
Negative binomial regressions account for these problems and for the overdispersion present in the data.
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[Insert Table III.7 approximately here]
The vector of the explanatory variables consists of the following variables: Post Reg
that equals one if an announcement happens after the adoption of the Reg NMS, and zero
otherwise; Illiq that equals one if the relative spread of the stock is above the median of
all of the stocks in the sample, and zero otherwise; the interaction of the previous two
variables, Illiq · Post Reg; the positive change in the proportion of the ISO volume for
liquid stocks, Liq · |∆ISOvol|∆>0; the positive change in the proportion of ISO volume
for illiquid stocks, Illiq · |∆ISOvol|∆>0; and the two corresponding variables for negative
changes in the proportion of the ISO volume. I examine separately the influence of the
positive and negative deviations in the proportion of ISO volume on the length of the
adjustment period, because the relation between trading aggressiveness and the speed of
price adjustment might be non-monotonic (as suggested by the univariate results).
The vector of the control variables consists of the mean turnover on event days [0; 2],
Turnover; the average size of a firm that is calculated as the log of its market capital-
ization at the beginning of the base period, LnMCap; the stock market volatility on an
announcement day that is measured by Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatil-
ity Index, VIX ; and the absolute value of the earnings surprise, Earn Surp. I expect
the coefficient for Turnover and LnMCap to be negative, because more frequently traded
stocks should adjust more quickly to their equilibrium value. By contrast, higher stock
market volatility on the announcement day and larger earnings surprises should slow down
the adjustment process. I also add year-fixed effects and control for the weekday and the
time of an announcement.
The benchmark value of the dependent variable equals the mean length of the price
adjustment period for liquid stocks before the adoption of the Reg NMS (218 minutes or
around 3.63 hours, according to Panel A of Table III.6). All of the coefficients should
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be interpreted as relative changes to the length of the price adjustment period from this
benchmark value: for one unit change in the explanatory variable, the difference in the
logs of the expected counts of the dependent variable is expected to change by β. For
example, the coefficient of -0.20 on the Post Reg means that the length of the price
adjustment period has on average decreased by e−0.20 − 1 = −0.18 or 18% from the
benchmark value for liquid stocks in the Post-Reg NMS period (from around 3.63 hours
to around 3 hours). As expected, the price adjustment period is significantly longer for
illiquid stocks by approximately 42%. It does not differ significantly between the two
regulation subperiods. All control variables, except LnMCap, are significant and have
their expected signs.
Consistent with the univariate results, the relation between trading aggressiveness and
the speed of price adjustment is rather weak for liquid stocks: negative changes in the
proportion of the ISO volume contribute to quicker price adjustment, whereas positive
changes do not play a significant role. For illiquid stocks, this relation continues to
display a pronounced U-shape, even if I add other control variables. A 100% change in
the proportion of the ISO volume slows down the adjustment process by 28% (ca. 78
minutes) for positive changes and by 36% (ca. 100 minutes) for negative changes from
its mean value of 4 hours and 40 minutes. This change is statistically and economically
significant.
Why do large decreases in trading aggressiveness have different implications for stocks
with different levels of liquidity? Aggressive orders induce quicker price changes within
a given time interval. Since liquid stocks are traded more frequently by definition, their
prices adjust quickly, and thus, an additional increase in the speed of the price changes
is not necessary. A decrease in trading aggressiveness speeds up the adjustment process
of liquid stocks, because it leads to a reduction in the abnormal volatility and does not
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produce a negative effect on the speed of the price changes. By contrast, illiquid stocks
are infrequently traded. Therefore, a large decrease in trading aggressiveness adversely
affects the speed of their price changes and slows down the adjustment of the stock price
towards its new equilibrium value.
Informativeness of ISO trades and the speed of price adjustment. The previ-
ously formulated hypotheses suggest that the negative effect of trading aggressiveness on
the speed of price adjustment should dominate if investors who submit ISOs are largely
uninformed and trade in different directions. In such a case, aggressive trades produce
very quick upward price changes following purchase transactions and very quick downward
price changes following sales transactions. Thus, an increase in aggressive trading raises
the probability of price overshooting and intraday volatility of the stock. In the follow-
ing, I test this hypothesis in the subsample of illiquid stocks, because, according to the
previous results, trading aggressiveness has a large and significant impact on these stocks.
Table III.5 shows that aggressive trading is largely uninformative for illiquid stocks after
positive earnings surprises, and it is strongly informative for these stocks after negative
earnings surprises. Therefore, I expect the negative influence of excess trading aggressive-
ness on the speed of price adjustment of illiquid stocks to be stronger in the subsample
of positive earnings surprises.
Models (2) and (3) of Table III.7 present the results for the subsamples of the positive
and negative earnings surprises, respectively. In line with previous expectations, the
negative effects of trading aggressiveness for illiquid stocks dominate only in the subsample
with positive earnings surprises. A 100% change in the proportion of ISO volume slows
down the adjustment process of the illiquid stocks by 36% for positive changes and by
75% for negative changes. Thus, an extreme decrease in trading aggressiveness can be
even more harmful than an excess increase in the situations when majority of investors
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are uncertain about the new equilibrium value of an illiquid stock. A large decrease in
trading aggressiveness might suggest that the majority of the investors are uninformed,
and they prefer to stay out of the market, which increases the probability that the trading
process freezes out completely. The negative effect of trading aggressiveness gets reduced
and loses its statistical significance in the sample of negative earnings surprises, when ISO
trades are on average more informative (Model 3).
Robustness checks. Models (4) to (6) of Table III.7 repeat the previous analysis
with a less conservative definition of abnormal volatility: volatility is defined as abnormal
if the realized volatility exceeds its median level in the same five-minute period on non-
announcement days. Although slightly lower in absolute value, all of the previous results
for illiquid stocks still hold. The previous marginally significant effect of decreases in
trading aggressiveness disappears for the subsample of liquid stocks, which again demon-
strates that there is no significant impact of trading aggressiveness on the speed of price
adjustment for these stocks.
Since the average price of the illiquid stocks, $20.1, is lower than the average price of
the liquid stocks, $32.8, the larger deviations in the intraday volatility of the one-minute
returns of the illiquid stocks on the announcement days might be just mechanical. There-
fore, the lower price of the illiquid stocks could bias the adjustment time upwards and
overestimate the influence of trading aggressiveness on the speed of the price adjustment
of these stocks. To account for the price level of the illiquid stocks, I use the realized price
range measure, proposed by Martens and van Dijk (2007):
RRti =
(log Hti−log Lti)2
4 log 2
,
where Hti represents the maximum closing midpoint price within a five-minute interval
i on day t and Lti represents the corresponding minimum price. Models (1) to (3) of
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Table III.8 report the results with the modified dependent variable. All of the previous
findings are robust.
[Insert Table III.8 approximately here]
Next, I measure the liquidity of the stock with the daily Amihud (2002) measure.
An indicator variable Illiq now equals one if the mean Amihud measure of the stock in
the base period is above the median for all of the stocks in the sample, and equals zero
otherwise. Models (4) to (6) of Table III.8 display the corresponding results, which are
again consistent with those of Table III.7.
Overall, the findings in this section show that the relation between trading aggressive-
ness and the speed of price adjustment is not significant for liquid stocks and exhibits a
pronounced U-shape for illiquid stocks. Thus, both large increases and large decreases in
the proportion of aggressive trades slow down the adjustment process of illiquid stocks.
For excess increases in trading aggressiveness, the adverse effect of the additional intraday
volatility dominates, especially after positive earnings surprises when the aggressive trad-
ing is overall uninformative. However, when the majority of ISO trades are submitted in
the direction of the earnings surprise, the negative effect of the excess trading aggressive-
ness is reduced and becomes largely insignificant. Interestingly, although less common,
large decreases in trading aggressiveness can be even more harmful for the adjustment
process of illiquid stocks, because they prevent their stock price from moving towards its
new equilibrium value and can even signal a complete freeze-out of the trading process.
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6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes how abnormal trading aggressiveness after earnings announcement
releases influences the speed of price adjustment of stocks on US financial markets. I
measure trading aggressiveness as the proportion of volume that is traded with the most
aggressive limit orders available, intermarket sweep orders, over a particular time interval.
Intermarket sweep orders represent an exemption from the Order Protection Rule of the
Regulation National Market System and are executed more quickly than other limit orders,
but possibly at an inferior price. They produce larger intraday price impact and contribute
to quicker price changes within a given time interval.
The major result of this study is that excess trading aggressiveness after earnings an-
nouncements is overall harmful to the speed of price adjustment of illiquid stocks. As
compared to the pre-Reg NMS period, the adjustment time after an earnings announce-
ment release has increased for illiquid stocks with large deviations in the proportion of
ISO volume. The effect is more pronounced after positive earnings announcements when
aggressive trades are mostly conducted by uninformed investors who do not observe the
new equilibrium value of the stock. Since uninformed investors are just as likely to buy or
to sell, quick price changes in different directions unnecessarily increase intraday volatility
and make the price stabilization process more difficult.
The findings in this paper suggest that the excessive use of intermarket sweep orders
produces adverse effects on the adjustment process of illiquid stocks after information
releases. Thus, market efficiency for these stocks can be even further reduced in situations
where traders become too aggressive - something, that needs to be taken into account by
stock exchanges and market regulators if they are interested in the promotion of accurate
and transparent prices.
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Appendix
Variable Definitions
Variable Description Source
1/P The inverse of the stock price (in $) TAQ
∆ISOvol The change in the proportion of daily volume that is exe-
cuted with aggressive intermarket sweep orders (ISOs) after
an announcement release relative to its mean in the base
period
TAQ
Amihud The Amihud’s measure of illiquidity, defined as the ratio of
the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on
that day (Amihud, 2002).
CRSP
Big Neg Surp One, if a 24-hour post-announcement return is negative and
below the median of all of the negative earnings announce-
ments, and zero otherwise
TAQ
Big Pos Surp One, if a 24-hour post-announcement return is positive and
above the median of all of the positive earnings announce-
ments, and zero otherwise
TAQ
Earn Surp The absolute value of a 24-hour post-announcement return TAQ
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Variable Description Source
EffSpr The effective relative spread, calculated as twice the abso-
lute difference between the transaction price and the mid-
point price, scaled by the midpoint price (EffSprt =
2 |Pt −Qt| /Qt). Observations with EffSpr > 0.5 are set
to missing values
TAQ
Eventi,
i  [−2; +2]
One for observations on the event day i , where i is calculated
as Current Day - Announcement Day
I/B/E/S
Illiquid (Illiq) One, if the relative spread of the stock is above the median
value of all of the stocks in the sample, and zero otherwise
TAQ
ISO One, if an order is marked as ISO, and zero otherwise TAQ
Leverage The market leverage, defined as the ratio of the total lia-
bilities to the sum of the total liabilities and the market
capitalization of the company
Compustat
Liquid (Liq) One, if the relative spread of the stock is below the median
value of all of the stocks in the sample, and zero otherwise
TAQ
LnMCap The natural logarithm of market capitalization CRSP
MCap The market value of equity (in million $) CRSP
Nasdaq One, if the stock is listed on Nasdaq, and zero otherwise TAQ
Neg Surp One, if a 24-hour post-announcement return is negative, and
zero otherwise
TAQ
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Variable Description Source
Pos Surp One, if a 24-hour post-announcement return is positive, and
zero otherwise
TAQ
Post-Reg NMS,
(Post Reg)
One, if an announcement happens after the final implemen-
tation of the Regulation NMS (October 2007), and zero oth-
erwise
Pre-Reg NMS One, if an announcement happens before the final imple-
mentation of the Regulation NMS (October 2007), and zero
otherwise
Prc Stock price (in $) CRSP
PrcImp The measure of the five-minute price impact of a trade, de-
fined as PrcImpt = 2 |Qt+5 −Qt| /(Qt ∗ wt), where Qt+5 is
the midpoint price of the stock after five minutes and wt is
the size of the trade
TAQ
Proportion of
ISO trades,
%Trades
The ratio of the number of intermarket sweep orders to the
total number of orders executed within a given time interval
TAQ
Proportion of
ISO volume,
%ISOvol
The ratio of the volume that is executed with intermarket
sweep orders to the total volume traded within a given time
interval
TAQ
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Variable Description Source
Proportion of
ISO purchases,
%Purchases
The ratio of the number of purchase transactions that are
executed with intermarket sweep orders to the total number
of purchase transactions within a given time interval
TAQ
Proportion of
ISO buy volume,
%ISOBuyV ol
The ratio of the volume of purchase transactions that are
executed with intermarket sweep orders to the total volume
of purchase transactions within a given time interval
TAQ
Proportion of
ISO sales,
%Sales
The ratio of the number of sale transactions that are exe-
cuted with intermarket sweep orders to the total number of
sale transactions within a given time interval
TAQ
Proportion of
ISO sell volume,
%ISOSellV ol
The ratio of the volume of sale transactions that are executed
with intermarket sweep orders to the total volume of sale
transactions within a given time interval
TAQ
RelSpr Intraday relative spread, defined as the difference between
the ask and the bid, scaled by their average; observations
with RelSpr>0.5 are set to missing values.
TAQ
RelSpr (daily) Daily relative spread, defined as the difference between the
closing ask and the closing bid, scaled by their average; ob-
servations with RelSpr (daily)>0.5 are set to missing values.
CRSP
ROA Return on assets, defined as the ratio of the operating income
after depreciation to the average total assets of the current
year and the previous year.
Compustat
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Variable Description Source
Size Size of a transaction (in shares) TAQ
TAi ith tercile of trading aggressiveness (TA1 - the lowest tercile
of trading aggressiveness and TA3 - the highest tercile of
trading aggressiveness)
Own
calculations
Total Assets Total assets (in million $) Compustat
Total Liabilities Total liabilities (in million $) Compustat
Turnover The average daily traded volume divided by the number of
shares outstanding
CRSP
VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index,
a measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options
that represents the market’s expectation of the stock market
volatility over the next 30 day period
Chicago
Board
Options
Exchange
Volatility The annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns over
the calendar month
CRSP
Volume The total volume traded within a 10-minute interval (in
shares)
TAQ
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Figures
Figure III.3: Changes in Proportion of ISO volume on Announcement Day. This figure
displays the mean percentage deviations in the proportion of ISO volume throughout the announcement
days. The deviations from the bootstrapped means are measured in 15-minute intervals relative to the
15-minute interval with an earnings announcement release (interval 0). The dashed line shows the 1%
significance level for the mean percentage change in the proportion of ISO volume, which is equal to
3.8%.
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Figure III.4: Trading Imbalances in ISO volume on Announcement Day. This figure displays
the mean proportion of ISO buy volume, defined as ISObuyvolume/Totalbuyvolume, and the mean proportion
of ISO sell volume, defined as ISO sell volume/Total sell volume, throughout the announcement days. Both
proportions are measured in 15-minute intervals relative to the 15-minute interval with an earnings
announcement release (interval 0). The dashed line marks the event interval.
A. Positive Earnings Surprises
B. Negative Earnings Surprises
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Figure III.5: Cumulative Intraday Returns and Abnormal Volatility. Panel A of this figure
depicts the development of the cumulative five-minute absolute returns within the first six hours since
an earnings announcement release (interval 0). I aggregate positive and negative earnings surprises,
and multiply all of the returns for negative earnings surprises by -1. The solid line represents the
subsample of the stocks with the above median increases in trading aggressiveness on the announcement
day. The dashed line represents the subsample of the stocks with the below median increases in trading
aggressiveness on the announcement day. Panel B presents the percentage increases in the realized
volatility on the announcement days from its base level, calculated as the mean realized volatility over
the same five-minute interval on the non-announcement days [-40;-3]. The realized volatility within each
five-minute interval is calculated as the standard deviation of the sum of the squared one-minute closing
midpoint returns.
A. Cumulative intraday post-announcement returns
B. Abnormal post-announcement volatility
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Figure III.6: Adjustment Time and Trading Aggressiveness. This figure depicts the relationship
between the mean length of the price adjustment period and the mean change in the proportion of ISO
volume after an information release, separately for the subsamples of liquid and illiquid stocks. The
length of the price adjustment period is measured as the number of five-minute time intervals until the
realized volatility of one-minute midpoint returns is no longer abnormal.
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Tables
Table III.1: Sample Construction. This table shows the sample selection of the earnings announce-
ments of US firms that happened within trading hours (from 9:30 a.m. till 16:00 p.m. EST) from 2006
to 2009. The data source for dates and times of the earnings announcements is the Institutional Brokers
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. I require each firm to exist in the intersection set of I/B/E/S and
CRSP.
Criteria Announce-
ments
Lost
obs.
Firms
Initial sample 10,334 3,361
Stock traded on an announcement day 9,687 647 3,273
Intraday transaction data available on
TAQ
8,720 967 3,008
Closing price not less than $5 6,126 2,594 2,334
Not more than one announcement per
day
6,040 86 2,322
Trading data exists for previous 2
months
5,944 96 2,307
At least one announcement before and
one announcement after Reg NMS,
out of which:
3,613 2,331 675
- Before Reg NMS 1,818 675
- After Reg NMS 1,795 675
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Table III.2: Sample Distributions. This table displays the distributions of firm characteristics in
the final sample (Columns 1 to 3) and the initial sample (Columns 4 to 6). The differences in the
means and medians are statistically significant at the 5% level for all of the variables, except the market
capitalization, MCap, which is statistically significant at the 10% level. See the Appendix for the exact
definition of all variables.
Final Initial
N Mean 50% N Mean 50%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Assets (in mln $) 666 8672 686 3300 6220 477
Total Liabilities (in mln $) 666 5990 507 3300 4309 274
MCap (in mln $) 675 2670 256 3361 2254 239
Prc (in $) 675 26 21 3361 20 14
ROA 654 0.07 0.05 3054 -0.01 0.04
Leverage 666 0.54 0.55 3290 0.46 0.41
RelSpr (daily) 675 0.01 0.00 3361 0.01 0.01
Amihud 675 0.95 0.04 3361 1.93 0.06
Volatility 675 0.44 0.41 3361 0.59 0.53
Turnover 675 0.006 0.003 3361 0.007 0.005
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Table III.3: Differences in Characteristics of ISOs and non-ISOs. Panel A of this table sum-
marizes the differences in trading characteristics between intermarket sweep orders (ISOs) and standard
limit orders (non-ISOs) in the base period and after earnings announcement releases. Columns (1) and
(2) display the mean of the bootstrapped distribution for ISOs and non-ISOs from the base period, corre-
spondingly. Columns (3) and (4) report the cross-sectional mean of the respective variables starting from
an announcement release until the end of the trading day (16:00 p.m. EST). I also report the p-value of
the t-test for the null-hypothesis that the difference in means between ISOs and non-ISOs equals zero. *
denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** - at the 5% level, and *** - at the 1% level. Column
(5) displays the difference-in-differences results. For proportions, Column (5) displays the difference be-
tween the base period and the event day. Panel B summarizes the differences in trading characteristics
between ISOs and non-ISOs after earnings announcement releases for stocks with different liquidity levels.
The variables are calculated from the intraday transaction data in the NYSE TAQ database. See the
Appendix for the exact definition of all variables.
Panel A: Base Period vs Announcement Day
Base Period Event Day Diff-in-Diff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ISO Non-ISO ∆1 ISO Non-ISO ∆2 ∆2-∆1
%Trades 40.8 45.4 4.6 ***
%Volume 37.8 42.4 4.6 ***
%Purchases 40.5 44.4 4.0 ***
%Sales 41.3 45.5 4.2 ***
Size 176 256 *** 180 226 *** 33 ***
EffSpr, % 1.73 1.82 * 1.84 1.86 0.08
PrcImp, % 1.29 1.20 ** 1.47 1.27 *** 0.11 **
Panel B: Liquid vs Illiquid on Event Day
Liquid Illiquid Diff-in-Diff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ISO Non-ISO ∆1 ISO Non-ISO ∆2 ∆2-∆1
%Trades 45.0 45.9 0.9 *
%Volume 41.6 43.3 1.8 ***
Size 163 200 *** 200 257 *** -20 ***
EffSpr, % 0.57 0.56 3.43 3.38 0.05
PrcImp, % 0.64 0.62 2.51 2.04 *** 0.45 ***
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Table III.4: Intraday Analysis of Effective Spread and Price Impact. This table presents the
results of panel OLS regressions with the effective relative spread as the dependent variable for Models
(1) and (2) and the price impact as the dependent variable for Models (3) and (4). One observation
represents a ten-minute trading interval for a stock. All regressions include firm-, year-, daytime- and
weekday-fixed effects. See the Appendix for the exact definition of all variables. P-values of the two-tailed
t-test with the null-hypothesis of a coefficient equaling zero are reported in form of asterisks to the right
of each coefficient. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** - at the 5% level, and *** - at
the 1% level. I also report the number of observations (N) and R2 for each regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EffSpr EffSpr PrcImp PrcImp
ISO -0.003 -0.003 0.053 *** 0.016 ***
Illiquid 0.664 *** 0.623 ***
ISO · Illiquid 0.001 0.187 ***
Event−2 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.007
Event−1 0.062 *** 0.064 *** 0.064 *** 0.066 ***
Event 0.049 *** 0.051 *** 0.091 *** 0.097 ***
Event+1 -0.015 -0.011 0.004 0.009
Event+2 -0.034 *** -0.030 ** -0.000 0.005
ISO · Event−2 0.010 0.010 -0.007 -0.007
ISO · Event−1 -0.012 -0.011 0.002 0.004
ISO · Event 0.020 0.021 0.036 ** 0.028
ISO · Event+1 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.000
ISO · Event+2 -0.003 -0.003 -0.014 -0.015
1/P 7.504 *** 6.768 *** 19.374 *** 18.593 ***
Volume -0.000 *** -0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
Nasdaq 1.413 *** 1.352 *** 1.197 *** 1.122 ***
N 1489118 1489118 1489118 1489118
R-squared 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.32
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Daytime FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table III.5: Informativeness of ISO Trades. This table reports the differences in the means between
an increase in the proportion of ISO buy volume and an increase in the proportion of ISO sell volume
on the announcement days, separately for the liquid stocks (Panel A) and the illiquid stocks (Panel B).
The first column shows the number of hours since an announcement release. Columns (2) and (3) report
the results for the positive surprises and the large positive surprises, respectively. Columns (4) and (5)
report the corresponding results for the negative surprises. An earnings surprise is measured as a 24-hour
stock return since an announcement release, and is classified as large if a 24-hour stock return is above
the median for all of the stocks in the sample for the positive earnings surprises and below the median
for the negative earnings surprises. The t-statistics of the two-tailed t-test with the null-hypothesis of a
difference in means equaling zero are in parentheses below each coefficient. P-values are reported in form
of asterisks to the right of each coefficient. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** - at the
5% level, and *** - at the 1% level.
Panel A: Liquid Stocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hour Pos Surp Big Pos Surp Neg Surp Big Neg Surp
1 0.47% 0.80% -0.45% -0.51%
(0.49) (0.69) (-0.45) (-0.43)
2 0.86% 0.74% -0.13% -0.11%
(1.09) (0.76) (-0.17) (-0.12)
3 0.90% 1.22% -0.33% -0.39%
(1.23) (1.43) (-0.44) (-0.45)
4 0.79% 1.43% * -0.13% -0.17%
(1.15) (1.79) (-0.19) (-0.20)
5 0.55% 1.45% * 0.03% -0.27%
(0.82) (1.84) (0.05) (-0.34)
Panel B: Illiquid Stocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hour Pos Surp Big Pos Surp Neg Surp Big Neg Surp
1 -0.73% 1.85% -6.13% ** -5.21%
(-0.34) (0.59) (-2.12) (-1.43)
2 0.91% 3.61% -6.51% *** -7.11% **
(0.44) (1.26) (-2.76) (-2.41)
3 1.72% 3.76% -4.95% ** -7.32% **
(0.90) (1.42) (-2.21) (-2.59)
4 1.27% 3.74% -6.03% *** -7.00% ***
(0.73) (1.53) (-2.95) (-2.75)
5 0.86% 3.03% -5.67% *** -6.86% ***
(0.50) (1.28) (-2.78) (-2.70)
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Table III.6: Price Adjustment: Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis. Panel A of this
table presents the distributions of the length of the price adjustment period (in minutes), separately for
the subsamples of liquid and illiquid stocks, in the pre- and the post-Reg NMS periods. See the Appendix
for the exact definition of all variables. Columns (3) and (6) report the p-values of the Mann-Whitney
test on the equality of medians between the pre- and post-Reg NMS periods for liquid and illiquid stocks,
respectively. Panel B displays the mean adjustment time across different terciles of trading aggressiveness
(TA1 to TA3) in the post-Reg NMS period. Trading aggressiveness is measured as the change in the
proportion of ISO volume that is traded after an announcement release relative to its mean in the base
period (∆ISOvol). The TA1 comprises the stocks with the lowest increases in trading aggressiveness on
an announcement day and the TA3 comprises the stocks with the highest increases. The announcements
in the pre-Reg NMS period are sorted in “pseudo” - TA terciles that equal the median TA tercile in the
post-Reg NMS period. The last two rows report the p-values of the Mann-Whitney test on the equality
of the medians across different terciles of trading aggressiveness.
Panel A: Pre-Reg NMS vs Post-Reg NMS
Liquid Illiquid
Pre-Reg
NMS
Post-Reg
NMS
MW-test
p-value
Pre-Reg
NMS
Post-Reg
NMS
MW-test
p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
5% 0 0 0 0
25% 35 35 60 50
50% 125 100 0.04 178 175 0.97
75% 300 240 480 585
95% 810 730 955 1020
Mean 218 188 308 331
Std 257 234 317 345
Panel B: Liquidity and Aggressiveness Terciles
Liquid Illiquid
Pre-Reg
NMS
Post-Reg
NMS
MW-test
p-value
Pre-Reg
NMS
Post-Reg
NMS
MW-test
p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TA1 130 105 0.22 235 200 0.78
TA2 115 95 0.14 148 150 0.88
TA3 145 115 0.55 195 225 0.44
TA1-TA3 0.78 0.27 0.31 0.82
TA2-TA3 0.57 0.22 0.12 0.05
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Table III.7: Price Adjustment: Difference-in-Differences Analysis. This table presents the
results of the negative binomial regressions that include observations from the pre- and post-Reg NMS
periods. The dependent variable in each model is the length of the adjustment period. Models (1) to
(3) report the results for the benchmark definition of abnormal volatility: volatility is abnormal if the
realized volatility in a five-minute interval exceeds the 75% cutoff value in the same five-minute interval
calculated over days [−40;−3]. Models (4) to (6) report the multivariate results for an alternative
definition of abnormal volatility: volatility is abnormal if it exceeds the median volatility in the same
five-minute period on the non-announcement days. Models (1) and (4) report the results for the total
sample, Models (2) and (5) for the positive earnings surprises, and Models (3) and (6) for the negative
earnings surprises. See the Appendix for the exact definition of all variables.
AV: Upper Quartile AV: Above Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Pos
Surp
Neg
Surp
Total Pos
Surp
Neg
Surp
Adj Time
Post Reg -0.20 * -0.05 -0.35 ** -0.15 * -0.06 -0.26 **
Illiq 0.35 *** 0.35 *** 0.39 *** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Illiq· Post Reg -0.07 -0.19 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.07
Liq· |∆ISOvol|∆>0 -0.01 -0.08 0.08 0.18 0.07 0.31 *
Liq· |∆ISOvol|∆<0 -0.51 * -0.95 ** 0.01 -0.20 -0.27 -0.10
Illiq· |∆ISOvol|∆>0 0.25 *** 0.31 *** 0.18 0.16 *** 0.22 *** 0.08
Illiq· |∆ISOvol|∆<0 0.31 ** 0.56 *** -0.01 0.17 * 0.37 *** -0.05
Turnover -9.78 ** -15.84 *** -5.38 -2.78 -1.58 -3.77
LnMCap 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.02 * 0.02 0.03
VIX 0.70 *** 0.70 ** 0.71 ** 0.54 *** 0.47 ** 0.62 **
Earn Surp 1.38 *** 1.00 1.95 ** 1.62 *** 1.45 *** 1.84 ***
N 3,613 1,826 1,762 3,613 1,826 1,762
P(Chi-Squared) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.005
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Daytime FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table III.8: Price Adjustment: Robustness Checks. This table presents the results of the negative
binomial regressions that include observations from the pre- and post-Reg NMS periods. The dependent
variable in each model is the length of the adjustment period. Models (1) to (3) use an alternative
definition of intraday volatility that is now measured as the realized price range in each five-minute
interval. Models (4) to (6) use the benchmark definition of the realized volatility, but differentiate
between the samples of liquid and illiquid stocks with the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. Models
(1) and (4) report the results for the total sample, Models (2) and (5) for the positive earnings surprises,
and Models (3) and (6) for the negative earnings surprises. See the Appendix for the exact definition of
all variables.
Price Range Amihud
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Pos
Surp
Neg
Surp
Total Pos
Surp
Neg
Surp
Adj time
Post Reg -0.20 * -0.15 -0.21 -0.19 -0.06 -0.28 *
Illiq 0.45 *** 0.46 *** 0.48 *** 0.37 *** 0.39 *** 0.39 ***
Illiq· Post Reg -0.01 -0.17 0.11 -0.09 -0.16 -0.08
Liq· |∆ISOvol|∆>0 0.10 0.05 0.12 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05
Liq· |∆ISOvol|∆<0 -0.49 * -0.88 ** -0.15 -0.71 *** -1.02 *** -0.35
Illiq· |∆ISOvol|∆>0 0.25 *** 0.37 *** 0.13 0.25 *** 0.29 *** 0.21 *
Illiq· |∆ISOvol|∆<0 0.37 *** 0.55 *** 0.14 0.34 *** 0.56 *** 0.06
Turnover -12.19 *** -24.96 *** -3.64 -9.17 ** -14.48 *** -5.77
LnMCap -0.04 ** -0.03 -0.04 * 0.01 0.00 0.01
VIX 0.67 *** 0.74 ** 0.61 * 0.70 *** 0.70 ** 0.73 **
Earn Surp 1.44 *** 1.33 * 1.79 ** 1.38 *** 0.95 1.99 **
N 3,589 1,808 1,756 3,613 1,826 1,762
P(Chi-Squared) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
WeekdayFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DaytimeFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YearFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Chapter IV
Trading Strategies of Corporate
Insiders
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze the trading strategies of corporate insiders. Our particular focus
is on the competing roles of liquidity and information. Two distinct but complementary
theoretical approaches in the literature develop models of insiders’ trading strategies. The
first approach is based on the notion that insiders possess private information and that
their trading strategies are primarily designed to optimally exploit their informational
advantage. Theoretical formulations of this information-based view of insider trading go
back to Kyle (1985), who shows how insiders could optimally profit from their informa-
tional advantage by spreading their transactions dynamically over time.1 The second
approach analyzes block traders who trade for liquidity reasons and spread their trades
over time to minimize price impact, especially temporary price impact. The analysis of
1While many authors have expanded on Kyle’s original analysis, very few have taken up its dynamic
aspect and analyze strategies for how traders with long-lived information break up their trades over time.
The most important extension for our purposes is Holden and Subrahmanyam (1993) and Foster and
Viswanathan (1994, 1996), who consider multiple competing traders. We discuss their model and later
extensions in more detail below.
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these liquidity-based trading strategies is more recent and goes back to Bertsimas and
Lo (1998) and Vayanos (1999, 2001).2
Both theories can only be distinguished empirically in a context in which multiple
block traders trade simultaneously. However, the theories are indistinguishable in en-
vironments where one block trader is assumed to trade only with small traders. Then
both theories predict that traders break up their trades and spread their transactions over
time. By contrast, for environments in which multiple block traders trade simultaneously,
the empirical predictions of information-based theories and liquidity-based theories dif-
fer. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1993) extend Kyle’s model to a setting with multiple
informed traders and show that insiders trade more aggressively if other insiders trade
on the same long-lived information at the same time. The intuition is that they become
competitors for the exploitation of the informative signal and enjoy an informational ad-
vantage only as long as the information has not been incorporated into prices through
the trades of other insiders.3 By contrast, liquidity-based arguments imply the opposite:
traders extend their trading horizons and trade more slowly if they know that others
trade in the same direction at the same time.4 In this scenario, other traders demand
liquidity in the same market at the same time, which increases temporary price impact
and makes trading more costly. This reduction in liquidity shifts the trade-off between
2Other approaches include Almgren (2003), Almgren and Chriss (2001), He and Mamaysky (2005),
Obizhaeva and Wang (2005), Huberman and Stanzl (2005), and Schied and Schöneborn (2009). The
papers differ with respect to the assumed objective of the insider and with respect to the details of the
price formation process, which is typically assumed to be an exogenous process that combines temporary
as well as permanent price impact. Vayanos (1999) derives prices and price impact endogenously from
the model.
3See also Foster and Viswanathan (1994, 1996), who also investigate the case in which the signals of
two competing insiders are not perfectly correlated. Then the prediction mentioned above holds only
for the common component of insiders‘ signals. Important extensions of this framework allow for the
possibility that information is disclosed (Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001)) and that it becomes stale
(Bernhardt and Miao (2004)).
4Note that the opposite happens in Vayanos’ (1999) model, because in his framework additional traders
supply liquidity and reduce price impact since their endowment shocks are uncorrelated, whereas in our
setting the opposite is the case. To the best of our knowledge, no model in the literature extends the
liquidity-based argument to a multiple-trader context. We provide such an extension in Appendix B.
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immediacy and the desire to avoid price impact towards the second objective, resulting
in less aggressive trading strategies and longer completion times for executing trades.
We analyze the transactions of corporate insiders in order to test these theories. In-
sider trading provides an ideal testing ground for these models. Insider transactions are
well documented and allow us to identify multiple transactions by the same insider. Im-
portantly, insiders’ filings allow us to separate situations in which insiders compete with
each other from situations in which only one insider trades. In addition, the motives iden-
tified by both theories play an important role: A significant part of the trades of corporate
insiders is based on informational advantages; at the same time, trades are typically large,
which creates liquidity motivations to spread transactions over time.
We study a sample of 1.85 million transactions by more than 99.000 insiders in the
United States. We first show that most of these transactions indeed form sequences that
result from breaking up larger trades and not just from random clustering of transactions.
We then analyze the length of transaction sequences in terms of calendar time (trade
duration). Based on event-study methodology, we classify about one in seven trades as
informed. We then distinguish days on which multiple insiders trade in the same direction
at the same time from those days on which only one insider trades.
We find support for both theories. On average, insiders trade more slowly and break up
trades into longer sequences whenever multiple insiders trade at the same time, which is
consistent with the predictions of liquidity-based models of strategic trading. By contrast,
informed trades, which are associated with large abnormal disclosure day returns, are
completed faster. Competition from other insiders reduces the trade duration for informed
trades, in line with the predictions of information-based models. We conclude that both
classes of models have significant explanatory power, although information-related effects
tend to be economically smaller than liquidity-related effects. Competition for the use of
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privileged information is somewhat more prevalent before the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley act (SOX) than in the later period of our sample.
In addition to the baseline predictions from the models in the literature, we formu-
late several other hypotheses and investigate a range of other variables that capture the
liquidity of the market or informational advantages. We group trades by the category of
insiders (CEO, other officers, etc.), which is most likely related to the amount of informa-
tion insiders possess. Interestingly, the least informed insiders who have no operational
role in the firm take the longest to complete their trades, which supports liquidity-based
theories more than information-based theories. If insiders are trading on the short side of
the market, i.e. they buy when the market moves up or sell when the market moves down,
then they trade over longer periods of time. Insiders take longer to complete trades in
less liquid markets, independently of the measure we chose to proxy for market liquidity.
We conclude that overall, the motive to avoid temporary price impact is more important
for insiders’ trading strategies compared to informational motives.
Next, we investigate how insiders adapt their trading strategies in response to changes
in the liquidity of the firm’s stock. The models of optimal liquidation strategies for large
blocks discussed above assume that the price impact of transactions is constant over
time. By contrast, we hypothesize that insiders do not simply follow mechanical trading
strategies, but respond to changes in market liquidity by avoiding low-liquidity days and
trading more on days on which liquidity is high. We find strong evidence for this liquidity-
timing hypothesis. The effective spread and the Amihud illiquidity measure are higher
by a factor of about two on days when insiders do not trade compared to days when they
trade. Additionally, within the subsample of days on which insiders trade, insiders trade
more on those days on which liquidity is higher. These findings are not driven by reverse
causality.
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We contribute to the literature in several ways. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to analyze strategic trading by corporate insiders empirically, and also the
first to provide empirical tests for the contrasting implications of information-based and
liquidity-based strategic trading models.5 Keim and Madhavan (1995) analyze trading
strategies for a sample of 21 institutions and find a positive relationship between trade
duration and block size. However, they do not analyze how traders compete for the use of
information or liquidity. Chan and Lakonishok (1995) analyze how 37 institutions spread
their trades over several days and how their strategies affect price impact and execution
costs. There is a large later literature on the price impact and the information content
of large block trades, but this literature does not explicitly analyze the determinants
of trading strategies and does not contrast liquidity motives with information-related
motives.6 All these papers study small proprietary data sets provided by institutions
that include identifiers for individual traders, information that is normally not available,
whereas we can rely on a large, comprehensive data set.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section briefly
describes the institutional framework of insider trading in the United States and how we
construct our data set. Section 2 shows that insiders break up large trades into sequences
of smaller transactions. Section 3 analyzes the determinants for trade duration and forms
the core of our analysis. Section 4 tests the liquidity-timing hypothesis and Section 5
concludes. The appendix contains the descriptions of our variables and a theoretical
model that analyzes competition for liquidity.
5Our definition of strategic trading is different from that in Betzer, Gider, Metzger and Theissen
(2011), who analyze the relationship between insider trades and trade reporting.
6See Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987, 1990) and Keim and Madhavan (1996). Later papers
focus in particular on price impact and the slope of demand curves, e.g. Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck
(2000) and Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002). For a recent empirical analysis of trading strategies and
price impact see Almgren, Thum, Hauptmann and Li (2005).
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2 Construction of the Data Set and Methodology
According to Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, all insiders have to
disclose their transactions to the SEC. Insiders are direct and indirect beneficial owners
of more than ten percent of any class of equity securities and any director or officer of
the issuer of equity securities (Section 16(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
SEC rule 16a-2). Until August 2002, insiders had to report their transactions on a monthly
basis within 10 days after the end of each calendar month in which the transaction occurred
(Form 4), which gave insiders up to forty days to disclose their trades. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) changed this practice. Since August 29, 2002, insiders had to report
their trades within two business days (SEC rule 16a-3(g)). Small purchases or sales that
do not add up to more than $10,000 within six months are exempt from these reporting
requirements (SEC rule 16a-6). These small acquisitions are not reported on Form 4 as
usual insider transactions but on Form 5, which has to be filed only within 45 days after
the issuer’s fiscal year end (SEC rule 16a-3(f)).
2.1 Construction of the Data Set
Our data source for insider transactions is the Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF) pro-
vided by Thomson Reuters. IFDF collects information on three forms insiders have to file
with the SEC: Form 3 (“Initial Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities”), Form
4 (“Statement of Changes of Beneficial Ownership of Securities”), and Form 5 (“Annual
Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities”). We include all open market purchases
and sales as well as private transactions between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2008
with complete data (including CUSIP, transaction date, and disclosure date) on IFDF.
Table 1 provides the details of the construction of our data set. We extract 3,272,073
transactions for 151,523 insiders from 18,380 firms. We match the transactions to CRSP
and lose 9.2% of the transactions because the firm is not listed on CRSP and another 9.1%
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because the stock price data available on CRSP are insufficient to compute abnormal re-
turns. We also delete all transactions for which the number of shares in the transaction as
reported on IFDF exceeds the number of shares traded on the exchange on the same day
as reported by CRSP; these transactions form 3.9% of the original sample and are most
likely privately negotiated and therefore not of interest for our analysis. We have a small
number of cases in which insiders trade in different directions on the same day (0.8% of
the original sample) and for which the transaction data on IFDF are incomplete (0.3%).
We delete these transactions. We are concerned that our analysis may be influenced by
computer-executed trades. We therefore exclude transactions for which the number of
shares traded is not a multiple of ten, which are most likely initiated by computerized al-
gorithms. These odd-numbered trades form 14.4% of our original sample. Excluding them
probably biases our results against liquidity-based theories because trading in multiples
of 500, 1000, or 5000 shares has been associated with stealth trading (Alexander and Pe-
terson (2007)), but we find that our results remain unaffected by excluding odd-numbered
trades. Furthermore, we do not have time stamps and can therefore not analyze trading
sequences that are completed within one day. We therefore aggregate all transactions
of the same insider, in the same stock, in the same direction, on the same day that are
executed at the same price. In unreported regressions, we check whether out results are
affected by the choice of this or several other aggregation rules and find that they have
no impact on the results. We are left with 1,849,513 transactions by 99,413 insiders of
11,013 firms, or 56.5% of the raw data. Of these 20.3% are purchases and 79.7% are sales.
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For all microstructure variables, we use the TAQ database to extract the necessary
intraday transaction data. For each trade we assign the bid and ask quotes prevailing one
second before the trade took place.7
2.2 Constructing Transaction Sequences
Definition of a transaction sequence. In our baseline analysis, we regard a trans-
action as a part of a sequence of transactions from a split trade if there is a subsequent
transaction in the same direction and by the same insider before or on the same day on
which the first transaction is disclosed. If two trades in the same direction are separated
by a trade in the opposite direction, or if the first trade has been disclosed, we start a new
sequence. The motivation for this definition is that trade splitting only helps insiders to
conceal information as long as the transaction has not been disclosed. Later we show that
our results are robust to this definition and that we can omit the requirement that the
first transaction has not been disclosed. Our definition is probably conservative. Huddart,
Hughes, and Levine (2001) analyze a model in which insiders have to disclose their trades
after every trading round and find that this disclosure requirement induces insiders to play
mixed strategies and to garble the information from disclosures by trading in the opposite
direction. In their model, insiders may interrupt a sequence of transactions in the same
direction with a transaction in the opposite direction to mislead the market. However, we
find hardly any evidence for this prediction and conclude that the theoretical possibility
highlighted by Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001) is not relevant for our analysis.8
7Henker and Wang (2006) consider this procedure to be more appropriate compared to the classical Lee
and Ready (1991) five-second rule. Bessembinder (2003) tries zero- to thirty-second delays in increments
of five seconds and does not find any differences in the results.
8In our sample, we observe 128,137 cases in which insiders trade more than once during one week.
There are only 121 cases in which insiders change the direction of their trades within a week. We therefore
conclude that insiders do not try to camouflage the information of disclosures by trading in the opposite
direction.
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Disclosure requirements changed with SOX on August 29, 2002. However, insiders did
sometimes not comply with these regulations before and after the passage of SOX. We
therefore use the actual rather than the mandated disclosure date to identify transaction
sequences. We define the maximum length of a transaction sequence to be 40 days. If
the first transaction of a sequence is not reported within 40 days, then we consider this
sequence to be finished to avoid sequences that stretch over extremely long periods. These
40 days define the upper legal bound for reporting most insider trades before SOX became
effective. We consider alternative definitions of trade sequences. In particular, we reran
our regressions with shorter time limits (7 days instead of 40 days) and find qualitatively
and quantitatively very similar results (results not tabulated).
Figure 1 displays some characteristics of transaction sequences according to our defi-
nition. Panel A of Figure 1 shows a secular trend throughout our sample period towards
more transaction sequences, which account for about 70% of all trades at the beginning
of our sample period and for 90% before the onset of the financial crisis, which then led
to a sharp drop in split trades. There is also a drop in August 2002 that continues until
January of the following year. Panel B of Figure 1 displays the number of transactions per
sequence, which shows a similar pattern. There are about two transactions per sequence
in 1996; the number increases steadily, with a short interruption after Sarbanes-Oxley, to
about ten transactions per sequence. The financial crisis caused a dramatic drop in the
number of transactions per sequence.
Definition of trade duration. The trade duration of transaction sequences is de-
fined as the weighted number of days between the first and the last transaction of the
sequence, where the weights are the number of shares traded in sequence s on date t :
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TradeDuration(s) =
T∑
t=1
t·SharesTradeds,t/
T∑
t=1
SharesTradeds,t.
This definition takes into account not only the number of days between the beginning
and the end of the transaction sequence but also the number of shares traded on each
day. Under this definition, trade duration decreases if the insider trades larger volumes
during the first days of the sequence compared to situations when the insider splits her
transactions equally throughout the sequence. The trade duration of a single trade is
equal to one. Average trade duration increases from about three to five days in the period
before Sarbanes-Oxley. After Sarbanes-Oxley, trade duration sharply decreases to two
days, largely for mechanical reasons, and stabilizes at about one and a half after 2004
(Panel C of Figure 1).
Next, we show that transaction sequences constitute trades that were broken up and
do not result from random clustering. We consider the clustering of transactions by
the same person in the same direction as evidence for trade splitting. Absent trade
splitting, the direction of insiders’ transactions should be uncorrelated over time, i.e., if
an insider executes purchases with probability p and sales with probability 1-p, then this
unconditional probability should be equal to the conditional probability given the direction
of the last transaction. Trade splitting may be active, if insiders post a sequence of market
orders, or passive, if they post limit orders that are executed against other orders over a
period of time. The only relevant aspect for our analysis is that a sequence of transactions
should be regarded as the execution of one larger trade. We first perform univariate tests
to see whether the unconditional probability and the conditional probability of a sale are
the same, given the direction of the previous transaction.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results for univariate tests. We calculate the proportion
of transactions that have the same sign as the previous transaction. Since we need the
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sign of the previous transaction, the calculations do not include the first transaction for
each person. In our baseline case, we do not impose a time limit within which the next
transaction has to occur. Table 3 shows that trades cluster not just randomly. In total,
20.3% of all transactions are purchases and 79.7% are sales (see Table 2). Conditional
on the previous transaction being a sale (purchase), the next transaction is also a sale
(purchase) in 98.8% (96.8%) of all cases, which is significant at the 0.01%-level using
standard tests. We repeat the analysis by requiring that the next transaction occurs
within a certain period of time, which we assume to be 183 days, 40 days, and 2 days of
the first transaction. The six-month restriction is motivated by the short-swing rule, the
40-day restriction by pre-SOX disclosure regulation, and the 2-day restriction by post-
SOX disclosure regulation (see above). We find higher probabilities for insiders to trade
in the same direction if we restrict the length of a transaction sequence more, although
the differences are economically insignificant.
In Panel B of Table 3 we address the same question with a standard Probit model
to make sure that transaction clustering cannot be attributed to exogenous factors that
influence the direction of trade. The dependent variable equals one if the transaction
is a purchase, and regress it on the same dummy variable for the previous transaction
(LagPurchase). We control for other factors that may drive trade clustering. Many papers
document the influence of investor sentiment on investment decisions of retail investors
and asset prices. In regression (2) in Table 3B we control for investor sentiment (e.g.,
Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)), by including Sentiment, the investor sentiment measure
of Baker and Wurgler (2006), as an independent variable. The insider trading literature
has shown that insiders often act like contrarian investors.9 We therefore include two
additional independent variables in models (3) and (4): RunupCAR, the abnormal return
9Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Jenter (2005), and Fidrmuc, Goergen, and
Renneboog (2006) find that insiders on aggregate are contrarian investors.
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over the 20 trading days before the transaction, and StockTercile, which is the tercile of
the stock return in the calendar month before the transaction of all sample companies
with sufficient data for this period. Both variables measure the relative development of
firm’s stock price in the month before an insider transaction. Model (5) includes all four
control variables.
Across all these regressions, the coefficient of LagPurchase is between 92% and 94%,
which means that the conditional probability that the next transaction is again a pur-
chase is at least 92% if we evaluate the impact at the mean of all independent variables.
This is economically significantly different from its unconditional probability of 20.3%
and statistically significant at all conventional significance levels. All controls have the
predicted signs and suggest that some trade clustering responds to investor sentiment and
contrarian motives. We conclude that trade splitting is pervasive. Insiders are much more
likely to purchase (sell) shares if the previous transaction was also a purchase (sale), even
after controlling for all factors that influence trade clustering.
We aggregate sequences of transactions and refer to them as aggregate trades. If we
analyze individual trades of a transaction sequence, we refer to them as single transactions.
The average trade duration for transaction sequences is 2 days (3.4 days pre-SOX and
1.4 days post-SOX) and varies between 1 and 20.6 days. Single transactions in a trading
sequence are only about one third as large as single trades (median size: $26,300 vs.
$72,200 or 0.002% vs. 0.013% as a percentage of all shares outstanding). Aggregate
trades are almost four times larger than single trades (median size: $255,300 vs. $72,200,
or 0.047% vs. 0.013% of all shares outstanding).
Table 2 provides summary statistics of all variables for our sample. We report sum-
mary statistics of trades instead of single transactions because these are the unit of our
analysis. The 1,849,513 insider transactions in our data set map into 471,241 trades. We
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identify 260,438 single trades and 210,803 aggregate trades (transaction sequences). For
all variables, which can change over a transaction sequence, we assign the value of the first
transaction to the whole sequence. We aggregate only Stake and Volume over trading
sequences.
2.3 Event Study Analysis
We apply standard event study analysis to disclosure day returns to measure the infor-
mation content of insider trades, which is an established methodology in the insider trad-
ing literature (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee (2001); Fidrmuc, Goergen, and
Renneboog (2006)). We calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) by using the
market model for different event windows between 2 to 41 trading days starting at the
disclosure day. The market return is proxied by the CRSP equally weighted return index,
and the estimation window ranges over 200 trading days from 220 until 21 trading days
prior to the disclosure day. We require at least 100 stock return observations for the
parameter estimation.
The results for the event study are presented in Table 4. Similar to the prior literature
on insider trading we find that insider trades are informative. Disclosure day returns
are significant across all event windows for the pooled sample. We can also confirm the
finding of Brochet (2010) that post-SOX the CARs after disclosing purchases increased
significantly, whereas the reaction to sales became less negative. In line with the prior
literature we find that purchases usually lead to stronger market reactions, although this
observation does not apply to the longer event windows pre-SOX (e.g. Lakonishok and
Lee (2001); Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003)).
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3 What Influences Trade Duration?
Since we analyze trade duration, the main unit of analysis for this section is a sequence
of transactions and not an individual transaction itself. In a setting in which only one
insider trades, both, information-based theories and liquidity-based theories, imply that
insiders stretch their trades over time. We generate contrasting predictions of these the-
ories of optimal trading strategies in two ways. First, as mentioned in the Introduction,
our main strategy is to focus on situations when several insiders trade simultaneously.
Second, we identify moderating factors that influence optimal trading strategies and that
differ depending on the motive for trading.10 We therefore test the implications for com-
petition by insiders first and then develop additional hypotheses about how the economic
environment influences the execution of information-based and liquidity-based trading
strategies.
3.1 Hypothesis Development
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1993) show in the context of a Kyle (1985) model that
insiders trade more intensely or more aggressively if they compete for the use of the
same information at the same time. Foster and Viswanathan (1996) refine this argument
by considering the possibility that insiders have information that is positively, but not
perfectly correlated. Then insiders compete more intensely for the component of their
information they have in common. We therefore have:
Hypothesis 1 (Informed trading with competition): Trade duration decreases if
several insiders compete for exploiting the same long-lived information.
10It may be possible to generate implications about the dynamic profiles of trades. Kyle (1985) predicts
that monopolistic insider trades result in a constant speed of information resolution. Optimal liquidation
strategies without privileged fundamental information imply that insiders sell their stakes at a decreasing
rate (e.g., Vayanos (2001)). However, these predictions seem to be highly model-dependent and do not
easily lend themselves to empirical testing.
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By contrast, liquidity-based arguments predict the opposite. We develop this argument
more formally in the context of a highly stylized model in Appendix B and provide the
intuition here. Assume two or more insiders wish to sell a block of shares for liquidity
reasons in order to diversify their portfolios. They intend to trade simultaneously and
their trades have a temporary impact on transaction prices.11 All insiders have a need to
trade, for example because they wish to reduce their exposure to the long-term uncertainty
about the fundamental value of the stock.12 Then trading faster implies larger benefits
from diversification as well as costs from incurring additional temporary price impact.
Consequently, each insider trades less and stretches her transactions over a longer period
of time if other insiders trade simultaneously in the same direction. The intuition for this
result is that simultaneous trading by other insiders increases the slope of the residual
demand function for each insider. The increased price impact increases the costs of
immediacy and therefore slows down trading by each insider. The fundamental risk of the
stock increases insiders’ demand for immediacy; hence, they should trade the asset faster
if the stock is more volatile.
Hypothesis 2 (Liquidity trading): (1) Trade duration increases if several insid-
ers trade simultaneously in the same direction for liquidity reasons. (2) Trade duration
decreases with the volatility of the stock if insiders sell for liquidity reasons.
Comparing Hypotheses 1 and 2 shows that information-based and liquidity-based ex-
planations have contrasting implications in a context in which multiple insiders trade at
the same time.
11In our model and in the argument in the text we abstract from permanent price impact based on the
notion that insiders trade for liquidity reasons and have no privileged information. Including permanent
price impact would complicate but not change the basic argument.
12The model is in the spirit of Almgren and Chriss (2001), He and Mamaysky (2005), and Huberman
and Stanzl (2005), who all use some variant of a mean-variance framework to generate a trade-off between
price impact and immediacy. Our model can be understood as a reduced-form version of these models,
because our model summarizes the costs from trading in a quadratic penalty function.
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Testing the implications of the two theoretical approaches requires us to distinguish
information-based trades from liquidity-based trades and days on which insiders compete
from days on which this is not the case. We measure the information content of trades
using the two-day cumulative abnormal announcement return on the day of and the day
after the disclosure of the first transaction in a sequence (CAR(0,1)). If an insider exploits
private information, we should see a stronger market reaction at the disclosure date. We
define a dummy variable Informed, which equals one if the two-day cumulative abnormal
return is greater in absolute value than the standard deviation of stock returns in the
month prior to the trade. Additionally, we require that the CAR is positive (negative)
for purchases (sales).13 Our results are robust to alternative definitions of Informed.
In the robustness section (Section 3.2) we report results using CAR(0,5). We measure
competition between insiders by defining the dummy variable MultipleInsiders, which is
one if more than one insider trades in the same direction on the same day, and zero
otherwise.
We formulate additional hypotheses that motivate the inclusion of additional explana-
tory variables below. We enter all these variables in one regression in order to avoid
omitted variable bias and collect the results in Table 5. Our baseline regression is model
(1), which regresses TradeDuration on the independent variables associated with our hy-
potheses. Models (2) to (5) perform two sample splits based on the direction of trade
and on the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX). The sample split into purchases
and sales is motivated by the notion in the insider trading literature that purchases have
a larger information content compared to sales (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). The
sample split into the pre- and post-SOX period recognizes that SOX changed disclosure
13We also investigated other measures of asymmetric information (e.g., earnings quality, R&D). How-
ever, these measures are only available annually or quarterly on the firm level and exhibit very low
correlations with our measure Informed. We believe that the asymmetric information component is most
accurately measured using ex post realized returns.
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standards for insider trades (see Section 2.1 above). The substantial reduction in the
disclosure requirement from a maximum of 40 days to only two business days reduces in-
siders’ ability to spread transactions over time without disclosing their trades. We group
variables in Table 5 by the associated hypothesis and order them in the order in which we
discuss them in the text. As an additional check, models (6) and (7) in Table 5 regress the
cumulative abnormal disclosure-date returns on the same independent variables. These
regressions allow us to identify which of the explanatory variables are systematically as-
sociated with more information. This analysis is performed separately for purchases and
for sales in accordance with standard procedures in the insider trading literature.
3.2 Analysis
3.2.1 Competition for Liquidity vs. Competition for Information
The main variable of interest in Table 5 is MultipleInsiders. The coefficient on Mul-
tipleInsiders is always positive and highly significant at all conventional levels with t-
statistics ranging from 27.3 to 48.4. The presence of at least one additional insider who
trades in the stock in the same direction increases trade duration on average by 5.3% in
the baseline regression (1). The effect has a similar strength for purchases and for sales,
but is about three times stronger in relative terms in the pre-SOX period (7.6% increase)
compared to the post-SOX period (2.7% increase). Since TradeDuration is much larger
before SOX than after, the economic effect is correspondingly even stronger in the pre-
SOX period. The evidence therefore strongly supports the prediction of Hypothesis 2
that insiders compete for the same liquidity and spread their trades over longer periods
if other insiders trade at the same time. By contrast, the coefficient on MultipleInsiders
does not support the predictions of Hypothesis 1 and information-based models for the
whole sample, because then we should find a negative coefficient.
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However, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are not mutually exclusive because some insider trades
may be motivated by information whereas others are motivated by liquidity reasons and
the result on MultipleInsiders then only shows that liquidity motivations dominate on
average. The interaction of Informed and MultipleInsiders shows that this seems to be
the case. The coefficient is highly significant and negative, which suggests that insid-
ers trade more aggressively if there is competition from other insiders and their trades
are motivated by the use of privileged information. The coefficient on the interaction
terms is between 20% and 50% of the coefficient on MultipleInsiders for all regressions.
The mean of Informed is 14% from Table 2, which means that we classify about one in
seven trades as information-based. In the presence of competition, these information-
based trades complete significantly faster compared to liquidity-motivated trades in the
presence of competition. Hence, we find strong predictions for the models of Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1996) that competition by insiders
for the use of the same information leads them to trade more aggressively. However,
this observation applies only to a minority of the insider trades in our sample so that
liquidity-based arguments have more explanatory power on average.14
Trades associated with several insiders are on average more informative. Regressions
(6) and (7) show that the coefficient onMultipleInsiders is always highly significant for the
regressions in which the dependent variable is the disclosure-day return. For purchases,
the effect is also economically significant with a 0.52% stronger increase of the stock price
for the announcement of purchases when more than one insider purchases at the same
time. By contrast, the effect is negligible for sales with a 0.04% stronger decrease of the
stock price. This corroborates the notion in the insider trading literature that purchases
14Informed equals one if the CAR(0,1) exceeds one standard deviation of the previous month’s stock
returns in absolute value. The results do not change if we increase the hurdle to two or three standard
deviations (results not reported) or if we use CAR(0,5) (reported below).
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tend to be more information-motivated than sales. Similarly, 18.8% of insider purchases
in our sample, but only 11.7% of insider sales, are classified as informed trades.
The coefficient on Informed shows that trade duration for informed trades is generally
shorter by about 0.5%. This effect is similar for purchases and sales and concentrated
entirely in the period after Sarbanes-Oxley. As we explained above, the models we com-
pare do not make direct predictions on trade duration but only on how trade duration
responds to competition. The post-SOX regulatory environment might have led insiders
to complete information-based trades faster whereas there was no corresponding need to
accelerate liquidity-motivated trades.
Hypothesis 2 also predicts that liquidity-motivated trades complete faster if insiders
are exposed to more risk because the benefits of immediacy increase if the risk of the
fundamental value of the shares is larger. We do not find much evidence for this pre-
diction. The coefficient on Volatility is in fact positive but statistically and economically
insignificant in the baseline regression (1). It has the predicted negative sign only in the
post-SOX period and then it becomes statistically highly significant, although the eco-
nomic effect is still small: the coefficient of -0.0078 implies that a one-standard deviation
increase in Volatility reduces TradeDuration by only 0.3%. We conclude that the con-
nection between volatility and the benefits from immediacy is weak and suspect that the
benefits from immediacy arise from other considerations.
3.2.2 Liquidity Effects
Next, we investigate the impact of several variables that are associated with the liq-
uidity of the market and with insiders’ desire to trade on certain days but not on others.
Based on the model in the appendix, we hypothesize that trade splitting is also a strategy
to optimize liquidity. Insiders trade over longer intervals of time if the market is less liquid
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or if they trade on the short side of the market, i.e., they buy when other investors want
to buy and sell when other investors want to sell.
Hypothesis 3 (Stock liquidity): (1) Trade duration increases in the illiquidity of
the stock. (2) Trade duration increases if insiders trade on the short side of the market.
Liquidity is a somewhat elusive concept and the literature has developed different
measures.15 We wish to use a measure that can be calculated on a daily basis. To conserve
space we only report results for the effective relative spread (EffectiveSpread) in Table 5.
The results for other liquidity measures (Amihud, Turnover, PriceImpact) are discussed
in Section 3.2. EffectiveSpread is defined as 2 · |Pt −Qt| /Qt, where Qt is the midpoint of
the quotes and Pt is the transaction price (see Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001)).
We average the measure for all trades during the day and assign the EffectiveSpread of
the first day of a trading sequence to the whole sequence.
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, we observe significantly longer trading sequences for
firms with less liquid stocks. The effects are somewhat stronger for purchases and for
the post-SOX period. However, economic significance is small: A one standard deviation
change in EffectiveSpread increases trade duration only by about 0.1% on average.
The variable ShortSide intends to capture periods during which insiders want to buy
when other investors buy and sell when other investors sell. We cannot measure the direc-
tion in which other traders want to trade directly and infer it from recent price movements
instead. We conduct this analysis at the firm level and classify insider transactions ac-
cording to the recent share price performance of the firm, assuming that it is more difficult
for insiders to buy (sell) shares if the stock of their company has over (under) performed
compared to all other stocks in the market. We capture this idea by defining the dummy
variable ShortSide, which equals one for purchases (sales) if the stock return of the firm
15See Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) for a recent analysis of liquidity measures.
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in the previous calendar month was in the upper (lower) tercile of the stock returns of all
firms in the sample. Hypothesis 3 predicts a positive sign for ShortSide. In Table 5 the
coefficient for ShortSide is positive as predicted and highly significant, which supports
the notion that insiders adapt their trading strategies to manage liquidity. Trade dura-
tion increases on average by about 2.3% if the insider is on the short side of the market.
Comparison of regressions (2) and (3) shows that this effect is driven mostly by sales
in a falling market (3.12% impact) rather than by purchases in a rising market (0.42%
impact).
Both effects, that of the effective spread and that of ShortSide, cannot be associated
with information effects. For both variables, CARs are smaller in absolute value, i.e.,
CARs are lower for purchases and higher for sales: insiders realize lower trading profits
from trades on the short side of the market and when the market is illiquid, whereas an
information-based explanation would have to associate higher effective spreads with more
information asymmetry, which would give the opposite sign.
3.2.3 Information Hierarchies and the Role of Insiders
Several papers in the insider trading literature investigate the so-called “information
hierarchy hypothesis,” which holds that those insiders who are closer to the firm have more
information and their trades have therefore more information content and are more prof-
itable (Seyhun (1986)). The empirical evidence on this hypothesis is mixed.16 Based on
our data we can distinguish between the CEO, officers other than the CEO, directors who
are not officers, the chairperson of the board, and other insiders who hold none of these
roles. Other insiders are mostly large shareholders, who have to file their transactions if
their ownership exceeds 10% of the outstanding shares.
16Seyhun (1986) shows that the directors and officers trade on more valuable information than other
insiders. Lin and Howe (1990) show that trades by the CEO and the officers and directors of the firm have
a higher information content than those of unaffiliated shareholders. Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog
(2006) find no evidence for the information hierarchy hypothesis.
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The univariate analysis in Table 4 above supports the information hierarchy hypothesis
for purchases: we observe the following ranking in terms of the absolute size of cumulative
abnormal returns for CAR(0,1) and CAR(0,5): CEO > Chairman > Officer > Director
> Other, although the return differences between these groups are not always statistically
significant. For CARs measured over longer event windows the ranking between Chairmen
and Officer is reversed; for sales, we cannot observe a clear ranking. The ranking for
purchases is in line with predictions based on the information hierarchy hypothesis. In
particular, we would always expect CEOs to be best informed and other insiders to be
least informed.
Based on this observation, we expect that those insiders who trade for information
reasons trade faster when they expect competition for the use of the same information
from other insiders, whereas they trade more slowly if they do not expect competition.
Insiders at the top of the information hierarchy should face less competition than those
at the bottom. To see this, consider a simplified situation in which insiders can observe
three independent signals: εCEO&Chair is observed only by the CEO and the chairman,
εD&O is observed by the CEO, chairman, and also by directors and officers, and εOther is
observed by all, including other insiders. Accordingly, there is little competition for the
exploitation of εCEO&Chair, some competition for εD&O, and the most intense competition
for εOther. Based on the theory of Foster and Viswanathan (1994), we therefore expect
that insiders at the top of the information hierarchy trade less intensely and spread their
trades over longer periods, whereas insiders at the bottom of the information hierarchy,
who are subject to more competition, trade more aggressively over shorter periods of time.
Hypothesis 4 (Information hierarchy): Insiders at the bottom of the information
hierarchy who trade on less information trade more aggressively, whereas those at the top
of the information hierarchy spread their trades over longer periods.
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The multivariate regressions in Table 5 include dummy variables for all categories of
insiders except the CEO, so the coefficients for the four remaining insider groups have to
be interpreted relative to the CEO of the company. We focus on the results for purchases
in regression (2) in Table 5, because the event study returns discussed above reveal that
the informativeness of sales does not conform to the information hierarchy hypothesis, so
that Hypothesis 4 cannot be applied to sales.
The results for regression (2) partially support Hypothesis 4. We do observe large
and negative coefficients for Officer and Director, showing that this group trades faster
than the CEO, in line with Hypothesis 4. The coefficient on Chairman is positive and
significant, although economically small. This result is difficult to explain as it would
suggest that the chairman typically expects less competition than the CEO. Contrary
to the predictions of Hypothesis 4, the largest and positive coefficient obtains for Other,
which suggests that other insiders mostly trade for reasons not related to the exploitation
of information.
In Table 5, we control for actual competition because we includeMultipleInsiders in the
regressions. In unreported robustness checks we interact each of the insider-role dummies
with MultipleInsiders to account for differences in the degree to which they are subject to
competition from others. We find qualitatively similar but statistically and economically
weaker results. Overall, we conclude that there is partial support for Hypothesis 4.
3.2.4 Control Variables
We control for several other factors that may influence trade duration beyond those on
which we form explicit hypotheses. The most obvious source of price impact is the size of
the stake an insider intends to trade. It is not possible to assign trade size unambiguously
to either information-based or to liquidity-based explanations. Insiders may wish to trade
larger stakes because they have stronger informative signals or because of liquidity shocks.
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In both cases, they may want to spread their trades over a longer period. We control for
trade size by including dummy variables for each decile of Stake. Stake is defined as the
number of shares traded scaled by the number of shares outstanding. This non-parametric
approach seems rather general and capable of capturing a range of different relationships
between aggregate trade size and trade duration.17 We do not report the coefficients in
our tables to conserve space. The impact of trade size is positive as expected. Trade
duration increases by about 50% from the first decile to the tenth decile.
We control for firm size using LogMarketCap, the logarithm of the market capitaliza-
tion of the company and observe that trade duration increases significantly with firm size.
We include Purchase, a dummy variable that equals one for purchases and zero for sales
in all regressions where we do not split the sample into purchases and sales. Completing
purchase transactions takes about 4% longer compared to sales in the pre-SOX period.
We control for the impact of earnings announcements because we expect that insiders
will adapt their trading strategies around major corporate news events like earnings an-
nouncements. Most firms have black-out periods before earnings announcements or only
allow insiders to trade in the two-week window after an earnings announcement (Bettis,
Coles, and Lemmon (2000)). We define BeforeEarn to equal one in the 14-day period
before an earnings announcement and AfterEarn to equal one in the 14-day period after
an earnings announcement. Table 2 shows that insiders avoid trading before earnings
announcements: Whereas 3.8% of insiders’ transactions occur in the two-week period
before earnings announcements, 21% of transactions occur in the two-week period after
earnings announcements. If trades would be distributed evenly throughout the year then
we would expect that the means of both variables are 8/52=15.4% with quarterly an-
nouncements. Regression (7) in Table 5 shows that insiders avoid informed selling before
17We obtain very similar results if we use StakeDecile or the continuous variables Stake and Stake².
We opt to use stake decile dummies because some regressions do not converge if we use Stake and Stake².
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earnings announcements, probably to avoid violating insider-trading laws: trading profits
as measured by disclosure day returns are lower by 0.19% and the profit from selling is
only 0.14% from the event study results in Table 4. There is no corresponding result for
purchases though. Trade duration is longer by 2.62% before earnings announcements and
this effect is driven entirely by sales and by transactions in the pre-SOX period.
SOX has only a limited impact on the factors that influence trade duration. The
coefficients of Informed, Volatility, and AfterEarn change their signs, but the former
two are insignificant before SOX. For most variables the post-SOX coefficient is smaller in
absolute value by a factor of two to three compared to the pre-SOX period; the exceptions
are EffectiveSpread and Officer.
3.3 Robustness Checks
We perform a number of robustness checks to see if our results are sensitive to (1) the
listing exchange (NYSE/AMEX vs. NASDAQ), (2) the level of market liquidity (low vs.
high effective spread), (3) whether more than one insider trades at the same time in the
same direction, and (4) different measures of liquidity. In Panel A of Table 6 we therefore
run regression (1) from Table 5 separately for the three pairs of subsamples. In Panel B
of Table 6 we rerun the same regression for different liquidity measures and alternative
definitions for trading sequences and Informed.
The most notable differences obtain for the effect of Volatility. The coefficient for
NYSE-firms supports the prediction of Hypothesis 2 that more risk reduces trade dura-
tion, whereas the same coefficient for NASDAQ firms implies the opposite. The effect of
liquidity (EffectiveSpread) on trade duration is about three times larger for NASDAQ-
than for NYSE-firms.
Many effects are much stronger in the sample with competition between insiders than
in the sample without competition. Hence, insiders react much more sensitively to a
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range of factors in their trading environment whenever there is competition from other
insiders. If the information content of trades is high and there is competition, trade
duration shortens by 2.18%, about four times more than if there is no competition. We
do not observe major differences between low and high spread firms.
Panel B of Table 6 presents results on robustness tests using different liquidity mea-
sures. The results are very similar independently of the liquidity measure used. All
liquidity measures, except PriceImpact, yield the same result: Higher stock illiquidity
leads to longer trading sequences, as predicted by Hypothesis 3. Economic and statistical
significance vary greatly and we find the strongest effects for the Amihud liquidity mea-
sure. The other coefficients are almost unaffected, only for Volatility we observe different
results depending on the liquidity measure used.
Secondly, we use an alternative definition of trading sequences. Our baseline definition
requires that all transactions of the sequence be executed before the disclosure of the
first trade. This definition is natural with respect to information-based explanations of
trading, but not with respect to liquidity-based explanations. Accordingly, we change
the definition of trading sequences by omitting the disclosure requirement. At the same
time, we set the maximum length of a sequence to 7 days instead of 40 days as in our
baseline definition. Table 6 Panel B shows that most coefficients are not affected. We
observe noticeable differences only for Volatility and EffectiveSpread. Volatility has now
the predicted negative sign and becomes significant, whereas EffectiveSpread becomes
insignificant. Finally, we use an alternative definition for Informed. Instead of our baseline
definition using CAR(0,1) we define Informed based on CAR(0,5), which classifies 15.1%
of all trades as informed (see Table 2). None of our results is materially affected by this
change.
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4 Do Insiders Time the Liquidity of the Market?
The previous section shows that liquidity concerns are of primary importance for
the decision of corporate insiders to split their trades and to spread their transactions
over time. In this section we analyze if and to what extent insiders adapt their trading
strategies to fluctuations in market liquidity.
Illiquidity is expensive for insiders, so they should avoid trading on days when the
stock is less liquid and trade more if the stock is more liquid. Furthermore, if they trade,
they should trade larger quantities on days on which liquidity is higher. This argument
assumes that insiders can observe liquidity measures and time their trades accordingly.
In Appendix B we formally derive this argument in the context of a highly stylized model
and derive the liquidity-timing hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 (Liquidity timing): Insiders trade more on days with higher stock
liquidity and less on days with lower liquidity.
We first perform univariate tests and then conduct multivariate regressions to test
Hypothesis 5. For the univariate tests we compare the equally-weighted and the trade-
size-weighted means of four liquidity measures over all days on which an insider actually
trades during a transaction sequence. Trade-size-weighting gives more weight to those
days of the trading sequence on which the insider trades more. Hence, if insiders optimize
their trades with respect to the liquidity of the market, then we should observe that the
trade-size-weighted average for each liquidity measure implies a higher liquidity than the
equally-weighted average.
The results in Panel A of Table 7 show that trade-size-weighted averages of Effec-
tiveSpread and Amihud (Turnover) are significantly lower (higher) than equally weighted
averages, which indicates that insiders trade larger quantities on days where liquidity is
higher. For PriceImpact we observe the opposite, but this result is statistically insignifi-
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cant. In Panel B of Table 7 we compare insider-trading days with all days during a trading
sequence on which insiders do not trade. We include up to 20 non-trading-days before and
after the transaction sequence in this analysis. We observe for all four liquidity measures
the predicted signs and that the differences between trading and non-trading days are
economically large and statistically highly significant. The EffectiveSpread, PriceImpact,
and Amihud are two times larger, and Turnover is about 22% less on non-trading days
compared to trading days. The univariate tests are in line with the predictions of Hypoth-
esis 5 and support the notion that insiders optimize their trades with respect to market
liquidity.
In Table 8 we perform multivariate OLS regressions to test the liquidity-timing hy-
pothesis. Again, we include all insider-trading days and all days during a sequence on
which insiders do not trade plus up to 20 non-trading days before and after the trading
sequence.18 The dependent variable is the percentage of shares outstanding the insider
trades on the respective day, which is zero for all non-trading days.19 The independent
variable of interest is the liquidity measure and we use four different liquidity measures,
one in each regression. We expect more insider trading on days with high stock liquidity;
hence, we expect this coefficient to be negative for all measures but Turnover.
We control for a number of effects: The Stake traded on the day before the day in
question, the absolute return of the stock on the same day, which is a day-to-day proxy
for market volatility, the abnormal market volume proxied by the percentage deviation
in U.S. market equity trading volume on that day from the average daily equity trading
volume in that month, BeforeEarn, and AfterEarn. We do not include the absolute stock
18In a not tabulated robustness check, we rerun all regressions from Tables 8 and 9 without the non-
trading days before the first and the last day of a trading sequence and find qualitatively very similar
results.
19Researchers sometimes run Tobit regressions in similar contexts where the dependent variable has
many observations at zero and no non-negative observations. We follow the advice of Angrist and Pischke
(2009) and use OLS regressions, because the dependent variable is not censored or truncated.
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return in regression (2), which uses Amihud as a liquidity measure, because Amihud is
mechanically related to the absolute stock return. Additionally, we control for calendar
months, day-of-the-week and firm fixed effects. The results in Panel A of Table 8 support
the liquidity-timing hypothesis: The coefficients have the predicted signs for all four
liquidity measures, although the coefficient on Amihud is insignificant and the coefficient
on Turnover is only marginally significant at the 10%-level.
In a second step we repeat the same analysis in first differences. The dependent
variable in Panel B of Table 8 is the change in Stake between two consecutive days.
The control variables are the same as in Panel A, we only omit the lag of Stake and
firm fixed effects. All continuous independent variables also enter in first differences.
Again, the coefficients on all four liquidity variables have the predicted signs and are
significant, although the coefficient on Amihud is significant only at the 10%-level. Hence,
if liquidity improves (deteriorates) insiders trade more (less), in line with the liquidity
timing hypothesis.
There is a potential endogeneity concern here, because informed trading may demand
liquidity and increase spreads, whereas insider trading that provides liquidity would reduce
spreads. Informed insider trades would then imply a positive correlation between insider
trading and spreads, which is the opposite of Hypothesis 5. However, insider trades that
provide liquidity would imply the same correlation as Hypothesis 5. We reason that if
reverse causality drives our results, then the results should be stronger on days on which
insiders account for a larger proportion of the daily trading volume, but become weaker or
vanish on days on which they account only for a small proportion of daily trading volume.
Hence, we split the sample at the median ratio of Stake over Turnover and present the
results for days with a below median ratio of Stake to Turnover in Panel C. Here we
only use those days on which insiders actually trade because otherwise our sample split
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would only measure the difference between days with and without insider trading. The
results contradict the notion that our results are driven by reverse causality. If we restrict
the sample to days on which insiders account for a smaller part of trading volume and
our results become economically and statistically stronger. Hence, if anything, reverse
causality works in the opposite direction and without reverse causality our results would
be even stronger: Insiders may consume liquidity and the results in Panel B show only the
net impact of their liquidity-induced trading according to Hypothesis 5 after subtracting
the opposite effect from insiders’ liquidity demand.
Finally, in Table 9 we perform probit regressions in which the dependent variable equals
one if an insider trades on a certain day and zero otherwise. The sample and the control
variables are identical to those in Table 8. We find strong support for the liquidity-timing
hypothesis. The coefficients on all four liquidity measures have the predicted signs and are
highly significant, at least at the 0.01%-level. Hence, insiders trade on days with higher
stock market liquidity and avoid trading on days with low liquidity. We also confirm
earlier findings that insiders trade less before and more after earnings announcements.
Additionally, we observe that insiders trade more on days on which the volatility of the
stock as measured by absolute stock returns is high as well as on days on which the
market volume is high. Insiders also prefer to trade at the beginning of the week. Taking
the evidence of Tables 7 and 9 together, we find strong support for the liquidity-timing
hypothesis. Insiders seem to adapt their trading strategies to changes in market liquidity
on a day-to-day basis, as predicted by our model.
156
5 Conclusions
We analyze the trading strategies of corporate insiders on two dimensions: the duration
of their trades and if and how they adapt their trading strategies to the liquidity of the
market. We compare information-based theories with liquidity-based theories and focus
on situations where several insiders compete, i.e., insiders trade in the same direction
at the same time. Information-based theories predict that insiders trade faster if they
compete with other insiders, whereas liquidity-based theories predict the opposite.
We find strong evidence for both theories. Insiders trade more slowly if they compete
with other insiders. They do the same if they sell shares in falling markets and if the
market is less liquid. We interpret all these findings as evidence supporting liquidity-
based explanations.
We identify trades that are based on more private information as the more profitable
trades. These trades are completed significantly faster if multiple insiders compete for ex-
ploiting the same long-lived information, which provides strong support for the predictions
of information-based models with competition between insiders.
Further theoretical work is needed to address the issues of competition among traders
in a more elaborate framework compared to extant theories and compared to the simple
model we develop in the appendix. In particular, liquidity-based models should allow for
multiple traders with correlated liquidity shocks who simultaneously demand liquidity in
the same market. It would be desirable to have models that endogenously derive how
informed as well as uninformed traders choose trade duration optimally.
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Appendix A
Variable definitions
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Appendix B
A Model of Simultaneous Trading by Multiple Insiders
Consider a highly simplified model of a market with I insiders indexed i = 1, ..., I and
two periods t=1,2. Each insider wishes to sell a block of Q shares over the two periods
and we denote by qit the quantity sold by insider i in period t. The number of shares
each insider intends to trade is identical so that the game is entirely symmetric. The
fundamental value of the shares is p0 in both periods, but market makers respond to
increased sales by insiders by temporarily reducing the price. The price of the shares in
period t is established as a function of the quantity traded by all insiders at that point:
pt = p0 − λt
i=I∑
i=1
qit, t = 1, 2. (1)
Hence, we focus on temporary price changes and abstract from changes in the funda-
mental value.20 The pricing rule resembles that of a call auction more than of a continuous
market. This assumption rules out the possibility that an insider gains an advantage by
trading slightly ahead of other insiders and thereby avoids the price impact induced by
other traders. The fundamental value p0 and the slope parameters are known to all
insiders at the beginning. Each insider maximizes the following objective:
p1q
i
1 + p2q
i
2 + p0 (Q− qi1 − qi2)− ρ2 (Q− qi1 − qi2)
2
. (2)
The first part of the objective consists of the trading revenues across the two periods,
p1q
i
1 + p2q
i
2. After the two trading rounds insider i has Q − qi1 − qi2 shares left, which
have a fundamental value p0, so the second term represents the fundamental value of her
20Models that analyze optimal strategies to trade large blocks usually employ price impact func-
tions that feature temporary price changes attributable to microstructure reasons with permanent prices
changes, which are due to changes in the fundamental value of the stock. See Almgren and Chriss (2001),
Huberman and Stanzl (2005) and Schied and Schöneborn (2009). Bertsimas and Lo (1998) assume a
pricing rule for which the price impact of trades is permanent.
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remaining shares after the two periods. Finally, we add a penalty term, which introduces
the notion that insiders have some urgency to trade, which may be motivated by risk
considerations. In a richer model with uncertainty about the fundamental value, such a
risk-premium would result if insiders are risk averse and exposed to the uncertainty about
the long-term fundamental value of the shares after the two trading periods.21 In such
a context, the parameter ρ would reflect the product of the variance of the long-term
fundamental value and insiders’ risk aversion. We therefore assume that insiders bear a
cost proportional to the square of the number of shares they still own after the two trading
periods. We do not introduce a penalty for the stock insiders hold after the first period,
but sell in the second period. This simplification has the additional advantage that the
optimal trading strategies chosen at time 0 are time-consistent.22
Define by Q−it ≡
j=I∑
j=1, j 6=i
qjt the quantity traded by traders other than trader i in period
t and inserting the definition for pt from (1) into (2):
t=2∑
t=1
(
p0 − λt
(
qit +Q
−i
t
))
qit + p0 (Q− qi1 − qi2)− ρ2 (Q− qi1 − qi2)
2. (3)
The first order conditions for maximizing this objective with respect to the quantity
qit traded by insider i at time t become:
p0 − λtQ−it − 2λtqit − p0 + ρ (Q− qi1 − qi2) = 0, t = 1, 2. (4)
From symmetry we have that the quantities traded by all insiders are the same. We
can therefore drop the superscript i and use qit = qt for all i and t. We can therefore
simplify the first order conditions as:
21Almgren and Chriss (2001) and Huberman and Stanzl (2005) use a mean-variance framework, whereas
Schied and Schöneborn (2009) analyze an expected-utility model. Some authors employ a mean-standard
deviation framework in order to embed the question in a value-at-risk framework, see e.g., Hisata and
Yamai (2000) and Dubil (2002).
22We considered an alternative specification with a penalty for shares held after the first period and
an additional penalty for shares held after the second period. Our conclusions are unchanged but the
mathematical derivations become more complex.
161
− (I + 1)λtqt + ρ (Q− qi1 − qi2) = 0, t = 1, 2. (5)
Upon solving we obtain:
q1 =
λ2ρQ
λ1λ2(I+1)+ρ(λ1+λ2)
, q2 =
λ1ρQ
λ1λ2(I+1)+ρ(λ1+λ2)
. (6)
Observe that the quantities traded in both periods increase in ρ, which is consistent
with our interpretation of ρ as a parameter that measures insiders’ urgency to trade.
Liquidity timing. The number of shares traded in period t decreases in λt, i.e., it
decreases if the market at time t becomes less liquid. This is intuitive because illiquidity
is expensive for insiders, so they will either trade in the more liquid period or not trade at
all if trading becomes more costly. Also, the number of shares traded in period t increases
in the slope of the pricing function in the other period, i.e., insiders trade more in period
1 if the market at t=2 becomes less liquid. Hence, insiders trade more in the period in
which the market is more liquid. This is the liquidity timing effect to which we refer in
the text.
Competition for liquidity. If the number of insiders I increases and more insiders
wish to trade at the same time, then each insider trades less. The reason is that each
insider perceives that for her, the market has become less liquid and trading more costly
if many other insiders trade at the same time.
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Figures
Figure IV.1: Development of Trade Sequences over Time. Panel A of this figure displays the
development of the proportion of trading sequences of all insider transactions, Panel B the average number
of transactions in a trading sequence, and Panel C the average trade duration of trading sequences over
the sample period. Single trades are excluded from Panel C. The dashed vertical line marks the month
when the Sarbanes-Oxley act came into force (August 2002).
A. Proportion of Trade Sequences Relative to All Trades
B. Number of Transactions in a Trading Sequence
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C. Average Trade Duration of Trading Sequences
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Tables
Table IV.1: Sample Design. This table displays how our sample is constructed from raw Thomson
Reuters Insider Filing database (IFDF) data to our final sample. We include all open market and private
transactions in the IFDF database (Table One) between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2008 in our
initial data set. We report the losses of observations after matching the IFDF data with CRSP, because
of missing information, and consistency checks.
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Table IV.2: Summary Statistics. This table displays descriptive statistics for all variables used in
our analysis. Insider trading data are taken from IFDF, accounting data from Compustat, market data
from CRSP, and intraday data from TAQ.
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Table IV.3: Existence of Trade Sequences. Panel A of this table displays the percentage of
transactions that are followed by a transaction in the same direction (separated for purchases and sales).
Please note that the total number of transactions is reduced and the percentage of sales is different
compared to the original sample because the first transaction of each individual insider in each firm can
only be used as benchmark for the next transaction by the insider in the respective firm. The Chi²-test
on independence and the Fisher exact test are based on the contingency table expressing the relationship
between sales and purchases conditional on the prior direction of trade. Panel B of this table presents
results for Probit regressions with Purchase as dependent variable. See Appendix A for a definition
of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the marginal effects (evaluated at
the mean of the independent variables) and in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for a
coefficient equal to zero. In all regressions, t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors. Additionally, we report McFadden’s R² and the p-values of the F-test with the null-hypothesis of
the coefficient of LagPurchase being equal to its unconditional mean.
A. Univariate Analysis
B. Probit Regressions
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Table IV.4: Event Study Analysis of Disclosure Day Returns. This table reports the cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) of insider purchases and sales for four different intervals after the disclosure date.
The CARs are estimated using the market model, the estimation period for the parameters is (-220, -21).
The sample is split into the pre- and post-SOX (after August 28, 2002) period. In the lower panel, the
table reports the CARs for five different insider groups. The table displays the CAR and, in parentheses,
the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for the null-hypothesis that the respective CAR equals zero.
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Table IV.5: Determinants of Trade Duration. Models (1) and (2) of the table present results
for OLS regressions with cumulative abnormal returns of the disclosure day and the next trading day
CAR(0;1) as the dependent variable. The event window starts on the disclosure date of the first trans-
action of a series of split trades or the disclosure date of a non-split trade. Models (3) to (7) of the table
present results for OLS regressions with LogTradeDuration as the dependent variable. See Appendix A
for a definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and,
in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for the null-hypothesis that the respective coefficient
equals zero. In all regressions, t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All
regressions include calendar year dummies, industry dummies, and dummies for each stake decile.
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Table IV.6: Trade Duration: Robustness Checks. The table presents results for OLS regressions
with LogTradeDuration as the dependent variable. Panel A: Models (1) and (2) show results for sample
splits with respect to listings on different exchanges. Models (3) and (4) display results for stocks with
different liquidity levels. The High Spread group includes illiquid stocks with the effective spread above
its median level across all stocks. Remaining (more liquid) stocks belong to the Low Spread group. Model
(5) reports results for all trading series when multiple insiders are trading the same stock and Model (6)
includes all remaining observations. Panel B: Models (1) to (3) control for different liquidity measures.
The header of the table reports the measure used for each column. Coefficients for each of the liquidity
measures are reported in the line LiquidityMeasure. Model (4) uses an alternative definition of a trading
sequence: the maximum length of a trading sequence is limited to 7 days. Model (5) uses an alternative
definition of Informed , based on CAR[0;5] instead of CAR[0;1]. Liquidity measure used in Models (4)
and (5) is the effective spread. See Appendix A for a definition of all variables. For each independent
variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test
for the null-hypothesis that the respective coefficient equals zero. In all regressions, t-statistics are based
on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All regressions include calendar year dummies, industry
dummies, and dummies for each stake decile.
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A. Sample Splits
172
B. Different Liquidity Measures and Alternative Definition of
Trade Sequences
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Table IV.7: Liquidity Timing: Univariate Analysis. Panel A of this table presents results of
the univariate test on liquidity timing, based on differences in liquidity on the days when insiders trade.
Column 1 reports the trade-size-weighted mean of the liquidity measure, where the weight of each day
in the trading sequence is the proportion of trade, executed on this day. Column 2 reports the equally-
weighted mean of the liquidity measure over all days in the trading sequence, on which insiders actually
trade. Column 3 reports the ratio of (2) to (1) in percent. Column 4 displays the t-statistic of the
two-sided t-test on the equality of two means. Column 5 shows the number of trading sequences for each
liquidity measure. Panel B presents results of the univariate test on liquidity timing, based on differences
in liquidity between trading and non-trading days within a sequence. Trading days include days within
a trading sequence when an insider actually trades, whereas non-trading days include remaining days in
between, up to 20 non-trading days before the start of a trading sequence and up to 20 non-trading days
after the end of a trading sequence. Column 1 reports the equally-weighted mean of the liquidity measure
on trading days and Column 2 on non-trading days. Column 3 reports the ratio of (2) to (1) in percent.
Column 4 displays the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test on the equality of two means. Column 5 shows
the number of trading sequences for each liquidity measure.
A. Trading Days Only
B. Trading Days vs Non-Trading Days
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Table IV.8: Liquidity Timing: Determinants of Stake Traded. Panel A of this table presents
results for OLS regressions with the number of shares traded by an insider on a particular day divided by
the total number of shares outstanding (Stake) in percent as the dependent variable. Regressions include
all non-trading days within a trading sequence as well as up to 20 non-trading days before the first trading
day in a sequence and up to 20 non-trading days after the last trading day in a sequence. The dependent
variable (Stake) equals 0 for non-trading days. The header of the table reports the liquidity measure used
for each column. Coefficients for each of the liquidity measures are reported in the line LiquidityMeasure.
Panel B presents results for OLS regressions with the difference in the number of shares traded by an
insider on a particular day from the number of shares traded on the previous day, divided by the total
number of shares outstanding, D.Stake (in percent), as the dependent variable. Coefficients for the first
differences of each of the liquidity measures are reported in the line D.LiquidityMeasure. Panel C of this
table presents results for OLS regressions with Stake as the dependent variable. The sample includes
only days, on which insiders actually trade. The table displays results for insider trades, for which
stake traded, scaled by the daily turnover of the stock, (Stake/Turnover) is below the median of the
whole sample. Coefficients for each of the liquidity measures are reported in the line LiquidityMeasure.
See Appendix A for a definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the
slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for the null-hypothesis that the
respective coefficient equals zero. In all regressions, t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors. All regressions include calendar month dummies and weekday dummies. Regressions in
Panels A and C additionally include firm-fixed effects.
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A. Levels
176
B. Differences
177
C. Stake/Turnover Below Median
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Table IV.9: Liquidity Timing: Determinants of Insider Trading Days. The table presents
results for Probit regressions with Trading as the dependent variable. Trading is equal to 1 for days on
which insider trade, and 0 otherwise. Regressions include all non-trading days within a trading sequence
as well as up to 20 non-trading days before the first trading day in a sequence and up to 20 non-trading
days after the last trading day in a sequence. The header of the table reports the liquidity measure used
for each column. Coefficients for each of the liquidity measures are reported in the line Liquidity measure.
See Appendix A for a definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the
marginal effects (evaluated at the mean of the independent variables) and, in parentheses, the t-statistic
of the two-sided t-test for the null-hypothesis that the respective coefficient equals zero. In all regressions,
t-values are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All regressions include calendar month
dummies.
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